2: Rosu and Vasilin S-4 (no date) ca. 1951 EDl Rumania EDl

Churches and Religion Romania

Digest

I. Prior to 1919

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The available evidence indicate that Christianity had been well established on the territory of the present day Romania in the second century. The region designated as Dacia, a province of the Roman Empire, had, between 106 and the end of the third century, an organized church with an established hierarchy. A bishop of "Gothic Dacia", (the name of this region after the withdrawal of the Roman legions) took part at the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea 325 A.D. Also, a Gothic Dacian bishop is mentioned among those present at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, 381 A. D. We do not possess any particular information concerning the Christianity in this region from the 5th until the 13th century. This was the period of barbarian invasion which destroyed organized social life and forced the great majority of the population to seek refuge in the mountains.

The available informations for the beginning of the 13th century show the church of that region as being a part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. From that time on and until the second half of the 19th century the Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church was under the ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople. This applies not only to the canonical and dogmatic matters but also to the investiture (appointment of high dignitaries of the

● 175 195 [642] church). The Romanian church has become independendent from this Patriarchy only as a result of a long and complex process which began when the independent Romanian State came into being in 1859 as "the United Romanian Principalities." The first constitution of the kingdom of Romania of 1866 stated (Article 21) that "the Romanian Orthodox Church is independent." But the recognition of its autocephaly by the Patriarchy of Constantinople was declared only in 1885. Nevertheless, the Romanian Church has continued to maintain its unity with the ecumenical church of the East. This relation was, however, confined to the purely religious aspect. The Romanian church considered to be its duty to consult Constantinople Patriarchy on difficult questions of dogmas, cannns, and cults whenever it was necessary.

Thus, it may be observed that the independence of the Romanian church was a consequence of the political independence of the Romanian state. The independence of the church signified the achievements of the sovereignty of the Romanian people and the church organization rendered important help and support to the incipient state.

[793] The Romanian clergy took part in the government administration and in political life. The clergymen could be elected to the parliaments and seats in some important governmental bodies were reserved to it. This was rather a consituation of the established tradition because in the past the representatives of the clergy had always been counsellors of the "domnitor" (the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly).

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(the ruler) and members of the "Sfatul Tarii" (country's Assembly). In general, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been since the foundation of the "United Principalities" in 1859 considered the predominant church and had a prioity over other churches. This situation continued when the Kingdom of Romania was formed after 1866 (hereafter called Old Kingdom in contrast to Romania after 1919). Nevertheless, the religious practices of other churches were tolerated and undistrubed. [798] The Romanian Orthodox Church did not consider itself universal, was not animated by any spirit of proselytism and was rather passive and tolerant towards other creeds and rites. For this reason and because of the small number of persons professing other religions in the Kingdom of Romania, the situation did not call for any special legislation on freedom of religion prior to World War I.

II. From World War I to the End of World War II

1. General Regime of Churches

657 The necessity for special legislation regulating the status of churches other than the Romanian Orthodox has arisen after World War I.

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The Romanian Kingdom emerged after World War I with an enlarged territory. The newly incorporated provinces were hitherto governed by different laws. Bulgarian law prevailed in Banat and Maramuresh, the same law with some specific provisions was also in force on Transylvania; Austrian law was

175 in force in Bukovina and the Russian law, with some specific
671 local rules, was in force in Bessarabia.

175 The population of the newly incorporated provinces was
162 predominantly Romanian but, in view of the long separation from the Old Kingdom, was somewhat different. Moreover, there were also other ethnological groups and a variety of churches and even sects.

The population of Transylvania and Banat, for instance, was divided mainly among the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. The population of Bukovina and Maramuresh was either of Catholic (Uniates) or Orthodox religion and had an important Jewish minority. In Bessarabia, in addition to the Eastern Orthodox Church, there was a real conglomerate of creeds and and rites, many of them originating back in the 17th century and subsequent reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church.

659 A new Constitution was adopted in 1923. It declared
[642] the principle of freedom of religion which needed to be developed in details and put into effect by special laws. This did not follow immediately but, instead, the Romanian Government carried out, in 1925, the unification and hierarchical reorganization of the Romanian Orthodox Church (see infra).

This step increased the pressure of the numerous other churches and rites practiced within the new frontiers. They intervened seeing that their status be defined and that their relations with the higher church authorities abroad, as well as with the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church, be settled by

795 part of Northern Bessarabia.

c) Armenian Uniates called also Roman Catholic of Armenian rite.

Each of these churches came under the supremacy of the Pope at a different time and under slightly different conditions. Only the Romanian Greek Catholics are dealt with in the present chapter (for others see infra III, 5).

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The union of the Greek Orthodox Romanians by nationality with the Roman Catholic Church was accomplished by an agreement in 1698 between the Vatican and the Orthodox Bishopric of Alba-Julia, ratified later, by the Pope. In joining the Catholic Church, this fraction of the Greek Orthodox Church, however, reserved, among other things, the right to officiate at the services in the Romanian language, and the right of the clergymen to marry. In exchange, the Uniates admitted four dogmatic points of the Catholics, among which the more important were the acceptance of the Pope's supremacy and the Filioque. This union was a result of a compromise accepted by the Holy See in view of circumstances which prevailed in Hungary in particular in Transylvania and Banat in the 17th century. Several political causes contributed to this union. To mention the principal ones, the Hungarian kings endeavored to convert the Romanian minority to Catholicism and thus to detach it from the influence of Romanian Principalities. The spreading of protestantism among the German minority in Transylvania presented a possibility of swaying the Romanians to the same religion.

● 175 795 The Greek Catholic fraction was amalgamated into the hierarchy of the Roman Church and became simply a rite within that church. At the very beginning, this church was organized as a single diocese with the rank of a Bishopric but, later on, the number of dioceses was raised to three. Nevertheless, during a period of approximately 90 years from the time of the union, the Uniate bishops were supervised and controlled by Jesuit monks sent from Rome. In 1855, the Greek Catholic Church was raised to the rank of a Mitropoly and the Jesuitic control was withdrawn.

115 659 Until the Concordat of 1929, the status of this church was based mainly on the provisions of the Act of Union of 1698. Both the Constitution of 1923 and the Law No. 54 of 1928 granted it priority above all the other religious minorities. It has been reorganized since the conclusion of the Concordat and was given all rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. [713] The highest dignitaries of the Greek Catholic Church were equally senators ex officio of the Romanian Parliament as were those of the Roman Catholic Church. The clergy has been paid by the State. For preparing its clergy the church was maintained three theological academies. [162] The returns of the census of 1930 showed that 7.9 percent of the population of Romania belonged to the Greek Catholic faith.

III. Churches under the Communist Regime

1. Basic Provisions

●175 642 Although Romania has been ruled by Soviet Russia since its surrender in August 1944 and is actually governed by a Communist Cabinet appointed by Moscow in March 1945, the beginning of the Communist regime is set as of January 1, 1948, e. g., after the King's abdication and the creation of a People's Republic, since the main revolutionary social reforms have been enacted after that date.

648 798 Romania signed and ratified the Peace Treaty with the Allied Nations (Official Gazette No. 199 of August 30, 1947). According to clear stipulations of the treaty Romania is bound to translate into national legislation its main provisions and apply them strictly. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty reads:

> "Romania shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, language or *religion*, the enjoyment of human rights and *fundamental freedoms*, including freedom of expression, of *press and publication*, of *religious worship*..." (Italics supplied.)

The freedom of religious worship was, therefore, considered as a fundamental one and the Romanian Government was supposed to make no discrimination between the different churches of rites of various denominations existent and practiced within its boundaries.

642 798 The first attempt to comply with these provisions was made through the new Romanian Constitution enacted on April 11, 1948.

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refused to join the monasteries and convents, were given the choice either to request internment in public poor houses (that is, the old people) or to be trained for a handicraft and afterwards assigned to work by the Office for Distribution of Labor Forces. Each member was obliged to communicate in writing his decision to the Ministry for Religious Affairs within 20 days.

It should be also mentioned that under the Law of November 3, 1948, providing for the nationalization of private hospitals, sanatoria and similar health institutions, a number of important Catholic hospitals were taken over by the government from the Church.

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5. Greek Catholic (Uniate) Churches (Romanian, Ruthenian, Armenian)

As it was mentioned *supra* II, 4., there were three Uniate churches in Romania. The origin and status of the so-called Greek Catholics, i.e., Romanian Uniates, was described there. The adherents of this church inhabit Transylvania. The members of Armenian Uniate Church (Roman Catholics of Armenian rite) inhabit also in Transylvania (bishopric in Gherla). The third Uniate church, so-called Greek Ruthenian, embraces only Ukrainian (i.e., Russian) population in Bukovina and Maramuresh. Its origin is dated from the Brest Church Council of 1596 when the prelates of the Orthodox Church then within the confines of Poland accepted the union with the Holy See on conditions similar to those accepted subsequently by the Romanian Church in 1698 (see *supra* II, 4).

To this Church belonged the Ukrainian population of the northern part of Bukovina and of Galicia--which incorporated in the Soviet Union after World War II--and also the Ukrainian and Belorussian population of these provinces. However, the latter population was officially incorporated into the Russian Church by the decree of Emperor Nicholas I in 1839. 175 795

All three Uniate churches in Romania were until now branches of the Roman Catholic Church and after the Concordat was denounced found themselves in a similar position, i.e., without a regulation by law. The members of all three churches experienced a pressure on the part of the government to induce them to "return", so to speak, to the Orthodox Church and to break with the Holy See. The disbandment of the Uniate parishes or rather their transformation into Orthodox parishes was indirectly stimulated by the Order No. 39,380 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Official Gazette No. 242 of October 18, 1948). Under the previous decree No. 177 of 1948, if members of a parish select another church they carry with them a part of the assets of the parish proportionate to their number. If 75 percent of the parishioners decide to join another church, the church building is transferred to the newly selected one. The Order No. 39,380 provided that, in counting such members, only the heads of each family are taken into account. Thus the counting was greatly facilitated and expedited. 175 795 659 [425]

No decrees were disclosed dealing especially with the Armenian Uniate Church.

I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

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IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

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[1] For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat țăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

[2] C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

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occasion of many of Rumania's woes, nor a national revolt against an alien dominant class, but the unmistakable sign of a deep cleft within Rumanian society. The explosive culmination of a situation which had been building up during the preceding half-century, it rendered explicit and obvious the political dangers of the unresolved agrarian question. The outbreak had been foreshadowed by local uprisings in 1888, 1889, 1894, and 1900, and a few observers had predicted trouble. On the whole, however, an atmosphere of optimism and complacency had prevailed in the years following Rumania's emergence as a united and independent state. In 1906 the Minister of Domains had proudly declared in the Rumanian senate: "Gentlemen, you know that Rumania is one of the countries in Europe in which the small holding is more widespread than elsewhere, where the relation between the large and the small proprietor is more to the advantage of the latter than even in democratic France." [3]

The brief but intense convulsion of 1907, which in the eyes of terrified contemporaries had threatened Rumania's existence as a state and had nearly become a civil war, broke this complacency and gave rise to some soul searching. Politicians and writers ardently debated the causes of the revolt. Indeed, the stimulus of this unsettling event produced some of the most original social writings that have appeared in Rumania. For those who were unwilling or unable to see the full import of the uprising, it was most simply explained as the result either of "instigation" or of "peasant misery." The Conservatives accused the Liberal party of instigating the revolt to overthrow the Cantacuzino government. Despite the vagaries of Rumanian politics, it seems unlikely that the Liberals, many of whom were large landowners themselves, should wittingly have used such a dangerous device, although there is evidence of Liberal agitation directed against the Jewish *fermiers*.

The Liberals in turn charged that the revolt was the work of foreign revolutionaries: "The Rumanian authorities have discovered that the peasant uprisings are the fruits of a secret propaganda carried on among the peasants by a revolutionary group, in which teachers, priests, and Russian seamen of the cruiser "Potemkin" are taking part." [4] They expelled from the country some 880 persons, in-

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[3] Quoted in G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 2 Teile, in *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), I, 25.

[4] Const. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în România* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 198. In 1905 the Russian cruiser "Potemkin," after the mutiny, eventually sailed to Constanța, where the crew debarked as political refugees.

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cluding Christian Rakovsky, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialist movement.

Although signs of revolutionary activity and organization had been observed in certain districts, and some inflammatory pamphlets from Bessarabia had circulated in Rumania, the spontaneous spread of the revolt and the lack of evidence of careful preparation would argue against any important significance of such activity. The Rumanian socialists, who were in an extremely weak position, opposed the uprising. In 1892 the party program had declared that a backward country like Rumania was in no position to initiate a social revolution, and in 1907 the party advised the peasants against revolting: "Uprisings benefit only the boyars. The peasants afterward become even weaker and more depressed. . . . Peasants, you will not be delivered by uprisings, you will achieve profitable and lasting results not through violence and plundering but through seeking to destroy the political power of the boyars, landowners, and tenants."[5] In any event, the charge of instigation is a superficial one which, if sustained, explains the spark, not the conflagration.

Neither is peasant misery, while clearly a necessary ground for the revolt, a sufficient explanation. Extreme misery "dulls the mind, numbs the soul, destroys energy and the spirit of revolt, and leads to resignation and blind submission—a state of mind diametrically opposed to that which leads to revolt."[6] Moreover, the 1906 harvest had been exceptionally good. The important part played by village leaders and wealthy peasants would indicate that the revolt was more than a simple reaction to misery.

Certain contemporaries, notably G. D. Creangă, Radu Rosetti, Constantin Garoflid, and C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, made more penetrating analyses of the problem. Creangă, by his statistical studies of property holdings, provided concrete evidence of the high percentage of land occupied by great estates. Rosetti, after an extensive historical survey of the agrarian question, concluded that "the latifundia is the enemy," that the true instigators of the rising were not Liberals or foreign agents but the "egoism, greediness, lack of scruple and lack of foresight on the part of the ruling classes both old and new."[7] Garoflid, an agrarian expert and himself a landowner, held that the acknowledged maldistribution of land was a consequence of a basic crisis in the system of agricultural production. The socialist

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

[6] Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[7] Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

● 175 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

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Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem [9]

311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

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[8] For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

[9] More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

[10] In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,153,645
10–100	38,723	862,800
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,826,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

423 the majority of the peasants were bound as *rumâni* (the most com-
566 mon term for serfs). In its form as in its relatively late flowering the Rumanian servile system more nearly resembled that of Russia than that of western Europe.

The life of the Rumanian serfs was bitter and squalid, as is illustrated by periodic mass flights across the Danube or into Transylvania. Their burdens resulted from their being on the bottom of the social structure of a state first fighting and then subservient to the Ottoman Empire and from the task of supporting, in a relatively self-sufficient economy, the needs of the boyars and their retainers. Although the growing boyar domination was a gradual process and apparently accompanied an internal breakdown of the village community, the act of binding the peasant to the land, carried out as a general measure by Michael the Brave (*ca.* 1558–1601), had, in large part at least, a military and political purpose: to insure a settled population able to provide military supplies. However, while the tax burden and the tributes owing the Turks were transmitted from prince and boyar to the back of the peasant, servile labor obligations, the *clacă*, were relatively light. The population was sparse, and the boyars were not reluctant to grant the peasants land, of which there was an abundance, provided, of course, they paid their tithes in kind.

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●175 Toward the middle of the eighteenth century two new elements appear: increasing state legislation, superseding or codifying customary practices, and the growth of commercial activity. The twin action of these two factors becomes ever more important right through the nineteenth century, and on their interrelation hangs much of the agrarian problem. Both were destructive of the old closed society of traditional rights and a relatively static economy; both were introduced from without. Sometimes they reinforced one another in promoting change; sometimes one held the other in check.

Around 1750 the Phanariot prince, Constantin Mavrocordat, formally abolished serfdom in an act anticipating and resembling the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II's emancipation of 1781. Although this act, in principle, relieved the peasant of personal bondage and of being tied to the land, it did not rid him of labor obligations or dues to the boyar for the use of the land he cultivated. Indeed, at about the same time the boyars initiated a persistent and successful effort to increase the number of days of the clacă and to define a working day in terms which greatly exceeded what a peasant could actually accomplish in one day. Simultaneously, they began to estab-

lish and extend seigneurial monopolies on such activities as milling 566
and the sale of wine.

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Both actions clearly arose from the growing commercial possibilities of these years. The Turks were increasing their imports of grain from the principalities, and despite Turkish restrictions trade was developed with neighboring states. Hence it was in the interest of the boyars to increase the amount of labor available to them and to monopolize profitable commercial undertakings. One direct consequence of this new commercial pressure on the peasant was the revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 "against the boyars who have devoured our rights."

The next step is signalized by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, which opened Rumanian ports to world commerce, and the Organic Statutes of 1831–32, which gave the principalities their first constitutional documents. The effect of the first was vastly to accelerate the pace of commercial expansion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century raising livestock had been the principal occupation, but it was now replaced by the cultivation of cereals, for which the acreage nearly doubled in the thirty years betwen 1829 and 1859. This expansion of commerce in cereals continued until by the outbreak of the First World War Rumania ranked fourth among the world's cereal exporters and fifth among the wheat exporters. As a result, the relative value of land steadily increased. As early as 1805 the boyars undertook to limit the peasants' right to pasture, and in 1828 Prince Sturdza announced that the peasants had no right to exploit more than two-thirds of the lord's domain.

This trend was reinforced by the Organic Statutes. Introduced 423
during the period of Russian occupation, these acts attempted to codify, in somewhat different terms for the two principalities, the relations between boyar and peasant. In so far as they reduced arbitrary action and made precise and definite the peasant's obligations, they were to his benefit. This gain, however, was largely canceled by the fact that for the first time the lord of the land was defined as a full proprietor of his estate. The traditional concept of "master of the land" was replaced by legal ownership. In return for set labor obligations and tithes, the peasants were granted use of land not in excess of two-thirds of the estate, the remaining third being totally in the lord's hands.[13] Under this system, while the peasants had life use of

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[13] The extent of the lord's demesne land—the land actually cultivated under his direction—before the nineteenth century is not certain. Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 21, points out that early village maps show no separate reserve for the master of the land, but

423 land, it was not passed on from father to son but reverted to the landowner, who was in turn responsible for providing newly married young cultivators with a holding. In fixing the extent of land to be held by each cultivator, these acts, especially the one for Moldavia, reduced the amount customarily enjoyed for pasturage and restricted the peasants' forest rights. Although the peasant was theoretically free to move, he was in fact tied to his community by a net of regulations.

[433] With a few modifications Rumanian agrarian relations were determined by the Organic Statutes for the next third of a century. Under 566 them, as a contemporary observer remarked, "The principalities took ●175 on a new life"; there was a marked increase in economic activity. That 421 the benefits of this activity were not generally shared by the peasants, however, is shown by their continued exodus across neighboring frontiers. They were being forced out of their old semipastoral habits, and the very increase of cereal exports could work to their disadvantage. For example, the entire 1847 wheat crop was sold in advance because of the urgent demands in other European states suffering from food shortages in the late 1840's. As a result of these premature sales, made largely through the boyars, the principalities experienced a food crisis which contributed greatly to the peasant unrest in the turbulent year 1848.

Apart from the abortive attempts at reform during the short-lived Wallachian revolution in 1848 and a moderate revision of the Organic Statutes in 1851, the next major change was the Act of 1864, which paralleled the 1848 emancipation in the Habsburg lands and the Russian emancipation of 1861. This act, promulgated for the united principalities by Prince Cuza, for political and social rather than for economic reasons, abolished the clacă and other servitudes. The peasants obtained full title to the land they had in use, based upon earlier regulations, and the landowners were given a compensation for the loss of their labor. The law followed the now recognized provision that peasant property could not exceed two-thirds of the former lord's estate. The new holdings could not be sold or alienated for a period of thirty years.

By this act, so it seemed, the remnants of the old servile system had been abolished. Possession and use of land were transformed into absolute property rights; the peasant holder was now a free proprietor, owing no servile obligations, and, indeed, the translation of the clacă and other dues into a redemption payment does seem to have dimin-

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Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 45, doubts if there is sufficient evidence to permit a positive declaration that the peasants traditionally had had the use of all the land.

ished his burdens.[14] Yet a quarter of a century after the Act of 1864 566
there began those peasant disturbances which culminated in the 1907 175
uprising. In some way, as Dobrogeanu-Gherea said, "The year 1864 421
carried in its womb the terrible year 1907."

The connection, however, is not a simple one and is paradoxical in several respects. Between 1864 and 1907 Rumania continued its rapid expansion in agriculture and commerce. Exports of grain, for example, increased from about 1,400,000 tons per year in the early 1880's to nearly 2,500,000 tons in 1905. Hence it is necessary to explain how under such circumstances there should have been growing peasant discontent. Was there, to repeat that old and difficult question, increasing poverty in the midst of expanding national wealth?

In the first place, while the Act of 1864 was passed against the 566
wishes of the boyars, by a coup d'état on the part of Prince Cuza, 175
the administration of the country, especially local administration, 423
was still largely under their control, and they had ample opportunity to twist the provisions of the law to their advantage. Undoubtedly many injustices were committed in its application: often the landowner was able to distribute the worst land to the peasants, holding the best in his own estate; in a number of cases false measuring standards were used, an easy trick in a country lacking basic ground surveys; sometimes the landowner so divided the holdings that the peasants were unable to reach their property without paying a toll. As a cumulative result of these malpractices it is possible that although by the law the peasants were to receive the land they had in use before the reform, they actually received less and of lower quality. Local studies of a few districts indicate that such may have been the case, but statistics are lacking to make a general conclusion.

Another criticism of the law has been that while the peasants' claims to land could not exceed two-thirds of the lord's estate, the excess demand being met by grants of state land, in those regions where the peasants' quota was less the lord was able to retain as absolute property, with no future obligation, well over the minimal one-third. Moreover, under the Organic Statutes the lord was responsible for providing newly married peasants with a holding, while the new act made no adequate provision for subsequent generations. Peasant holdings now became inheritable property to be passed on from father to children. Since the new holdings were virtually inalienable and

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[14] This point, as in Russia, has been much disputed, and some authors have maintained that the peasants' burdens actually increased. The comparative figures, however, which are provided by Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 516, if they are accurate and representative, show a considerable falling off of the amount owed by the peasant.

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since the practice was to distribute land equally among heirs, there was an inevitable tendency, on many peasant holdings at least, toward a progressive subdivision of the property. This tendency has been regarded as one of the worst consequences of the reform: "At the end of three generations, the land distributed by Cuza to the rural workers was dispersed into an impalpable dust." [15] Unquestionably the fragmentation of holdings constituted a major obstacle to the introduction of rational agricultural techniques. Further, the reform did not grant land to a number of peasants, those who previously had not performed the clacă or who were listed as free proprietors. Finally, an examination of the size of the lots granted to the peasants reveals that a large number of cultivators did not receive enough land in the first place to enable them to establish a self-supporting holding on the level of cultivation then prevailing.[16]

It is clear, then, that the peasants' gains were limited, that in most cases they were not in a position to set up an independent farm, that the lord was relieved of all future responsibility, and that a number of categories of peasants were not taken care of. Such certainly were the drawbacks. The basis of Rumanian agriculture was not really altered. The reform of 1864 neither set Rumanian agriculture on the path of small peasant farming on the western European model—whether that was even theoretically possible, given the general nature of the Rumanian economy, will be discussed later—nor fostered large-scale farming based upon agricultural wage labor in the English or Prussian pattern.

In addition to the limitations of the 1864 reform, two other factors have been adduced to explain growing peasant dissatisfaction: the laws on agricultural contracts of 1866 and 1872, which are said to have reintroduced serfdom, and the land hunger of an increasing population. The immediate effect of the reform was to create a crisis in production and a great decline in the area sown, largely because the peasants preferred to cultivate their new holdings and refused to work for the landowners, who were faced with a serious labor shortage. The boyars attempted to compensate for this by passing special laws governing agricultural contracts, which unquestionably put the peasant at the landowner's mercy in matters regarding the fulfill-

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[15] Emerit, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

[16] The allotments were based on an earlier threefold division of the peasants, determined by the number of oxen they possessed. Though the figures are only approximate, peasants having four oxen received roughly 6 hectares; those with two oxen 4½ hectares; and the so-called "tail-end" peasants, 2½ hectares. At the prevailing level of cultivation it was estimated that only the first class, a rather small minority of the peasantry, could obtain an assured surplus.

566 ment of labor contracts and even permitted the employment of military force to drive the peasant to work. Although the harsher aspects
●175 of these laws were later abandoned, they permanently affected land-
423 lord-peasant relations and did much to justify the term neoserfdom, "the confirmation of the old servitudes in contractual form."

Yet these laws, while harsh on the peasant once he fell into the power of the landowner, would be significant only on the assumption that the peasants were increasingly obliged to go to the landowner for assistance. That is, the laws of contracts merely accelerated the relapse into a servile system—one lacking the paternalistic protection of the old order—but were not in themselves the cause of a deteriorating situation. Moreover, the peasant uprisings did not occur when the laws were at their harshest but later when some of the worst provisions had been abrogated.

Land hunger, in general, results from an excess of population relative to the amount of land available. As has been noted, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Rumanian principalities were not thickly settled, though even at the time of the Organic Statutes it was not possible to give adequate grants of arable land to the peasants in the old and relatively thickly settled mountainous districts. By the middle of the century the boyars were invoking population pressure to explain the high cost of land. There is no question that in the second half of the nineteenth century Rumania's population expanded at a very rapid rate.

At the same time, however, the expansion of land under cultivation
311 appears to have been increasing even more rapidly, as the plough was put to untilled pastures, waste, and meadow.[17] The extent to which the peasants were able to benefit from this expansion of cultivated area cannot be estimated with any precision. Undoubtedly much of it took place on large estates under the control of the landowners. To some extent, too, it resulted from the peasants converting their pasture land to arable. The act of 1864 had made no provision for communal pasturing; the small peasant holdings were inadequate for both grain and livestock, and from 1864 there is a notable decline in animal husbandry. It is estimated that whereas in 1860 meadows and pasture comprised 33 per cent of the total surface of Rumania, they were reduced to 17 per cent in the years 1901–5, thus offsetting to a considerable degree the gain in land under cultiva-

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[17] According to Constantin Garofild, *Chestia agrară în România* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 128, between 1859 and 1899 the population of Rumania increased by 54 per cent, whereas the area of land under cultivation increased by 85 per cent between 1862 and 1905.

making greater demands upon both the land and the peasant. Since 311
his profits tended to be in direct proportion to the area he was able to lease, there was a marked inclination to build up vast agricultural trusts, some of which covered more than 100,000 hectares. Although ultimately the large tenant was a consequence rather than a cause of the agrarian problem, he was the focus of hatred and abuse: hated by the peasants because he dealt directly with them, verbally abused by the landowner-politicians who made him their scapegoat. Certainly some of the more spectacular injustices and preposterous labor contracts can be found on lands operated by tenants.

This speculative interest on the part of the tenant in acquiring 566
more land contributed to a rapid rise in rents. Between 1870 and 423
1906 rents mounted between 100 and 200 per cent for a third of the 175
properties and over 200 per cent for another third. The peasants 241
consequently were obliged to pay more dearly for the use of land. In 1870 they generally retained from two to four parts of the produce of rented land and delivered one part to the landowner or large tenant; by 1906 in over half the cases studied in an investigation, the ratio was one to one.[21]

The rise in the value of land was not accompanied by an equivalent improvement in agricultural techniques. Most of the peasants were both inexperienced in the careful cultivation of small holdings and financially unable to improve their methods, and the large landowners and tenants had little incentive. By the working of the 1864 reform the peasants remained attached to their strip of land, lacking even the free mobility of the farm laborer. They continued to own most of the means of production: over 90 per cent of the draft animals, ploughs, and harrows in Rumania belonged to the peasants.

Under these conditions the distinction between large-scale and small-scale farming was blurred, and it was characteristic of the latifundiary cultivation prevailing in Rumania that the size of an undertaking was not determined by an organized integration of the productive factors of a given area but was rather the arithmetical sum of a large number of peasant cultivations. The peasant, in return for a piece of land, contracted either to cultivate another piece of land for the proprietor or tenant or to share the produce in a form of metayage. Money payments were uncommon except in Moldavia.[22]

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[21] Creangă, *op. cit.*, II, 18–22.

[22] It must be observed, however, that while the great estates did not, in most cases, utilize progressive farming methods, the output of the large farms was consistently higher than that of the peasant holdings. The reasons for this difference have been the occasion of much dispute. Supporters of large-scale cultivation have held that despite

From a consideration of all these factors the peculiar nature of the
466 Rumanian agrarian crisis emerges. The poorer peasant, who had been
forced to go to the landowner or tenant for additional land, was in
423 an increasingly bad bargaining position. The landowners or tenants,
in responding to commercial incentives, could increase production
● 175 with little cost to themselves merely by demanding more of him, since
he supplied the implements and draft animals as well as the labor.[23] Clinging to his little plot of ground and doggedly refusing to become a migrant wage laborer, the poor peasant could see no possible relief to his situation except to have more land. On the other hand, the richer peasant, whose land was sufficient to produce a surplus, likewise found himself restricted by the relative monopoly in land, the high rents, and the speculation of the large tenants: the system was an obstacle to the further improvement of his position.[24]

In general, then, the economic background of the 1907 revolt lay not in peasant poverty alone but in the protracted dislocating effect of commerce upon a previously "natural economy" and a society involved in the ambiguities of neoserfdom. This dislocation has occurred in many forms throughout the globe where modern industry and commerce have impinged upon traditional social and economic patterns. The particular form it took in Rumania, increasing agrarian tension in the midst of a flourishing foreign commerce in cereals, was a product not only of economic and demographic factors but of Rumania's particular social structure, which was dominated by a boyar oligarchy.

Socially and economically Rumania resembled tsarist Russia in several ways. As Dobrogeanu-Gherea observed: "We are the only country in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which has the sad privilege of peasant revolts—neither the Western countries, superior to us in culture, nor those of the East, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, which are inferior to us, have them." [25] In both countries the history

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the prevalence of unprogressive latifundiary cultivation, large property was making technical advances and was paving the way toward more scientific farming. Advocates of peasant farming have replied that the large owners had kept the best land to themselves and that the peasants were unable to give adequate attention to their own fields. As one peasant is reported to have said: "Do you think this beautiful maize is mine? It belongs to the Jewish tenant. I haven't even hoed my own once yet, his twice. He didn't allot us the land till late." Creangă, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

23. This curious fact, that under the prevailing agrarian relations prosperity seemed to sharpen social tensions, may explain why the 1907 revolt should have followed the excellent 1906 harvest.

24. This grievance of the richer peasants may serve to explain why the minor uprising of 1888 had been most violent in the district of Ialomița, a sparsely populated region having a comparatively prosperous peasantry, but in which an exceptionally high percentage of the land (69 per cent) was in the hands of large proprietors, who leased out more than 70 per cent of their estates.

25. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

of property relations followed a different course from that in the 566
West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily 423
increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century 175
did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as [157]
to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked 668
contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

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[26] The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garoflid.

668 boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

● 175 Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

[566] The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

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partly out of fear of Russian intervention, enjoined the peasants to
•175 shun violence and to continue working for the boyars.

Similarly, critics of conditions provoking the 1907 revolt show concern for Rumania's position as a nation. Radu Rosetti, for example, believed the threat of foreign intervention which such an outbreak might produce to be one of the most dangerous features of the peasant uprising. Despite his sympathy for the peasants and desire for reform, he pressed for a strong army and an increase in the village gendarmerie, to prevent a repetition of the disorders of 1907 and to show the peasants that the law would be enforced.[27] The socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea, approaching the question from a different point of view, was equally anxious to maintain Rumania's independence. Fearing that the many similarities between Rumania and tsarist Russia might lead the latter to "regard the Moldo-Wallachian provinces as an easy prey," [28] he urged that Rumania must be protected from tsarist advances by the introduction and preservation of liberal institutions, completely unlike those of Russia. The populist Constantin Stere flatly stated that Rumania could not afford the "luxury of a revolutionary party," since in Rumania's uncertain position such activity invited foreign intervention.[29]

Consequently, although many economic and social tensions disturbed Rumania, and it was obvious that the boyars would not on their own initiative undertake any reforms likely to change the established order, there was little organized revolutionary activity or even revolutionary thinking. On the other hand, the prevalent sense of national insecurity also made the ruling groups more cautious in the exercise of power. King Carol I, a German prince who had been called to the throne in 1866, could not pretend to be an autocratic tsar. On more than one occasion the king, for reasons of national interest, advocated reform and undertook to soften the obstinacy of the boyars, who were likewise sensitive to real pressure from above or below and frequently showed themselves accommodating and flexible when threatened with serious resistance.

647 Rumania's weak power position led many of its political leaders to seek both political and ideological support from the West. Western political and constitutional forms were adopted wholesale: the Constitution of 1866 was based on Belgium's model, the legal system was taken from the Code Napoléon. Imitation of Western institutions had two different and contrary results. On one level, many

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[27] Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

[28] Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[29] Constantin Stere, "Socialdemocratism sau poporanism," *Viaţa românească* (January, 1908), p. 50.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

pag. 22.

II

WAR AND AGRARIAN REFORM, 1913–21

The Balkan and First World Wars

● 175 THE relative calm and the economic revival which followed the 1907 revolt were interrupted shortly by the outbreak of war. Rumania's part in the Second Balkan War was a brief excursion across the Danube into Bulgaria to obtain Southern Dobrogea, but that campaign had an important effect on the agrarian question. Rumanian troops saw in Bulgaria a land of small holdings, without great landowners or large tenants, where the villages were better built and the fields more successfully tilled than in Rumania. The Liberal leader Ion I. C. Brătianu, returning from Bulgaria, published an article in the party organ *Indépendance Roumaine* in the autumn of 1913, in which he advocated a reform of the franchise and an expropriation of large properties to provide the peasants with land. This statement marked an abrupt shift in Liberal party policy, as in the years immediately after 1907 the Liberal leaders had declared themselves opposed to expropriation. Whether Brătianu was reading the signs of the times or whether he was making a calculated political move to oust the Conservatives, then in power, the question of land reform by expropriation had at last been taken up by one of the major political parties.

The Liberals were called to power in December, 1913. Elections were held in February, 1914, and the new Liberal assembly voted for the principle of revising the articles of the Constitution of 1866 relating to the inviolability of property and to the franchise. A constituent assembly, elected in June, 1914, appointed two commissions to prepare the reforms. At this point the First World War broke out and became the exclusive object of attention. The national interest outweighed the social. The constituent assembly was not reconvened until three years later; the commission for land reform met twice, but according to one of its members, "No work was done at all. In 1914—nothing; in 1915—nothing; that was all its preparatory work." [1]

The history of Rumania in the First World War is an exceedingly complex intermingling of international, national, and social crosscurrents. When war came Rumania remained neutral, although it had been party to the Triple Alliance (by a treaty which had been kept a complete secret from the Rumanian people). For two years it held this position while the Allies and the Central Powers attempted to outbid one another in promises of territory. The Allies, however, were in the better bargaining position: they could offer the Habsburg lands, Transylvania and Bucovina, as against Russian Bessarabia. The entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers and the initial successes of the Russian 1916 offensive tipped the balance in favor of the Allies. On August 27, 1916 the government declared war on Austria-Hungary.

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[1] Quoted in Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, p. 98.

Rumania immediately met military disaster. The Russian offensive came to a halt, and the anticipated Allied offensive in the Balkans, sufficient to occupy the Bulgarians, failed to materialize. The Rumanian assault on Transylvania was repulsed; the German General Mackensen successfully counterattacked from Bulgaria. With the German occupation of Bucarest in December, 1916, the Rumanian government withdrew to Iaşi, the capital of Moldavia. After a brief period of calm, the entire situation on the Eastern Front was altered by the Russian Revolution.

The February Revolution had an immediate effect upon the Rumanian situation. Russian and Rumanian troops were in close contact on the Moldavian front; the revolutionary ferment spreading among the Russian soldiers, the organization of soldiers' councils, and the agitation for taking over the land could easily have been communicated to the Rumanians. This revolutionary atmosphere, combined with military defeat and the occupation of much of the kingdom by the Germans, rendered the Rumanian government's position extremely precarious. At this critical juncture King Ferdinand [2] visited the front in April, 1917, and made the following declaration to the troops: [3]

> Sons of peasants, who, with your own hands, have defended the soil on which you were born, on which your lives have been passed, I, your King, tell you that besides the great recompense of victory which will assure for every one of you the nation's gratitude, you have earned the right of being masters, in a larger measure, of that soil upon which you fought.
>
> Land will be given you. I, your King, am the first to set the example; and you will also take a larger part in public affairs.

That there was need for such a move to bolster the morale of the troops and to ward off imminent danger of revolution is shown in a

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[2] King Carol I died in October, 1914, and was succeeded by his nephew Ferdinand I.

[3] Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

175 speech of May 27, 1917 by Professor N. Basilescu, who had been one of the few to foresee the 1907 uprising: "This is the state of mind in the country: disbelief in the government, disbelief in Parliament, disbelief in the constituted authority. . . . Today as yesterday revolution appears to the Rumanian peasant the only possible means for him to resolve the great case between him and the proprietors of estates."[4] The eleventh-hour move by the king, which was supported by both the parties, seems to have been instrumental in averting trouble and in encouraging the troops. In the final Russian offensive of July, 1917, the Rumanian troops made a brave showing against the Germans and fought valiantly at the battles of Mărăşti (July 28) and Mărăşeşti (August 12–19).

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423 The paternalistic tone of the king's address was also apparent, however, in the steps taken to carry out his proclamation. No peasant delegate participated in the constituent assembly which convened in 1917, and the bill passed by that assembly was simply a compromise worked out by the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Under Article 19 of the 1866 Constitution, property was inviolable; it could be expropriated only for reasons of public utility, narrowly defined as communications, public health, and national defense. Hence, to expropriate land for the purpose of distributing it to the peasants, it was necessary to amend the constitution.

The 1917 amendment extended the definition of public utility to include expropriation for the purpose of increasing peasant holdings. Cultivable land belonging to the crown and to public and private institutions and all rural properties belonging to foreigners and absentee owners were to be expropriated in their entirety. In addition, 2,000,000 hectares of cultivable land were to be expropriated from private properties (including absentee holdings) of over 100 hectares, the expropriation to be based on a progressive scale which was not defined. Thus, no maximum limit was set to properties. The figure of 2,000,000 hectares was not based on any agricultural criteria but represented a compromise between the amounts proposed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. The chief fault of this amendment was that it was not itself a law for expropriation but only set forth the principles of such a law. Section 5 of the amended Article 19 provided for the promulgation of a law to be passed six months after the national liberation by a two-thirds majority, usually required only for constitutional amendments. If this law were not passed, there would be no land reform.

With the October Revolution, Russia's withdrawal from the war,

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[4] Quoted in Diaconescu, *Chestiunea ţărănească în România*, p. 141.

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and the collapse of the Eastern Front, Rumania was in a hopeless 175
military position, and in March, 1918, it sued for peace. The pro- 423
German Alexandru Marghiloman, who had remained behind in Bucarest, was entrusted with a new government. This government dissolved the constituent assembly, and Marghiloman declared that "the whole agrarian problem must be taken up anew from the beginning."

During the brief term of the Marghiloman government, Constantin Garoflid, Minister of Agriculture, introduced a series of agrarian measures: obligatory leases, the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the organization of agricultural workers. Garoflid, though a Conservative and a landowner, had long been opposed to the latifundiary system in Rumania and desired to build up a prosperous medium peasantry. He regarded the 1917 amendment as "not a scientific work but an electoral manifesto." Although previously recognizing the need for expropriation, he considered such an extreme measure unsuited to wartime conditions and advocated forced leases of land to the peasants as a temporary solution. Much in Garoflid's program was conducive to a rational development of Rumanian agriculture. He may even have had in mind a progressive series of reforms, but his proposals were open to the criticism that in Rumania a policy advocating such moderation and gradualness most often meant doing nothing at all. His program, however, was not even to be begun.

The collapse of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918, Ru- [178]
mania's reentry into the war, and the withdrawal of Mackensen's forces again reversed the situation. The Marghiloman government was dismissed and its laws declared null and void. With the breakdown of the Central Powers, chaos spread through eastern Europe. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Rumania a dry year, combined with the dislocations caused by the war and the German occupation, left the peasants hard pressed for food. The action of the Marghiloman government in dissolving the constituent assembly had increased their doubts in the good faith of any government. Tension was heightened by the revolutionary activity among the Rumanians in the neighboring regions of Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia, which had been or were shortly to be incorporated in Greater Rumania.

The Agrarian Reforms of 1918–21

Immediately after the armistice, on November 12, 1918, King 175
Ferdinand issued a new proclamation reaffirming his pledge of 1917. 423
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● 175 Under the pressure of events the government did not bother to follow
656 the formalities prescribed in the 1917 amendment but quickly drafted
423 a decree-law, to be ratified subsequently by the parliament. This decree-law of December 15, 1918, laid down the norms under which land was immediately to be expropriated. Some of the leading provisions were as follows:[5]

a) As in the constitutional amendment, arable crown and mortmain land as well as foreign and absentee properties were completely expropriated.

b) The amount of 2,000,000 hectares was to be expropriated on a sliding scale from private properties of over 100 hectares. This rather arbitrary scale did represent an advance upon the 1917 amendment in limiting all properties to 500 hectares, but it made no provision for geographical differences, relative land hunger, or rational organization of estates. The law based the expropriation on properties rather than on proprietorship, to the benefit of the landowner with multiple holdings. Moreover, the relation between the scale of expropriation and the 2,000,000 hectares to be obtained was not accurately computed, and the expropriation actually fell short by some 450,000 hectares.

c) Compensation for expropriated land was to be based on a number of factors: price of sale in the region for five years prior to 1916, regional level of rent, evaluation by credit institutions, net income per hectares, etc., but was not to exceed twenty times the regional rental rate. Payments to proprietors were to be made by 5 per cent state bonds, redeemable in fifty years. The state was to contribute up to 35 per cent of the cost.

d) Peasant associations were to be created to serve as temporary recipients of the transferred land. The law went into little detail as regards resettlement, which was covered later by the law of 1921.

175 Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had headed the government on Decem-
423 ber 14, 1918, resigned on September 27, 1919, in a dispute with the
185 Allies on the peace settlement. King Ferdinand accepted the resignation and formed a nonparty cabinet under General Vaitoianu to hold a general election. This election, virtually the first to be uncontrolled in Rumanian history, produced surprising results. The Liberals lost most of their seats in the Old Kingdom, and after some delay a bloc made up of the newly formed Peasant party and the National party of Transylvania assumed office.

During its brief term this government, with the Transylvanian Vaida-Voevod as Premier and Ion Mihalache as Minister of Agricul-

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[5] Full summaries of this and the subsequent agrarian law of 1921 are given in Diaconescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–334, and Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–182.

ture, introduced a bill for the resettlement of the peasants as well as 175
for an extension of the expropriation. According to Mihalache, the 423
Vaida government sought to make a new agrarian reform which was
not based on the limited concept of the constituent assembly at Iași.[6] 185
Although this bill was not passed, it is of importance as an early expression of the agrarian program of what was to become the National Peasant party.

The *exposé de motifs* of the bill granted that when promulgated the acts of 1917 and 1918 represented the only workable formulae, given the composition of parliament and the state of the nation, but stated that the incorporation of Bessarabia and the other provinces in Greater Rumania now made imperative further action on behalf of the peasants in the Old Kingdom, since the new provinces were enjoying extensive land reforms. By the terms of this bill expropriation was to be based on the total holdings of a proprietor, not on separate properties, and was extended to include property continuously rented for ten years prior to 1916. Private property in excess of 100 hectares of cultivable land was to be expropriated; in this the framers of the bill consciously followed the provisions of the relatively radical Bessarabian land reform. Exceptions, however, were made for estates organized as farms with a significant capital investment; these were limited to 250 hectares in densely populated regions and to 500 hectares in regions of sparse population. Property remaining after expropriation was not to be leased except to peasant cooperatives. In general, the bill was more radical than its predecessors in the Old Kingdom and represented a peasant point of view, both as regards the expropriation and the organization of agriculture, rather than a political compromise formulated by the landowners to avert peasant revolt.

As soon as the nature of Mihalache's bill became known, the old parties took steps to block it. The Minister of Agriculture was unable to obtain an audience with the king, allegedly as a result of Liberal intrigue. On March 12, 1920, after failing to obtain the king's approval to present the bill as a government measure, Mihalache presented it to the assembly as a private member's bill. At that session he warned: "But it should be known that if parliament has to leave, or if the government has to leave, it is because of a conspiracy by the whole oligarchy of all the boyar political parties." His prediction was realized; on the following day the government, which still held a substantial parliamentary majority, was dismissed by the crown in

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[6] For the text of this bill and the debate at its introduction, see the pamphlet published by the Federaţia Democraţiei, *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor* (Bucarest, 1920).

175 what has been called "the most questionable act of King Ferdinand's
185 reign."[7] Although peasant disturbances, general instability, and the inexperience of the Vaida government have been cited as reasons
423 for its downfall, it seems clear that its dismissal stemmed directly from the hostility of the landowners to the proposed agrarian bill.[8] Thus, the effort of the Peasant party to carry through a more radical reform by legal means was defeated.

The new premier, General Averescu, was selected because he was a popular military hero. He immediately ordered new elections and by the usual controls was able to obtain a majority for his People's party. Mihalache was replaced by Constantin Garoflid. Garoflid, as has been seen, was by no means opposed to land reform, but he did not approve of the emphasis upon large-scale expropriation and the creation of a multitude of small holdings. It was his task, however, to complete a measure based upon principles he had always attacked.

423 The second land reform law for the Old Kingdom was promulgated on July 17, 1921. Although primarily concerned with allotting land and resettling the peasants, it also extended expropriation to obtain the 450,000 hectares lacking after the 1918 decree-law. Expropriation was now based on proprietors rather than properties, and the old sliding scale was abandoned in favor of a more elastic measure which took account of regional geographic differences and relative land hunger.[9] Land left to the proprietor was to be determined at once,

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[7] R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 551.

[8] The attitude of the landowners at this time is shown in a circular distributed by the Union of Syndicates of Moldavian Landowners: "We, landowners, are firmly determined to oppose by all means, and especially by impeaching before the Court of Cassation, all those provisions of the decree-law of 1918, of the law for communal grazing, and of any future law or decree, which may conflict with the letter of the Constitution regarding the expropriation of land . . . To re-consecrate the intangible right of property, we demand that a law shall be passed which shall punish with hard labor for life whomsoever shall speak of expropriation again." Quoted in Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[9] Land was left to the proprietors on the following basis:

	Land cultivated by owner (hectares)	*Land cultivated by owner with important capital investments (hectares)*
In highlands and hills	100	100
In plains, where demand for land was great	150	200
In plains, where demand for land was moderate	200	300
In plains, where demand for land was satisfied	250	500

3 Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

423 185 668 tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

● 175 423 *Agrarian Reform in the New Territories*

Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

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[15] F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

[16] The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

[17] R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

Although the general agrarian structure of Bessarabia resembled that of the Old Kingdom, certain differences developed during the century of Russian control. The emancipation of 1861 corresponded roughly to the Cuza reform, but the allotted land, *nadyel*, was given over not to the peasant but to the peasant commune, the mir. While the Bessarabian allotments at the time of the emancipation were greater than for most parts of Russia, there was, as in Rumania, an increasing land hunger arising from the nature of the reform and the rapidly expanding population. The Stolypin reforms, after the 1905 revolution, worked to increase individual peasant ownership and to break up the mir, but by the outbreak of the war nadyel land still constituted the largest category of property. In Russia after 1907 the sale of land to the peasants by the large landowners was widespread and especially so in Bessarabia. Although a comparison of the pre-1914 distribution of property in Bessarabia with that in Rumania is difficult to make since the Russian returns were based upon distinctions between types of ownership rather than size, the general order of the problem was similar in the two regions.[18]

The history of Bessarabia's incorporation into Rumania is still bitterly controversial. Only the major developments can be sketched here. Immediately after the February Revolution, two political currents began to emerge in Bessarabia, an agrarian-revolutionary (which tended to be hostile to Rumania as a land dominated by boyars) and a nationalist-Moldavian. From July, 1917, the peasants began to seize land, and by the end of the year some two-thirds of the large property had been taken over. A military committee, representative of the Moldavian element, convoked a congress which, on October 21–23, 1917, passed a resolution in favor of the "historical and political autonomy" of Bessarabia and decided to convoke a national council (*Sfatul Ţării*). The situation was utterly disorganized by the October Revolution and the Ukrainian break with the Bolsheviks. The *Sfat*, which was strongly Moldavian nationalist, was opposed to the centralism of the new Bolshevik regime. On December 2, 1917, it announced the formation of a Democratic Moldavian Republic as a self-governing unit in the Federative Democratic Russian Republic.

A crisis was reached in January, 1918, when Rumanian troops, sent to Bessarabia at the request of the Sfat, ousted the Bolshevik Soviets which had gained power in several cities and had attempted to supersede the Sfat. Shortly thereafter, the Sfat proclaimed the independence of the Moldavian republic. When Rumania sued for peace in March, 1918, the Germans favored the Rumanian interest

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[18] For statistics on land distribution in Bessarabia see the Appendix.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

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in Bessarabia. On April 9, 1918, the Sfat by open vote—86 to 3, with 36 delegates abstaining—declared for the union of Bessarabia with Rumania, but with important reservations: the Bessarabian land reform was to be maintained and the province was to have administrative autonomy.[19]

In Bessarabia, unlike the Old Kingdom, the redistribution of land was achieved by the direct action of the peasants. As a consequence, there were doubts, to say the least, among the cultivators as to the desirability of uniting with Rumania. Mihalache reported that the Bessarabian peasants said to him, "We will not unite with Rumania, since Rumania belongs to the *ciocoi*, who have fleeced the peasants." [20] Before Bessarabia was united with Rumania, however, there was a retreat from the first wave of land seizures. The Sfat succeeded in retaining 50 hectares for each proprietor, and subsequently the area was increased to 100 hectares. The land reform law proposed by the Sfat was subsequently ratified in Rumania by the decree-law of December 22, 1918, but 47 of the 73 articles of this decree-law were later modified by the law adopted by the Rumanian assembly in 1920.

The Bessarabian reform as finally drafted expropriated in full: former state and crown domains, mortmain estates, monastic properties (except one-half hectare for each monk), estates belonging to towns (except land reserved for town planning), estates of foreigners, and estates farmed out for five successive years. One million hectares were to be expropriated from private property, including all properties above 100 hectares (multiple holdings were counted as one property). Peasant allotments were set at 6–8 hectares, with complementary lots for peasants lacking the minimum. Compensation was based on rent obtained in the period 1910–14, capitalized at 5½ per cent. The price of the land, in general, was set at 800 lei per hectare, over the protests of the peasants who maintained that they had obtained the land through the revolution. The state assumed 25 per cent of the price. According to official Rumanian statistics, the total area expropriated was about 1,492,000 hectares.[21]

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[19] The Bessarabian controversy has centered on the actions of the Sfat: whether it was representative and whether its decisions reflected the wishes of the people. In the Soviet view, the Sfat was merely the tool of the landlord counterrevolutionaries, and the ousted Soviets the true representatives of the peasant masses. Dolnik, *op. cit.*, p. 20. There have been doubts as to the validity of the vote of April 9, 1918, and assertions that it was made under Rumanian military pressure. The high number of abstentions and the open vote would lead to the suspicion that it was scarcely an ideal referendum.

[20] *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor,* (Bucarest, 1920), p. 54. Ciocoi was the peasant's term for the boyar's pack of retainers.

[21] For further statistics on the Bessarabian land reform see the Appendix.

It has been held that Bessarabia provided a revolutionary leaven 175 for the rest of Rumania. To a degree this is true. Even before the 423 First World War both socialist and populist theories were transmitted from Russia to Rumania through Bessarabia. The Bessarabian land reform had an effect upon the policy of the nascent Rumanian Peasant party; the exposé de motifs of the Peasant party's reform bill of 1920 argued that the law passed by Sfatul Ţării for Bessarabia made equally extensive measures mandatory for all of Rumania. Mihalache, in defending his bill, pointed out that the Bucarest assembly was unwilling to accept for the Old Kingdom measures they had previously ratified for Bessarabia, and asked whether the impression was to remain that the Bessarabian peasant had achieved more for himself through revolution than had the peasant of the Old Kingdom through the good offices of the parliament.[22]

But the radical influences coming from Bessarabia were less than the contrary influence of Rumania upon Bessarabia. Successive formulations and arrangements regarding Bessarabia progressively reduced the extent of the agrarian reform, took away the administrative autonomy of the province, and extended the centralized administration of Bucarest. As a result, regardless of the original sentiment favoring incorporation in Rumania, Bessarabia was a disaffected area throughout the interwar period, with much the most corrupt administration of any Rumanian province.

2. BUCOVINA

Bucovina, which had formed the northern portion of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Austria in 1775. The 176 [162] population was originally largely Rumanian; in 1848 Rumanians numbered 209,000 as against 108,000 Ruthenians. This proportion altered in subsequent decades until by 1910 the Ruthenians were the largest group, though not a majority, outnumbering the Rumanians 305,000 to 233,000. There were also some 102,000 Jews and 66,000 Germans at that date. In general, the Ruthenian population was concentrated in the northern part of Bucovina, the Rumanian in the south.

By the treaty of alliance of August 17, 1916, between the Allies and Rumania, the latter was to receive all of Bucovina to the Prut River. At the time of the peace conference, it was suggested that part of northern Bucovina be included, for ethnic reasons, in eastern Galicia. This suggestion was dropped with the collapse of Galician au-

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[22] *Proectul legei de improprietărirea ţăranilor*, pp. 29 and 58.

175 tonomy because of the desire not to increase the number of Ukrainians under Polish rule. The incorporation of Bucovina had none of the turbulence that accompanied Bessarabia's. A general congress met on November 28, 1918, and voted for union with Rumania.

311 Before the First World War, of the cultivable area of Bucovina, holdings over 100 hectares occupied 25 per cent, holdings between 10 and 100 hectares 27 per cent, and small holdings 48 per cent. (If the very extensive forest lands are included the holdings over 100 hectares covered more than 60 per cent of the surface of the province.) Large properties were less dominant than in the Old Kingdom and medium properties much more important, partly because of German colonization and efforts by the Austrian government to foster this category of holding.

423 The decree-law of September 7, 1919, for the Bucovina land reform was ratified by the law of July, 1921, which modified the decree in favor of the landowners and reduced the extent of land to be expropriated. Land reform in Bucovina was made under more peaceful circumstances than elsewhere and was more carefully worked out. The state was given a right to reserve land for general needs, and the landowner was allowed continued use of his land until it was actually taken over. The reform expropriated in full: estates of foreigners and absentees, mortmain estates, estates of persons who had lost their civil rights, and estates farmed out for more than nine years. Expropriation of private properties was on a sliding scale beginning at 100 hectares and permitting a maximum of 250 hectares on properties having considerable inventory and equipment. Scattered properties belonging to the same owner were counted as one. The allotment of land was made in lots of 4–8 hectares, colonization lots of 5 hectares, and complementary lots of not less than ¼ hectare for peasants having less than 4 hectares. Compensation to landowners was approximately the same as in the Old Kingdom, and the state assumed 50 per cent of the cost. The peasant could pay in whole or in part, the remainder becoming a mortgage payable in 50 years at 5 per cent. According to official statistics the total area expropriated in Bucovina was about 76,000 hectares.[23]

3. TRANSYLVANIA

175 The disputed history of Transylvania and the endless controversy that has raged between the Rumanians and the Hungarians

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[23] For further statistics on the distribution of land in Bucovina and the effects of the land reform see the Appendix.

are far too complex for inclusion here. Whatever the origins of the Transylvanian population, at the outbreak of the First World War the Rumanians constituted a majority of the inhabitants of this region; with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Transylvanian Rumanians, along with the other ethnic groups in the empire moved to break away. On October 12, 1918, the Rumanian National party of Transylvania drafted a resolution demanding the right of self-determination. A national assembly was called at Alba Iulia on December first and passed a resolution in favor of the union of all Rumanians. The basis of this union was to be: 175

1) full national liberty for all races;
2) full autonomy for all regions;
3) a democratic regime with general, direct, equal, and secret elections;
4) complete liberty of press, assembly, and association;
5) radical agrarian reform;
6) equitable conditions for industrial workers.

A Governing Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), under Iuliu Maniu, was established as the temporary administration. The Treaty of Trianon assigned Transylvania and the adjacent regions of Maramureş, Crişana, and the Banat to Rumania.

Servile tenures had been abolished somewhat earlier in Transylvania than in the Old Kingdom, and the relative importance of medium properties reflected the generally higher level of cultivation. Nevertheless, there was a great disparity between large and small properties, a disparity intensified by the national question. The Rumanians were almost entirely peasants, and most of the large estates belonged to Hungarians. Reliable information, however, is lacking regarding the distribution of land either by size of property or by nationality; according to Hungarian critics of Rumanian statistics, no exact figures have ever been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Rumania.[24] The Rumanians have claimed that they held only 24 per cent of the total area and that 98 per cent of the properties over 100 cadastral yokes (the yoke, used in Transylvania, equals .58 hectares) were held by non-Rumanians. While this claim may have been extreme, Hungarian sources grant that 87 per cent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyars. [566] 311

The project for the land reform, prepared in thirty-two sittings of the Governing Council, became a decree-law on September 12, 671 423

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[24] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 316, n. 2.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

page 94

VI

THE LIBERAL PERIOD, 1922–28

Survey of Political Events

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RUMANIAN politics did not really "return to normal" until Ion I. C. Brătianu and the National Liberal party took office in January, 1922. The coalition government under Vaida Voevod, which had come in as a result of the first postwar elections in the autumn of 1919, had been arbitrarily ousted by the king in March, 1920,[1] and the war hero General Averescu was called to form a government. Averescu, who had widespread popularity among the troops and was of peasant origin, appears to have played a double role. In 1918 he had formed his People's League as a rallying point against the established corruption and inefficiency of the old parties; he had even engaged in negotiations with the extreme Left.[2] In 1919 he had temporarily joined the Vaida government; on his political campaigns he had promised five hectares of land to every peasant cultivator, a demagogic promise quite impossible of fulfillment. When he came to power, however, as leader of his People's party, it was as the restorer of order, or, as he said, "the last reserve of the Rumanian bourgeoisie."[3]

If the Averescu movement can be said to have had any leading idea at all, it was, as General Cantacuzino put it, that the reforms which were required could not be carried out by the old Liberal party

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[1] For the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Vaida government see above, p. 27. According to the Liberals in 1922, the Vaida government collapsed because of a rising bolshevist current: "public opinion demanded General Averescu." *Istoricul Partidului Național Liberal de la 1848 și până astazi* (Bucarest, 1923), p. 226. While there was doubtless a great deal of social unrest at this time, especially since the Socialists had refused to recognize the 1919 elections, there seems to be no reason to doubt that the downfall of the Vaida government was a direct result of collusion between King Ferdinand and the landowners to check Mihalache's proposed agrarian bill.

[2] According to the socialist Titel Petrescu (*Socialismul în România*, p. 314), after the armistice Averescu had consulted with the socialists on the prospects of collaboration and had even discussed the possible overthrow of the monarchy.

[3] L. Trotsky and Ch. Rakovsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi rumynii* (Moscow, 1922), p. 126. In a debate in the chamber Mihalache inveighed against Averescu's group: "Your party is a heterogeneous conglomeration, without a program, without a clear vision, and without consistency. Your party is based solely on the popularity of General Averescu, and will last only as long as that popularity endures. . . . You are purely and simply covering troops for the old parties of the ruling classes." Mihalache, *Partidul Țărănesc în politica țărei* (Bucarest, 1925), pp. 17–18.

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but only by a new and popular force united around a man repre- 175 ● senting the "principle of discipline."[4] This yearning after discipline 665 and order usually manifested itself in all parties when once they came to power, but was especially noticeable in those men or groups who were in office, not through the operation of the electoral system—however unreliable it may have been—but through some special circumstance. General Radescu, who was Prime Minister in the winter of 1944–45, was the last and most pathetic example. This call for discipline was an attempt to compensate for Rumania's underlying political instability. In most instances it was directed against the Left and the doctrine of class warfare.

Elections were held in May, 1920, and produced, not unexpectedly, a resounding success for Averescu's party, which obtained 209 out of 369 seats in the chamber. Averescu had made an electoral pact with Take Ionescu and had been joined by a splinter group of Transylvanians under the poet and subsequent fascist, Octavian Goga. He was also supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals who, it was unkindly observed, felt the need of finding new bottles for their old wine. There is also evidence, however, that he did attract a fairly large popular vote from the peasants.[5] The new cabinet included Take Ionescu as Foreign Minister, and Nicolae Titulescu, well known later in the League of Nations, as Minister of Finance. The Conservative landowner Constantin Garoflid was Minister of Agriculture and Domains, and the sinister and cynical Constantin Argetoianu, an accomplished election manipulator, was Minister of the Interior. The position of the National Liberal party at this time is not altogether clear. While Averescu had attacked the Liberals, they were willing to accept his election. Doubtless they were not reluctant to stay in the background until the storms of popular discontent had been subdued.

The two principal actions of the Averescu government were the 664 agrarian reform law of 1921, already discussed, and the suppression of Left-wing activity. In October, 1920, an abortive general strike was crushed, and the socialists who had voted for affiliation with the Third International arrested.[6] Tension aroused by the general strike and its suppression was augmented by a bomb explosion in the Ru-

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 18. The position of some of the men in Averescu's group, notably Manoilescu, came to be known as neoliberalism and provided a transition from the policy of the old Liberals to the leading ideas of the Carolist period.

[5] Mihalache admitted as much, saying that in 1919 a great many peasants had confused General Averescu with the Peasant party and thought that he was working with the peasants against the landlords. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[6] For further discussion of socialist activities at this time see below, pp. 246–247.

664 manian senate on December 9, 1920, which killed several persons and led to a temporary state of siege in Bucarest. This type of violence was less characteristic of Rumanian than of Bulgarian or Serbian political life, but was a foreshadowing of the political degeneracy of the 1930's.

665 ●175 Having served his purpose as man of the hour, Averescu's position gradually deteriorated in 1921, partly because of blunders in the cabinet but largely because the various groups which had installed him now deserted and turned against him. The Liberals, who had accepted him, withdrew their support and retired from parliament, on the rather disingenuous grounds that the government was not representative and had mishandled the Liberals' land reform. Whatever the occasion, it was apparent that with the passing of the postwar turmoil the Liberals were prepared to resume their traditional leadership. General Averescu resigned on December 17, 1921. Take Ionescu attempted to form a cabinet but failed to obtain a vote of confidence. On January 19, Ion I. C. Brătianu took over the government.

With the exception of an interlude between March, 1926, and June, 1927, the Liberals were in office from 1922 to 1928. They retained a hold on the key administrative and financial posts and exerted a decisive influence over King Ferdinand in his last years. Perhaps their strongest bulwark was the dominating personality of Ion I. C. Brătianu. This masterful old politician, who had fought stubbornly throughout the war and the peace negotiations for the realization of Greater Rumania, ruled his party and the country in an arbitrary patrician manner, and until his death the Liberals were firmly established.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that they commanded extensive popular support during these years, practically none outside the Old Kingdom. Part of their success lay in the failure of the other parties to create or maintain a united and effective opposition. Although the Liberals did resort to crude electoral manipulations and to repressive police measures, usually in connection with periodic Communist scares, they were still an old-fashioned party and had not developed these procedures to the unhappy perfection now so familiar.[7] Under sufficient pressure they preferred to retire rather than to overthrow the constitution. But it required several years for the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party of the Old Kingdom to form the consolidated opposition which ultimately dislodged them.

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[7] A somewhat sensational glimpse of the dark side of the Liberal administration is given in C. G. Costa-Foru's *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens* (Vienna, 1925), an exposé of the terrorist methods employed by the Rumanian secret police, the *Siguranța*.

In March, 1922, the Liberals made an election in which they contrived 665
to win 260 seats, as against 17 in the 1920 elections (General 175
Averescu's party dropped to 11 seats). The opposition parties challenged the validity of the elections and withdrew from parliament.

A sharp controversy arose over the coronation of King Ferdinand on October 15, 1922. The opposition parties contended that the coronation should be sponsored by a coalition of all parties. Despite the fact that the coronation was held in the Transylvanian town of Alba Iulia to celebrate the unity of all Rumanian lands, the Transylvanian National party boycotted the ceremony.[8]

642 When the Liberals called for the March, 1922, elections they announced that one of the main tasks of the new assembly would be the preparation of a new constitution. Following the coronation, they proceeded to push through this act in the session opening in November. The legality of such a one-party procedure was denied by the opposition as contrary to the guarantees of autonomy in the original contracts made between the representative bodies of the new territories and the government of the Old Kingdom.[9] The opposition parties temporarily attended the parliamentary debates on the constitution, but the tumultuous sessions did not block its passage in March, 1923.

The 1923 Constitution was based on that of 1866, which it followed in many respects.[10] Because of the acquisition of such extensive new territories, a new constitutional document was deemed necessary. The following are some of its more controversial points:[11]

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[8] It is illustrative of the antagonism created by the centralizing policy of the Liberals that none of the chief figures responsible for the union of the new provinces with the Old Kingdom was present at the Coronation.

[9] The arbitrary action of the Liberals was particularly resented in Transylvania, where the National party was undoubtedly the strongest political group. The regional autonomy of the province had already been infringed upon when General Averescu quite illegally abolished the Transylvanian Consiliu Dirigent in 1920.

[10] The 1866 Constitution, closely patterned after the Belgian model, had been significantly amended on three occasions before 1923: 1) In 1879, in accordance with the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin, religious beliefs were removed as an obstacle to naturalization. This amendment was introduced to prevent the exclusion of Jews from citizenship. 2) In 1884 the number of electoral colleges for the chamber was reduced from four to three, thus broadening the franchise somewhat for the benefit of the growing urban middle class. 3) In 1914 the Liberals initiated measures for electoral and agrarian reforms. This work, which was delayed by the war, was carried out by the constitutional assembly in Iaşi in 1917. Article 19 was amended to permit land expropriation for purposes of agrarian reform; Articles 57 and 67 established universal suffrage and proportional representation for the chamber.

[11] For a French translation of the text with commentary see F. R. and P. Dareste, *Les Constitutions modernes* (4th ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1928–34), II, 355 ff.; for a bibliography of Rumanian commentaries, *ibid.*, III, 223–226. An examination of some of its shortcomings was made by David Mitrany, "The New Rumanian Constitution," *The*

6) District and local councils had both elected members and members introduced by the national assembly. The ratio of the two types of members was not fixed (in the original draft of the new constitution, appointed members were limited to one-fifth the total) and permitted an indeterminate amount of central control over local councils. 642

7) The powers of the crown, while confined to those enunciated in the constitution, were considerable and included the right to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, appoint and dismiss ministers, and sanction or veto laws. In many constitutional monarchies the crown has similar powers, which are formalized or limited by custom; in Rumania the crust of tradition was quite thin and the crown was actually in a position to exert a great deal of influence.

8) "In case of danger to the state, martial law, partial or general, may be established by means of a bill" (Article 128).

In summary, the constitution was relatively brief (138 articles), vague on many points, and left important details to be determined by subsequent laws. There were a number of loopholes whereby civil rights guarantees could be evaded and arbitrary executive action imposed. To be sure, in most constitutions qualifying clauses recognize the state's right to take exceptional measures for its own preservation, but whereas these exceptional measures are usually understood to be applicable only in cases of emergency, the situation in Rumania was such as to make exceptional measures—arrests without warrant, violation of privacy of correspondence, and prolonged states of siege—more or less standard practice. The omissions and evasions in the Rumanian constitution were of less importance than the spirit in which the document was interpreted.

Although the opposition parties hotly attacked the Liberals, denounced the new constitution, and boycotted the assembly, they were by no means united in their actions or purposes; in 1924 and 1925 there was a frequent regrouping of party alignments. The most important question was the course to be taken by the National party of Transylvania. All parties desired to gain the support of this well-organized body; since it had been formed as a regional Rumanian party in opposition to the Magyars, rather than on a social basis, its position in the political system of united Rumania was somewhat ambiguous. In 1920 General Averescu had tried without success to gain its adherence; when Brătianu came to power in 1922 he offered Maniu three portfolios in the cabinet but Maniu refused the offer. 175 665

In June, 1924, it was announced that the National party of Transylvania and the Peasant party ~~had~~ officially united, but shortly

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

● 175 665 thereafter they drifted apart again.[13] In January, 1925, the National party of Transylvania temporarily fused with the historian Iorga's National Democratic party (to which Argetoianu now belonged). In May, 1925, a United Opposition, including Iorga's group, Maniu's Transylvanians, and the Peasant party, was temporarily established and demanded the resignation of the government. Averescu did not join the opposition bloc and it was rumored that he had a secret understanding with the Liberals to succeed them. In elections to the newly created Chambers of Agriculture,[14] 44 out of 75 districts were won by the United Opposition, 27 by the government, and 4 by the People's party. The tide seemed to be turning against the Liberals.

One reason the Liberals were able to maintain their position in the face of a growing if uncoordinated opposition during the years from 1922 to 1925 was the perennial fear of bolshevism, which in turn served to weaken or discredit all radical or reformist movements. On
648 the international level Soviet-Rumanian relations were very bad be-
175 cause of the unresolved Bessarabian dispute. A conference held in
Vienna in April, 1924, failed to bring any agreement between the two disputants.[15] Each side accused the other of plotting aggression and each took measures which aggravated the tension. The creation in 1924 of a Moldavian Soviet Republic on the left bank of the Dniester and ominous Soviet speeches forecasting the ultimate reunion of all Moldavians increased Rumanian anxiety. At the same time, in February, 1925, Vintilă Brătianu, Minister of Finance and brother of Ion I. C. Brătianu, stated his opposition to returning Wrangel's fleet to the U.S.S.R. because of the danger of a strong Soviet Black Sea fleet, and announced that negotiations were in progress for the cooperation of British, French, and Rumanian capital in the establishment of an armaments and munitions factory in Rumania.[16] Such an announcement obviously matched the Soviet thesis that the Western bourgeois powers were using the eastern European states as advanced bases for an assault upon the U.S.S.R.

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[13] For a discussion of the union of the Transylvanian National party and the Peasant party see below, pp. 140–141.

[14] Chambers of agriculture were established in each district in 1925, with a mixed membership of elected and appointed members. In addition to their agricultural functions, they elected members to the senate. They soon became political instruments and were of very little value in the improvement of agriculture.

113 [15] According to Louis Fischer, on the basis of information obtained from Christian Rakovsky, Litvinov and Trotsky were willing to accept the loss of Bessarabia, but Stalin, Rakovsky, and Chicherin were not. The latter hoped that by means of the Bessarabian issue they could "keep Rumania perennially on tenterhooks." Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 134–135.

[16] *Times* (London), February 7, 1925.

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In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state.

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Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion.

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Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iași; he was subsequently acquitted.[17]

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael[18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

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[17] For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

[18] Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

175 665 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had forced the king to exclude Carol.

[661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

175 671 666 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law, whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

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[19] According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the 175
parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the op- 671
position parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' 666
plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party
was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that
in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposi-
tion parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he fa- 665
vored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still 175
fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transyl-
vanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again
on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts.
The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian
National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition
cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But
on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called
on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government."[20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peas- 661
ants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the elec- 666
tion. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming
his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether
successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Mili-
tary officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number
of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled.
The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their
constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Miha-
lache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gen-
darmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

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[20] *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and 666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their 175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with a majority of the seats going to the Liberals. The Liberals resigned 665 from the Ştirbey cabinet on June 21, stating that it had failed in its 175 mission.

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[21] The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

On June 22 the king called Brătianu, who formed an all-Liberal government, with the addition of Dr. Lupu, Argetoianu, and Titulescu, and issued a manifesto:[22]

> The mission of the Government headed by M. Barbu Ştirbey to achieve an understanding and collaboration between the various political parties has not succeeded, and because of the differences of views in the midst of the cabinet, the electoral campaign threatened to become the occasion of agitation favoring political passions and subversive currents. In these conditions, a government was required which could be upheld by a solidly organized and experienced party and could assume entire responsibility for the situation. His Majesty the King has entrusted us with this heavy responsibility. We desire the sincere application of the laws guaranteeing the liberty of elections. We will not permit the disturbance of order nor the violation of law, and will not tolerate anarchist tendencies. Closely united with our collaborators in the parties which assure us their co-operation we will carry out our program which the country knows well.

This manifesto is a nice epitome of the Liberals' politics. Presenting themselves as the solid defenders of the law and the constitution, they had actually achieved, with the cooperation of the king, a very neat coup. By breaking the Ştirbey coalition and relying on the king's mistrust of the opposition, Brătianu had driven the National Peasants back into the wilderness without the slightest popular justification. The references to "subversive currents" and "anarchist tendencies," while conjuring up the specter of communism, cannot be taken very seriously unless the whole mass of the peasantry was to be considered subversive. It is not surprising that the National Peasants should have seen all the complicated political maneuvers of those years, including the schisms in their own ranks, as Brătianu machinations.

The Liberals dropped their talk of a national cabinet, and conducted the elections of July 7, 1927, in the usual manner; they won 298 out of 387 seats in the chamber; Dr. Lupu was rewarded for his cooperation with 22 seats. The National Peasants managed to obtain 49; Averescu's People's party and Iorga's group failed to obtain even the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes. The political picture

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[22] *L'Économiste roumain* (Organ de l'Institut Économique Roumain et de l'Association des Banques Roumaines) (July 1, 1927), p. 171.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

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was reverting to a two-party system, in the Rumanian style, with the National Peasants the only significant opponents of the Liberals.

Two deaths, however, were to undermine the position of the Liberals. On July 20, 1927, King Ferdinand died;[23] he was succeeded by the five-year-old Michael under a regency comprising Ferdinand's second son Prince Nicholas, the Patriarch Miron Cristea, and the first president of the Court of Cassation, Buzdugan. All parties recognized the regency but Maniu immediately demanded the resignation of the Liberals and new elections. With the death of Ferdinand, the Carol issue again insinuated itself into the conflict between the National Peasants and the Liberals. The National Peasants maintained a somewhat equivocal attitude toward the regency and while not demanding Carol's return, gave no indication that they would not welcome it. Carol, on his part, was issuing ambiguous statements from abroad, saying that he was making no plans for return but that if the people called him he would not be deaf to their appeal. The government accused the National Peasants of duplicity and prohibited their political meetings. Maniu responded by a call for a popular movement to oust the Liberals by all legal parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. In October, 1927, Mihail Manoilescu, who had been associated with General Averescu's People's party and who was to blossom into a well-known political economist, was arrested by the government on the charge of carrying political letters from Carol to Rumanian opposition leaders. The government brought him to trial, but he was acquitted, much to the Liberals' discomfiture. During the trial the government quoted letters to show that Carol had abdicated of his own will; Manoilescu in his defense maintained that Ferdinand had wanted Carol to return but that efforts at reconciliation had been thwarted by the Brătianus.

On November 24, 1927, Ion I. C. Brătianu died. With his death, following close upon that of the king, the Liberals began to lose their grip, although they remained in power for another year. There was no change in the government; Vintilă Brătianu became head of the cabinet and leader of the party. Although he had been a conscientious minister and had determined the party's economic policy, he lacked the political stature of his elder brother. Feeling the insecurity of his position, he proposed collaboration with the National Peasants, on the basis of an equal division of cabinet posts and a common list in new elections with 55 per cent of the seats going to the Liberals.

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[23] For a resumé of events after Fedinand's death see "La Situation politique en Roumanie après la mort du roi Ferdinand I," *M.A.B.* (*Mezinárodní Agrární Bureau*) *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, No. 1 (Prague, 1928), pp. 55–69.

Maniu naturally refused the offer, and Vintilă Brătianu declared his 175
intention to continue as head of the government. 665

In the winter and spring of 1927–28, the National Peasants extended their attacks on what they called the usurping government. Maniu embarrassed the government in its efforts to obtain a foreign stabilization loan by declaring on December 22, that his party disapproved of the new budget and that a government without the support of the nation was not in a position to receive foreign loans.[24] In January, 1928, the National Peasants sent representatives abroad, to Paris, London and Berlin, to persuade foreign opinion that the Liberals lacked national approval.

Large protest meetings were held throughout Rumania, climaxed 175
by a massive peasant demonstration in Alba Iulia on May 6. This 662
demonstration aroused great excitement and some apprehension, but it ended in a slightly ludicrous vein. Thousands of peasants came from all over Rumania, though principally from Transylvania, to attend a dramatic denunciation of the Liberals, but at the conclusion of the rally the leaders were at a loss as to what should be done next—a problem that always plagued the Peasant leaders. Some of the more ardent ones wanted to prepare a "March on Rome," and indeed a column of peasants did march off in the direction of Bucarest, but dispersed on the way. Other leaders favored a moderation in sharp contrast to the violence of the oratory, which had blasted the government as the "enemy of the people." Most humiliating, the National Peasants were forced to appeal to the government to provide rail transport to return the peasants to their homes. But despite this touch of *opéra bouffe*, the demonstration was an impressive display of the opposition's ability to call out the peasantry.

It is quite possible, however, that the government was less worried by the direct threat of these measures than by their effect in increasing the difficulty of obtaining a stabilization loan, the principal preoccupation of Vintilă Brătianu during his year in office and his principal excuse for remaining in power. In the summer of 1928 the loan threatened to be the rock which would wreck the government. In July Vintilă Brătianu convoked the chamber in extraordinary session to report on his negotiations and to get authorization to obtain an external loan of up to $250,000,000. The National Peasant depu-

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[24] It should be added, however, that Maniu had not blocked discussion or voting on the budget. On December 27 the National Peasant representatives Madgearu and Popovici, while repeating that the Liberal government did not have legal authority to contract foreign loan, stated that if it did succeed the National Peasants would not subsequently refuse to recognize the undertaking, but would respect engagements taken, however unjustifiably, in the name of the state.

175 ties boycotted the assembly, formed their own gathering, and resolved
that laws passed by the Liberal chamber could not bind the Ru-
662 manian nation. Vintilă Brătianu tried to persuade the regency that he should remain in office until the loan negotiations were completed. Ultimately, his delays and in particular his request that even after the completion of the negotiations he be permitted to retain office to supervise the application of the loan brought him into conflict with the regents, who were anxious to calm the political situation. Overestimating his position, he resigned on November 3 and dropped the negotiations.

To his surprise his resignation was accepted. The regents consulted Maniu and Averescu on the formation of a coalition cabinet; Maniu would make no agreement except on the basis of new and free elections. The regents requested Titulescu to form a coalition cabinet; Titulescu failed. Finally, the regents were obliged on November 9 to call upon Maniu to form his own cabinet.

Thus ended the long regime of the Brătianus. The combination of two failures contributed to their defeat. Politically they failed to obtain the mass support of the peasants, necessary under universal suffrage, but were unwilling, or unable, to adopt measures to prevent the rise of an effective opposition. Economically, they were unable to restore either the national finances or the condition of agriculture. The stabilization loan and the bad harvest of 1928 directly contributed to their downfall, but the continuing economic uncertainty and instability of the postwar years always gave the opposition a long stick with which to belabor them.

Composition and Political Principles of the Liberals

665 Although the National Liberal party[25] was pleased to trace its origins to the group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brătianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous." The limitations of the Brătianus' conception of political liberty should be evident from

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[25] This was the party's official title. The word national has usually been omitted in this paper to avoid possible confusion with the term, National Peasant, which indicates the actual fusion of two distinct parties.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

VII

THE PEASANTIST PERIOD, 1928–30

Survey of Political Events

115 175 PERHAPS the most disheartening episode in Rumanian history between the wars was the failure of the National Peasant party during its brief term of office after the fall of the Liberals. The period between the formation of the Maniu government in November, 1928, and Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, is a watershed: 1928 was the culmination of a political struggle which had been going on since the end of the First World War; 1930 was the beginning of the long descent into the abyss of 1940 and 1941. The inability of the National Peasants either to relieve the agrarian question or to maintain their political power ended the prospect of a peasant democracy.

When the regents, on November 9, called upon Maniu to form his own government, the National Peasants came into office on a wave of national enthusiasm and optimism. There were widespread rejoicings over the "bloodless revolution"; not only peasants but even business circles and some Liberals were happy to escape from the confining atmosphere of the Brătianu regime. On November 11 Maniu formed an all National Peasant cabinet, including in its important posts: Vaida Voevod at the Interior, G. Mironescu, a wealthy Moldavian who had come from Take Ionescu's party, in the Foreign Office; Ion Mihalache at Agriculture; and Virgil Madgearu at Commerce and Industry. On the following day he announced that "Our first aim will be to give the principles of the Constitution their real meaning and impart a character of strict legality to the working of the administration." [1] He went on to say that he would not disrupt his predecessors' work in the negotiations for a stabilization loan, that he would organize agricultural credit, and give greater power to local institutions. Certain ministries were to be abolished, martial law and censorship to be suspended.

115 In these initial statements the general aims of the new government are apparent: the primary stress is upon restoring, or rather creating for the first time, a truly constitutional regime. Secondly, the aid of

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[1] *Times* (London), November 12, 1928.

P 130

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops 433
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Saraţeanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuţi by a Ukrainian Nationalist

665 candidate and in Roman by a fascist. The Communist candidate in
175 Timişoara polled over 25,000 votes. Here were the seeds of the political upheavals of the next decade.

665 At this point, when the National Peasants still commanded a strong
175 majority but were suffering a perceptible loss of popularity and a
643 slackening of impetus, Carol dramatically returned to Rumania on June 6, 1930. His return was not a surprise, as there had been rumors about it for weeks, so many in fact that the government had forbidden the mention of his name in the press. Maniu, after announcing that the government had sanctioned his return, resigned and was replaced by Mironescu, who annulled the act excluding Carol from the throne. He then resigned and a brief period of confusion ensued. The Liberal party split on the question; Vintilă Brătianu sharply opposed Carol's return and expelled a section of the party under Gheorghe Brătianu, the historian and adopted son of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who had come out for Carol. After two days, during which Marshal Presan attempted unsuccessfully to create a coalition cabinet, Maniu was recalled and formed a new National Peasant government, much the same as his first but with the addition of the economist Manoilescu, who had worked diligently for Carol's return.

The details of Carol's spectacular return are not altogether clear. Apparently the initiative had been his but Maniu had welcomed him.[5] As has already been noted, the National Peasants had never been satisfied with Carol's renunciation of the crown. The disadvantages inherent in the regency, which still had many years to go before Michael reached his majority; the hope of having a king on their side as Ferdinand had been on the Liberals'; the increasing difficulties of the party and the portents of waning popularity; and finally the obvious popular approval of Carol's return—all these combined to make the National Peasants accept the fatal step. At that the party

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[5] Ten years later Maniu wrote an article in the journal *Timpul* (September 14, 1940), describing his attitude toward Carol's return: "Ever since 1926 I was against Prince Carol's retirement and favored his return, not only in order to satisfy public opinion—which manifested this desire increasingly—but also to insure the continuity of the dynastic order and the normal government of the country. . . . Therefore, in my capacity as Prime Minister I favored the return of Prince Carol, but only under certain well-defined conditions which were to be put into force from the very beginning. However, after only a few weeks of his reign, I realized to my regret that these conditions were not being fulfilled. Thus, among other things the Coronation of King Carol II and of Queen Helen, arranged for the month of September 1930, was indefinitely postponed. Instead, and in defiance of Christian morals, he compromised his reign by leading a life against which I protested unceasingly for ten years. Having arrived at the conclusion that under these conditions I could no longer accept responsibility for Prince Carol's return and for his rule, I resigned, but maintained my attitude of energetic and continuous protest."

leaders were not in complete agreement. Some desired Carol's imme- 665
diate proclamation as king, some were hostile to him, and others 175●
advocated his entering the regency. Maniu himself was opposed to 643
proclaiming him king until Carol should leave Mme Lupescu and achieve a reconciliation with his wife. "But," he said later, "I could not force my views in face of public opinion."[6]

The newly constituted government was short-lived. When Maniu learned that Mme Lupescu had returned to Rumania contrary to what he believed to be Carol's agreement, he resigned in protest on October 6. A new National Peasant cabinet was formed under the wealthy but colorless Mironescu, without Maniu or Vaida Voevod. Although this cabinet remained in office until the following April, its dismissal was only a matter of time. Carol had announced his desire to create a coalition government, and as soon as the National Peasants had completed a new loan agreement they were removed from office. The second National Peasant government of 1932–33 will be discussed later in connection with the depression.

Maniu's resignation in October, 1930, was a significant event as it marked, when viewed in retrospect, the conclusion of Rumania's brief experiment with responsible government. In so far as his action was a protest against royal irresponsibility and bad faith, Maniu was remaining true, as he did always, to his conception of legality and constitutionality. But as a protest against the king's moral standards it was misdirected. "Bourgeois sexual morality," Mr. Hugh Seton-Watson has said, "is probably less esteemed in Rumania than anywhere else on the Continent. It was not the right issue on which to base the whole conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship."[7]

The episode is inexplicable without some insight into Maniu's per- 159
sonality, which, in its rather cold incorruptibility, was in the sharpest possible contrast to the laxness and opportunism of Rumanian public life. Born in Transylvania in 1873, Iuliu Maniu had studied law in Vienna. He had been attorney of the Uniate Metropolitanate of Blaj and professor of law at the Blaj Theological Academy. As deputy to the Hungarian parliament he had gained a reputation as a stubborn and doughty opponent of Hungarian policy in Transylvania. The clerical atmosphere of Blaj and the parliamentary atmosphere of the Budapest chamber had a lasting influence. Maniu

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[6] John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (London, 1936), pp. 367–369, includes an unpublished speech by Maniu which was to have been delivered in 1934 and which provides some additional details concerning the National Peasant leader's position on Carol's return.

[7] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (2d ed., Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 204.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberalism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity. 175

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. 66 In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the 175 Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years.

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

115 and it is illustrative of the nature of Rumanian politics that the National Peasant party had by this time already become an "old" party —had outlived the impulses which had created them. He desired a rearrangement of the political mosaic to give due place to "younger" elements and believed that this required the installation of a disinterested government of "personalities." Besides the knowledge that Carol was counting their days, the National Peasants saw their once impressive popularity draining away, through the depression and their manifest failure to bring about the new Jerusalem.

In by-elections of January, 1931, the government lost a number of seats, and perhaps the only safe conclusion one can draw from Rumanian elections is that the loss of government-held seats means an undeniable fall in public confidence. The customary flurry of rumors presaged the government's overthrow, and indeed its negotiations for a second foreign loan were the condition for its remaining in power, as had been the case with Vintilă Brătianu's government three years [648] before. On March 10 the loan agreement was signed in Paris, and on April 4 Mironescu resigned. Rumania's outstanding diplomat, Titulescu, was recalled from London—a standard procedure during the cabinet crises of these years—to form a coalition government. Both the National Peasants and the Liberals accepted on certain conditions but Iorga, significantly, voted against it and demanded a cabinet of personalities.

On April 18 Carol called upon Iorga, who, with Argetoianu as his capable hatchet man, formed a cabinet of at least some of the talents. Iorga, announcing his program to be hard work and economy, summoned and immediately dismissed the National Peasant chamber. New elections were held, but even with Argetoianu doing his efficient best at the Ministry of the Interior and with an electoral pact with the Liberals, the government bloc of National Union obtained only 48 per cent of votes. The National Peasants of course were forced down to 15 per cent, and Maniu announced his retirement from politics. The Communists' Workers and Peasant Union won five seats, their first representation in the chamber. Incidentally, none of their members was returned from Bessarabia, reputedly the seat of Rumanian communism; all five were from the industrial centers of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bucovina.

Carol's guiding hand is evident in the creation of the Iorga-Argetoianu government, and after its formation he announced his 159 intentions to preside over cabinet meetings once a week. Nicolae Iorga, the internationally known and incredibly voluminous historian, had never commanded any following beyond a coterie of ad-

mirers. His individualism, or perhaps his vanity, had made him an 159
uncertain political ally, and he took to himself the role of mentor and guardian of the Rumanian national consciousness. His efforts in politics, however, were far less impressive than his output as a historian.[1]

The government's term in office was not edifying.[2] As the economic 175
situation deteriorated, the complete absence of any organized political support made itself felt when all the other parties began a violent press campaign; the Liberals belabored Argetoianu's financial policy as one of bankruptcy; the Transylvanian press threatened a demand for autonomy; the aging Marshal Averescu, bitterly disappointed by Carol's failure to select him as man of the hour, assailed both the government and the king. A crisis rose between Carol and the government over the salaries of state officials. The government, faced by a bad deficit and the failure to obtain an additional loan from France, was attempting to reduce official salaries. Carol opposed this and forced Iorga's resignation on June 6, 1932.

After an unsuccessful effort by Titulescu, the National Peasants, 665
under Vaida Voevod, were recalled for their second term of office. In 175
the elections of July they obtained only 45 per cent of the votes, a great decline from their 80 per cent of 1928, but sufficient to give them the premium. The Iron Guard and other fascist groups showed gains and won some additional seats, primarily in Bessarabia, the region of deepest discontent. An effort was made to bring Maniu out of retirement; he did resume leadership of the party but was unable to reach an understanding with Carol.

The program of the new National Peasant government was along the same lines as its predecessors and included the reintroduction of the administrative decentralization law, which had been revoked by the Iorga government; a modification of the electoral law, which all parties promised to change but which they somehow did not get around to when in power; and a reduction of taxes and expenditures. The party had an initial success in obtaining a Swiss loan of 50 million francs for the payment of back salaries of state officials. In October, however, Vaida Voevod resigned after a disagreement with the influential Titulescu on the question of Rumanian-Soviet nego-

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[1] For a recent tribute to Iorga, who was assassinated by the Iron Guard in 1940, see John Campbell, "Nicholas Iorga," *The Slavonic and East European Review, 26*, No. 66 (November, 1947), 44–59.

[2] For a particularly jaundiced account of the Iorga-Argetoianu administration see G. C. Logio, *Rumania*, pp. 39–52. Logio, as a foreign business man, was especially bitter on the subject of Rumanian business ethics and heartily disliked Carol, "who promulgates rascally laws defrauding the unwary foreign investor and trader."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

665 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign ●175 Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February 668 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight en- 665 sued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some 175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the 175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task.

665 Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

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[648] [3] Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

[4] In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

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he was on good terms with the up-and-coming Iron Guard. Indeed, a year later he said, under oath, that as early as 1929, when he had been Minister of the Interior, he had been in touch with the Iron Guardists for the purpose of directing their youthful enthusiasm toward less extreme ends and "of drawing the attention of the organization to the necessity of combating Communism." [5] In 1934 Vaida Voevod, after failing to get the National Peasants to accept his "numerus Valachicus"—a device to oust non-Rumanian minorities, especially the Hungarians, from posts in the government and in "nationally important enterprises"—abandoned the party and formed his own hypernationalist, semifascist political group.[6]

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In November, 1933, the Vaida government resigned, partly at least because of the king's dissatisfaction with its handling of the increasing fascist activity and its failure to prevent attacks directed against himself, Mme Lupescu, and his entourage.[7] After five years out of power the old Liberals, under Duca, came into office on November 14. Duca, who, like Vaida Voevod, stated that he had tried to "channelize" the energies of the Iron Guard, undertook to dissolve the movement on the eve of the new elections. On December 29 he was assassinated by three Iron Guardists at the Sinaia railway station. After several days' confusion, Gheorghe Tătărescu became head of the Liberal cabinet which was to remain in office until November, 1937.

During these three years of hectic political changes, five main developments are observable:

1) The growing influence of the king. While Carol was unsuccessful in establishing a government of personalities, he was making rapid progress in unraveling the old political fabric and undermining and splitting the leadership of the major parties. He was also increasing his extraparliamentary influence through his camerilla and through his appointees in administrative posts.

2) The increasing paralysis and confusion of the National Peasants. As has been seen already, their decline was more or less implicit in the situation as of 1930, and during the following years the

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[5] *Patria*, March 31, 1934, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 76.

[6] See C. A. Macartney's account of a conversation with Vaida Voevod on the "numerus Valachicus," *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 326.

[7] Although internally Rumanian politics were moving to the Right, the Vaida government did, in July, sign the London Convention defining aggression, to which the U.S.S.R. was also a signatory. This step, which marked a slight improvement in Rumanian-Soviet relations, was a part of the realignment of forces after the rise of Hitler.

175 leadership divided, many of the party's most capable men deserted, the party's popularity declined, and an increasing number of peasant supporters were attracted to the Iron Guard.

3) An apparent recovery of the Liberals. The Liberal party had been badly hit by their defeat in 1928 and the schism between Vintilă Brătianu and Gheorghe Brătianu, occasioned by Carol's return. With Vintilă Brătianu's death in 1930 the way was cleared for a gradual reconciliation with the king. The Young Liberals (Gheorghe Brătianu) failed to make any significant headway, and under Duca the old Liberals seemed to be heading for a comeback.

4) The flowering of fascism. The meteoric rise of the Iron Guard was the most spectacular event of thos[illegible]rs, and trailing in its wake were a number of less fiery fascist, semi[illegible]st and anti-Semitic formations of unequal importance. In the party system they served to replace the older coteries, such as Iorga's and Averescu's parties, which were fading from the scene, but in fact they heralded the collapse of parliamentary government.

5) The total impotence of the Left-wing labor movements. They had never been strong in Rumania, but during these three years they were driven from the offensive, however weak, to the defensive. Popular discontent did not, after 1933, swell the ranks of the labor movements but strengthened the Iron Guard.

The Struggle against the Depression

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439 During these years the economic situation steadily deteriorated. It was estimated that the nominal national income in lei dropped by about 45 per cent between 1929 and 1932.[8] While Rumania was able to maintain a positive balance of trade throughout the depression, the value of exports fell from 29 billion lei in 1929 to 14 billion in 1933 and 1934, even though the weight of exports increased from 7,000,000 metric tons to 8,000,000. Imports fell from 1,102,000 metric tons in 1929 to 467,000 in 1933 (450,000 in 1932). State revenues declined from 36 billion lei in 1929 to 18 billion in 1933.

439 The depression in Rumania had been initiated by the world agricultural crisis in 1929, which produced a tremendous fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly disastrous in the Balkan states because of their inability to compete with the great overseas producers. As industrial commodities fell neither so soon nor so far the resulting price scissors hurt the peasant as agricultural producer

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[8] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 127.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

page 187

IX

THE CAROLIST PERIOD: NEOLIBERALISM, 1934–37

Survey of Political Events

THE term neoliberalism, which may appear a gross misnomer 665 for these singularly unliberal years, is descriptive of two facts: 1) The Liberal party returned to office and, what is more, remained there for the full term of four years, thus repeating its record as the only party under the 1923 Constitution to achieve such a feat of endurance. Nevertheless, the Liberal cabinet of the 1930's was not the same as the party of Ion I. C. and Vintilă Brătianu. Not only did King Carol really hold the leading strings of political power but within the Liberal party itself (not to speak of Gheorghe Brătianu's Young Liberals) there was a growing cleavage between Gheorghe Tătărescu, the head of the government, and Constantin Brătianu, the third of the elder Brătianu brothers, who was party chief. This split did not become open until later, but Tătărescu as a king's man was clearly moving away from the old lines of the Liberals. 2) The leading ideas of the administration at this time have a certain relation to the doctrine of so-called neoliberalism, which was advanced in the 1920's but which at that time was associated with Averescu's People's party.[1]

The years 1934 and 1935 were a kind of plateau in the troubled 175 history of the 1930's. The depression leveled off and there was a slow 648 move toward recovery. The political party system, while basically completely unstable, did at least pause from the rapid changes of government which had marked the years 1931–33. King Carol seemed less bent on securing a personal political dictatorship. Even on the international scene there was a temporary, if uneasy, breathing spell. The first impulse of fascism which had brought Hitler to power had not set all of east Europe tumbling as had been feared. Rumania reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.[2] The Lit-

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[1] The People's party was a melange of "regenerated" liberalism combined with an emphasis upon order and discipline, plus a great deal of crass opportunism.

[2] Without, however, obtaining a clear statement of recognition of its possession of Bessarabia. For a discussion of this point see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs, 18,* No. 3 (New York, April, 1940), 557–562.

175 648 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 661 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

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[3] In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

[4] *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

[5] It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineaţa* and *Universul* over her trial.

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Ţării*. Carol's own 575 activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations.

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles 648 system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall

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[6] In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticize. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

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In November, 1937, the Liberal government reached the end of its term and resigned. Carol requested Mihalache to form a new cabinet, on the unacceptable condition that he collaborate with Vaida Voevod. On his refusal, Tătărescu was recalled to form a cabinet and prepare for elections. He obtained Iorga's collaboration and made an electoral pact with Vaida Voevod's nationalist group. Then, to the general surprise, it was announced that Maniu and the Iron Guard leader Codreanu (and also Gheorghe Brătianu) had formed a nonaggression pact to insure free elections. This pact in recent years has been loosely used by the Communists to prove Maniu a profascist. Such an interpretation obviously will not hold water, and there is no reason to doubt that his purpose in making the pact was as he defined it: to guarantee that Tătărescu could not employ the usual method of fixing the election. It was not a political agreement nor were joint lists established. It might also be added that the Rumanian Communist party gave its support to the National Peasants even after the pact with the Iron Guard.[9]

Nevertheless, the pact was a blunder. It was bound to have a demoralizing effect upon democratic elements struggling for survival to see an alliance between Maniu and the frank and open enemy of democratic and parliamentary institutions, especially since the National Peasant electoral campaign could not be directed against the Iron Guard. Codreanu certainly had much more to gain from such a pact in being able to associate his name with Maniu's. Above all it showed the National Peasants' own loss of confidence in themselves or their ideas, and was in the sharpest contrast to their refusals to make any deals on the road to power in 1927 and 1928. The defection of some of the outstanding leaders of the party in the following months was a further indication of the disruption of the party.

The pact was, however, successful in its immediate aim; by the balancing of forces which it achieved the elections were relatively free (though they elicited a low turnout of the electorate, a sign, perhaps, of the decline of parliamentarism).[10] For the first time in Rumanian history, and the last, a government in power failed to get the 40 per cent of the votes necessary for the premium. The government obtained 36 per cent, the National Peasants 21 per cent, the

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[10] Whereas in the 1928 elections 77.4 per cent of the registered voters actually voted, the percentage dropped off steadily in subsequent elections; in 1937 the figure was only 66 per cent. It is possible, and it has been suggested, that government pressure in 1937 kept people from the polls in some areas. A very interesting analysis of this election is given by C. Enescu, "Semnificaţia alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluţia politică a neamului românesc," *Sociologie Românească*, 2, Nos. 11-12 (November-December, 1937), pp. 512-526.

175 665 Iron Guard 16 per cent, and the National Christian party (the fusion of Goga's and Cuza's nationalist, anti-Semitic parties) 9 per cent. Rumania's curious electoral system had broken down. The Liberals' failure was clearly a loss of confidence. The National Peasants or the Iron Guard seemed the most likely alternatives.

At this point, however, Carol moved in and on December 28, 1937, called upon the Transylvanian poet and lyrical fascist, Octavian Goga, to form a cabinet. Carol's own explanation of this surprising decision, which was in fact the immediate prelude to his personal dictatorship, was that he had no alternative. He could not bring back the Liberals; he did not want the Iron Guard in power, so his only move was to spike the guns of the extreme Right by putting in another but less dynamic Rightist party. There was, of course, another solution: to have called in the National Peasants, but the personal feud between Carol and Maniu precluded that course. There is no evidence, however, that Carol was at all reluctant to take power into his own hands.

Goga was installed with a rather heterogeneous cabinet including Gen. Ion Antonescu and three runaways from the National Peasants, chief of whom was Armand Calinescu. This government had a brief and hectic career, notable chiefly for arousing foreign protests because of its anti-Jewish activities but for little else. On February 10 Carol ended the farce, dismissed Goga, and set up a government of National Union under the Patriarch Miron Cristea, including an assortment of old worthies: Averescu, Vaida Voevod, General Vaitoianu, Mironescu, Iorga, Tătărescu, Argetoianu, Calinescu, and General Antonescu. It was a strange collection when one considers Carol's advocacy of the "younger generation." The period of explicit royal dictatorship had started.

Economic and Agrarian Policy

642 If the drift toward a royal dictatorship was induced by the victories of fascism throughout Europe and by the political conflict within Rumania itself, a third reason was the economic policy pursued after the depression. While much of the dictatorial paraphernalia of these years may be attributed to Carol's personal tastes or to the political desirability of making use of the nationalist and fascist sentiments of the times, a quite separate impulse toward an authoritarian, corporatist society was contained in the economic policy of neoliberalism.

159 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this impulse is to be found

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antry. As for the Iron Guard, while its rise was in part fostered by 668 sympathetic politicians and its temporary success after Carol's fall was with the approval of the Germans, it was in its insane way the culmination of a widespread indigenous fascist impulse which had been building up in the interwar years.

The Rumanian Communists, on the other hand, while not altogether without support, enjoyed neither wide popularity (party membership in 1944 was approximately 1,000) nor control of the instruments of power, and they could not, in 1945 at least, have gained the latter without the aid of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the previous political movements had by 1945 become rather threadbare, either through internal disintegration, senility, or public failure, and one might argue that a break with the past was salutary. But that the Communists were to create the new dispensation was in no way a Rumanian decision. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of communism as such, the Groza government was a Soviet creation. The implications of this fact will be considered shortly.

History of Marxist Parties in Rumania

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were slight signs 668 of pre-Marxist socialism in the Rumanian principalities.[1] Some of 175 Fourier's and Louis Blanc's ideas had been picked up by Rumanian students in Paris, and indeed a short-lived phalanstery was formed at Scaeni near Ploești. Marxist socialism, however, came to Rumania by way of Russia. In the 1870's Iași, capital of Moldavia, was a meeting place and haven for Russian revolutionaries. In 1879 the first Rumanian socialist newspaper, *Basarabia*, was published; its editorials were along Bakuninist-anarchist lines, with a strange flavor of anti-Semitism. In 1881 the first small socialist group in Iași was disbanded by the Rumanian authorities upon the demand of the Russian government.

Between 1887 and 1897 the socialist movement in Rumania revived and developed. Like many currents of foreign thought, Marxism in Rumania was something of a fad. All manner of people employed the terminology. Its political content was loosely defined and combined with anarchist and populist ideas. The intellectual leader of Rumanian socialism was the Russian emigré Constantin Dobrogeanu-

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[1] For a brief account of the socialist movement in Rumania, cf. N. Ghiulea, "Labour Organizations in Rumania," *International Labour Review, 9,* No. 1 (January, 1924), 31-49. C. Titel Petrescu has a lengthy but scrappily organized account in *Socialismul în România.* Trotsky was in Bucarest in 1913; his articles on the Rumanian socialist movement are collected in *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii.*

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Gherea, whose stream of articles defining Marxism and applying it to Rumania had a lasting influence not only upon Rumanian socialism but upon Rumanian thought in general. In 1884 a socialist study group appeared in Bucarest, and in the following year a newspaper, *Rights of Man*. In 1890 a socialist club began to enter candidates in local and national elections. In 1893 was founded the Rumanian Social Democratic party with a program based upon that of the German Social Democrats. Rumania was recognized as a backward country which could not take the initiative in the socialist movement. The work of the Rumanian socialists was to be preparatory, their tactics moderate and legal. The demands of the program were universal suffrage, administrative decentralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, equal conditions for women, secularization of schools, equal application of laws, the right of association, limitation of the royal prerogative, a progressive income tax, and an eight-hour day. The program was explicitly antirevolutionary. The new party attempted to organize workers in the few industrial centers of the country, Bucarest, Galaţi, Brăila, and Ploeşti, and to anchor the socialist movement to the nascent trade unions. It also tried in 1897 to spread socialism in the villages, but this effort was immediately suppressed by the Conservative government. For the most part, however, in this period the socialist movement was confined to intellectuals, who had made a good deal of progress toward formulating a program which they felt suitable to Rumania's special needs.

Between 1898 and 1900 the socialists hit a crisis. A section of the party, weary of the political wilderness and seeing no future in isolation, were tempted by the devil, collaboration. In 1899, under their influence, the party changed its name from Social Democrat to National Democrat on the grounds that Rumania was not ripe for socialism. In 1900 Constantin Stere, later the populist leader, split the party by taking a group into the Liberal camp. By the turn of the century the first effort at creating a socialist party had collapsed in confusion and disagreement.

The Russian revolution of 1905 and the significant increase in urban and labor population led to a second revival of socialism. In this phase the party found a broader base of support; it had more contact with the working class and the trade unions, and a talented leader in Christian Rakovsky, a doctor of Bulgarian-Dobrogean origin with international socialist connections. The tactics of the party were still reformist. While labor groups in a few towns sided with the peasants in the 1907 uprising, the Social Democratic party

took an altogether negative view and admonished the peasants to 668
retire, as they were only playing into the hands of their adversaries. 175
Nevertheless, in the repression that followed, the Liberal government suppressed the Social Democratic party and expelled Rakovsky from the country as an undesirable alien. He was later readmitted by the Conservative government.

The Rumanian Social Democrats campaigned against the Balkan wars, against Rumania's participation, and against the annexation of the Dobrogean quadrilateral. They came out for a federative republic of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. When the First World War came they maintained their antiwar stand and demanded Balkan neutrality. An inter-Balkan socialist conference held in Bucarest in July, 1915, issued a resolution favoring the German antiwar Socialists, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the Russian Left-wing socialists; opposing class collaboration and "social patriotism"; and criticizing the passivity of the Bureau of the Second International. On June 15, 1916, just before Rumania's entry into the war, the workers of Galaţi demonstrated against Rumanian participation. After Rumania entered the war, the Social Democrats remained opposed but ineffective. Party papers were confiscated, meetings disbanded, and Rakovsky arrested and imprisoned.

A new phase appeared with the outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia. On the first of May Russian troops liberated Rakovsky from the prison at Iaşi, and during the period of complete confusion on the Eastern Front in 1917 and 1918 the Rumanian socialist movement more or less merged with the Russian revolution. Rakovsky himself took an increasingly important part in the Russian revolution, becoming president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom in 1919. Rumanian Social Democrats, under Mihai Gheorghiu Bujor, formed a Rumanian revolutionary battalion with its headquarters in Odessa. Inside Rumania itself, however, the socialists were repressed, both in Iaşi, held by the Rumanian government, and in Bucarest, occupied by the Germans.

At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1918, the social situation in Rumania was unsettled, and three years later Rakovsky observed, oversanguinely, that "the prospects of a revolutionary movement were excellent, the position of the administration was critical."[2] Within the country new radical parties sprang up, expressing the widespread dislike of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who was considered responsible for Rumania's involvement in a ruinous war. Externally revolutions were stirring in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. On the other

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[2] Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

668 hand, the steps taken toward agrarian reform in 1917 and 1918
175 provided a safety valve for peasant unrest. Rumania was among the victorious powers and Brătianu was soon to fight for its territorial rewards. The Bessarabian issue was already introducing a national element into the relations with Bolshevik Russia. At the same time Brătianu took firm measures against signs of social upheaval.

On December 13, 1918, the government harshly repressed a labor manifestation at the National Theater in Bucarest.[3] Social tension continued through 1919 and 1920 and reached a final climax in the abortive general strike of October 20–28, 1920. The strike was set off by the restrictive measures of the Averescu government, which had been called in as a party of discipline and order. The general council of the Social Democratic party and leaders of the labor syndicates had presented the government with demands to respect the right of association, to recognize work councils in industrial establishments, to remove troops from all factories, and to abolish the state of siege and censorship. The government responded by arresting the socialist and labor leaders, including the deputies to the chamber. The general strike which followed was precipitated by an independent strike of the workers in the railway shops, always the most militant section of Rumanian labor. The strike lasted only seven days and the government had little trouble in breaking it.

After the failure of the general strike the Rumanian socialist movement split, the more radical section forming the Communist party and the moderates the Social Democratic party. Before 1914 the Rumanian socialists had followed the moderate policy of the Second International and were perhaps even more moderate because of Rumania's situation as a backward agrarian state. The war, however, had the effect of associating the party with the more radical section of the international socialist movement. This trend to the Left was not for doctrinal reasons; the Rumanian socialists had not taken a Leninist position. Rather it was because the big Social Democratic parties in the West, in France and Germany, had become involved in the war and because the Russian Marxists, with whom the Rumanian socialist leaders had close personal contacts, were becoming the standard-bearers of militant socialism. Moreover, the antiwar stand of the Rumanian socialists had put them into conflict with the authorities and driven many of them into illegal activity. Finally, the Russian revolution itself produced a wave of enthusiasm which quite

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[3] According to the socialist leader Moscovici, the demonstration had no revolutionary intent, had occurred more or less by accident, and the socialist leaders had not known of it in advance. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

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168 overpowered any doubts about the "ripeness" of east European countries for the socialist revolution. Thus, such men as Rakovsky and Al.
173 Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the son of the socialist leader), who had been reformists before the war, joined the Communist camp.[4]

According to Rakovsky, the program of the party congress of April, 1919, accepted the basic theses of the Third International, but this trend was opposed by the Social Democratic leaders of Bucovina and Transylvania who were closer to the traditions of Austrian and Hungarian Social Democracy.[5] In 1920 a group of Rumanian delegates was sent to Moscow—solely as observers according to the socialist Petrescu—to examine the situation in Russia and to inform themselves on the principles of the Comintern. This group returned in January, 1921, and it transpired that they had affiliated the Rumanian party with the Third International. A general council met in February, at which the Communists gained control (according to Petrescu, the socialist leaders were in prison as a result of the general strike) and called a general congress for May, 1921. The government now stepped in and arrested for high treason all the delegates to the congress who voted for affiliation, some 70 in number.

After 1921 the Social Democrats and the Communists went their separate ways. In 1922 the Communists attempted to establish a united front in the trade union movement but were defeated. At a general council, the trade unions maintained their political independence; trade union members could belong to any party but party activity within the unions was to be prohibited. In 1925 the General Council of Trade Unions affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation. The Communists in retaliation set up a "United" Trade Union General Council which never achieved a substantial following but which rendered any trade union activity liable to government repression.

The history of Rumanian Social Democracy between the wars is not inspiring, and the party never achieved a large following. It based itself upon the trade unions, a rather narrow foundation for a political party in Rumania. Moreover, it was never quite clear what the relations between socialism and the trade unions should be. Most of the Social Democratic leaders were trade union officials but in many cases they favored complete separation of political and union activities. There is little evidence that the Socialists had any success

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[4] This enthusiastic and nondoctrinal support of revolution was of course the cause of later friction when the Third International undertook to impose the Leninist outlook on the member parties.

[5] Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

668 in improving labor conditions, partly because of their anxiety lest
175 their actions be considered subversive.[6] The Rumanian trade union movement remained weak,[7] legislation passed to assist labor was not applied, and the representatives of industry were successful in impeding labor reforms on the grounds of national interest.[8]

As a political party the Social Democrats had a fundamental handicap. In their interpretation of Marxism they believed that Rumania had not yet reached the stage where it could embark upon or even directly prepare for the socialist revolution. The hopes of the party lay not in Rumania itself but in the advanced states of the West. One of the party leaders, Ilie Moscovici, said in 1923: "Lacking the objective factors—the concentration of capital, sufficient development of industry, and a large proletarian mass—and not having the subjective factors—education and a class conscious proletariat—Rumania suffers all the contradictions of the capitalist regime without having the necessary factors for social transformation."[9] Such a passive outlook, which was admittedly depending upon developments beyond Rumania to realize its ideals, was scarcely likely to win an enthusiastic following. The Social Democrats considered it their principal function to remove the obstacles set by the oligarchy to the free industrial and capitalist development of Rumania, to lift the cultural level of the masses, to bring democracy to Rumania, and to foster international cooperation of labor.

Because of their weak position the Socialists wobbled between maintaining doctrinal purity and collaborating with other parties. They

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[6] For example, M. Flueraş, in 1926, felt it necessary to explain rather apologetically that the great interest shown by the workers in labor legislation should not be interpreted as a revolutionary tendency. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information, 17,* No. 7 (February 15, 1926), 231.

[7] Trade union membership increased only from 25,000 in 1919 to 42,000 in 1929. Transylvania and the Banat had, in 1929, 25,000 members, the Old Kingdom only 11,000, Bucovina, 6,000, and Bessarabia, 790. *Ibid., 33,* No. 8 (February 24, 1930), 265.

[8] In 1934 the Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Labor which said, among other things, "The improvement of the living conditions of workers can only be gradually achieved. Any defiance of this rule must be detrimental to the national economy in that it would bring about both a weakening of the credit of the state and an increase in unemployment, thus leading to a worsening of social conditions. The present limits of economic possibility can only be exceeded by means of an increase of production brought about through the formation of new capital and through an increase in the productive capacity of labor on a sound economic basis." *Ibid., 49,* No. 11 (March 12, 1934), 352. To a degree, of course, this statement was perfectly true. On the other hand, the constant reports of employers' infringements of labor laws, such as the weekly rest act, leave no doubt that their actions were hardly determined by any such general considerations. Cf. *Ibid., 52,* No. 11 (December 10, 1934), 825, report by the Rumanian Chamber of Labor on the application of labor laws.

[9] "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice,* p. 302.

worked with the National Peasants in the 1926 communal elections 668
in an effort to oust the Liberals, and again in the general elections 176
of 1928 which established the Maniu government. A dissenting splinter group broke away to form an Independent Socialist party, somewhat to the Left of the Social Democrats and advocating collaboration with "legal" Communists. Collaboration between the National Peasants and the Social Democrats ceased shortly after the former came to power. The Socialists charged the Maniu government with betraying the working class; at a party congress held in 1930 collaboration was condemned and the party reaffirmed its independence and single-minded loyalty to the workers.

In the years leading up to the Carolist dictatorship the Social Democrats were altogether ineffective and powerless. They drafted numerous resolutions against fascism and in favor of democracy, but were in no position to do anything about either. In 1935 and 1936, when courted by the Communists, who had adopted the Popular Front, they replied that they were unwilling to sign any agreement with the various Communist-front organizations and that common action was possible only if the Communists came into the open and renounced their illegal activities. In the 1937 elections they refused to have anything to do with the National Peasants because of the pact with Codreanu, and succeeded only in reuniting with the Independent Socialists, an achievement of little consequence.

After the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in 1938, the Social Democrats folded up. The collaborationist spirit again made its appearance. The party reexamined its theoretical principles and altered its definition of the state, which was no longer seen as a class instrument but as "an instrument useful and necessary to all."[10] Two of the Social Democratic leaders, Flueraş and Mirescu, entered the labor commission of the Goga-Cuza government. When Carol replaced the trade unions by corporatist bodies, the General Confederation of Labor was absorbed into the Front of National Rebirth, and one of the Socialist leaders, Grigorovici, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship.[11]

If the Social Democrats found agrarian Rumania an unpromising

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[10] This change was expressed in an article by Lotar Rădăceanu in *Gândul Vremii* (March–June, 1938), cited in Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază*, p. 269. Pătrăşcanu was very critical of the theoretical position adopted by Rădăceanu and stated that it cleared the way to accepting the Carolist dictatorship. Still, such facility has its advantages. Rădăceanu is now in the Groza government whereas Pătrăşcanu was discharged from the Ministry of Justice and ousted from the Communist party.

[11] Titel Petrescu, while admitting a good deal of opportunism in these actions, defends them as necessary to preserve what rights still remained to labor.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

668
175

environment for their moderate Marxism and their reliance upon the urban working class, the Communists encountered far more serious obstacles. In Rumania the question of communism was completely entangled in the issue of Soviet-Rumanian relations. More than in most European countries communism and high treason were regarded as completely synonymous terms. This national conflict, which the Rumanian Communists could not begin to overcome, dogged their efforts from the start. Rumania's relations with Russia had never been very good; tsarist Russia may have acted as protector of the Balkan Christians, but its own interests in the Black Sea littoral had always been a source of anxiety to the Rumanian principalities. The dispute over Bessarabia, beginning in 1812 and heightened by the territorial transfers of 1856 and 1878, was a constant source of irritation. Because of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918, the Soviet Union and Rumania did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1934.

In addition to this territorial dispute, the Communists faced another difficulty. The Third International was founded in the hope and expectation that the disasters and havoc of the First World War would create sufficient social upheaval to bring about the proletarian revolution. But as has been seen, while revolution threatened to gain the upper hand in many eastern European states, Rumania stood fast and indeed sent troops to put down Bela Kun's Soviet regime in Hungary. As a result Rumania, perhaps more than any state of eastern Europe, regarded itself as the bulwark against bolshevism, both against Soviet territorial advance and against the Communist revolutionary doctrine. All sides were in agreement on the point. Rumanian authors repeatedly referred to the agrarian reform as the most effective protection against communism. At the League of Nations and other international meetings, Rumania exerted a good deal of diplomatic pressure on the grounds of its importance as an outpost against the Soviet Union. For their part the Russians saw in Rumania one of the key points of the *cordon sanitaire*, an advance base for the malevolent capitalist states.

Where were the Communists to find their support in such a country? They sought it among the proletariat, the small peasants, and the national minorities. The proletariat, as the Social Democrats discovered, was too small to be effective, although the Communists did obtain their few nuclei in the industrial centers. As for the small peasants, the Communists, unlike the Social Democrats, tried hard to penetrate the countryside but the land reforms had weakened its revolutionary potentialities. Besides, the Peasant party was much more likely to obtain the support of the peasantry, and did. The

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

668

Communists did have some success with the minorities (the present leaders of Rumanian communism, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaras are /75 all from the ethnic minorities), but any success in this direction would only intensify the feeling that they were an antinational and treasonous party.

Finally, the Communists were handicapped by the fact that almost from the outset they were an illegal party and with but occasional relaxations remained so throughout the interwar period. Although most of the Rumanian governments were not averse to having the Communists as a whipping boy, the Communists brought a good deal of their difficulties on their own heads by their tactics, which were devious, disingenuous, and unsuccessful. In 1921 Rakovsky remarked with some bitterness that General Averescu was arresting not only the "illegal" party workers but those working "lawfully." [12] In a similar spirit a Communist pamphlet of 1925, describing the uprising at Tatar Bunar in Bessarabia, castigated the cordon sanitaire and the provocative accusations that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble, but went on to say, "Not only the free booters of Bucarest, but the capitalists of the whole world are trembling before the convulsions of the proletarian giant. They fear that the red wave rolling out of the East will burst the Dniester dam and flood onward to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean." [13] Although this dual policy of pursuing both legal and illegal activities received a brilliant defense and elaboration in Lenin's pamphlet, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, it has probably, in the long run, done the Communists far more harm than good. It may be, as Lenin said, that a good warrior should know all his weapons, legal as well as illegal, parliamentary as well as revolutionary, but such a military plan of campaign should have remained a highly classified document, not a broadside, and was bound to lose effectiveness with repetition. As soon as the enemy became aware of this tactic the Communists were left open to the charge of bad faith no matter what course they followed. In the case of Rumania, of course, they had very little opportunity for any legal activity in their own name, but their efforts to achieve fronts of one complexion or another in the 1920's and 1930's were all unsuccessful.

The Rumanian Communist party got off to an unfortunate start. The arrest in 1921 of the delegates who had voted for affiliation with the Third International deprived it of many of its leaders. Among the active members who took their place was Ana Pauker, a young Jewish schoolteacher from Moldavia who had joined an illegal group in the Social Democratic party in 1918. She had married Marcel Pauker, son of a leading Rumanian publisher.[14] Elected to the Central Committee she became one of the party's most determined fighters. In 1924 when the party was definitely outlawed, she was arrested, but was subsequently released and left the country.

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[12] Ch. Rakovsky, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *The Communist International*, No. 13 (n.d.), pp. 112–114.

[13] *Bessarabia . . . The Roumanian Hell*, published in English by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid (London, n.d.), p. 13.

The directives of the Comintern did not facilitate the work of the Rumanian Communists. For example, the resolution on the national question, passed by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, stated that under the Versailles system a number of small imperialist states had been created in eastern Europe to fight the proletarian revolution.[15] The states had been formed by the annexation of large territories with foreign populations.

> At the same time the struggle of the oppressed peoples against national oppression has become a struggle against the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie who were victorious in the world war, since the strengthening of the new imperialist powers means the strengthening of the forces of world imperialism. The importance of the struggle against national oppression is still further augmented by the fact that the nationalities oppressed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, in their social composition are largely peasants, and the struggle for their national liberation is at the same time the struggle of the peasant masses against foreign landlords and capitalists.

Under these conditions, the resolution declared, the general formula, "The right of every nation to self-determination even to the extent of separation," should be rendered more specific: "The political separation of oppressed peoples from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece." The resolution noted with disapproval that certain Communist parties were falling into deviations on this question, that their slogans were not directed against the states founded on national oppression but toward partial reform and autonomy within existing boundaries.

The resolution was even more specific on the Ukrainian question, an evident example of the overlapping of Soviet and Comintern aims. The congress declared that the Ukrainian national problems in Po-

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[14] C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens*, p. 21; C. Bobrovskaya, "Two Bolshevik Heroines," *The Communist International*, *14*, No. 8 (1937), 958–960.

[15] "Resolution of V. World Congress of Comintern on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans," *The Communist International*, New Ser., No. 7 (December, 1924–January, 1925), pp. 90–99.

land, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed one Ukrainian problem 668
demanding a common solution for all three countries. In this case it 115
opposed slogans of autonomy for Carpathian Russia, the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Bucovina because they were directed toward forming a coalition with the wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry. The congress, therefore, considered it necessary "for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it with the U.S.S.R." As for Transylvania and Dobrogea, the congress merely recommended that these areas be separated from Rumania and made independent regions.

Much of the nationalities program of the congress was admirable, its opposition to the hypernationalism of the Balkan states, its championing of national equality and cultural and educational rights for minorities. But these reform measures were clearly of less importance than the demand for separation. It is difficult to see how a party advocating the loss of Transylvania, Dobrogea, Bessarabia, and Bucovina was going to gain much popularity in Rumania, especially when the majority of the population in these areas (with the exception of Bucovina) and much the greatest number of peasants were Rumanians. With such instructions the Rumanian Communist party was never able to shake off the imputation of being an antinational party.

In addition to handing out such uncomfortable assignments, the Comintern heckled the Rumanian Communists for lapsing into any number of deviations. Because the party had been forced underground, it had been unable to conduct the necessary educational campaign to bolshevize itself, with the result that there were deplorable signs of "ultra-left and right liquidatorial tendencies." [16] The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1926 felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian Communists and directed them to correct their errors. Specifically the party was to issue a journal, fight the Right-wing deviations, and "struggle against even the smallest sectional manifestations."

At this time the party was troubled by two questions, the trade union issue and a united front against the Liberals. With regard to the "unitary" trade unions and their relations to the Amsterdam Union, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party issued the following orders:

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[16] Al. Badulescu, in a review of the Rumanian party organ *Lupta de Clasă*, *The Communist International, 4,* No. 15 (October 15, 1927), 811–812.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI

668
115

> The duty of mobilizing the working class masses to insure the legality of the unitary trade unions is a primary one for us Communists. Although the unitary trade unions are not by any means a Communist organization and still less a Communist Party organization, as the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie together maintain, they are the one legal organization based on the class struggle, and it is the duty of the Communists to use all their influence in the unitary and reformist trade unions, in the workshops and factories, for rousing the worker to fight for the legality of the unitary trade unions.

With this approach it is not surprising that the Social Democrats should have complained that wherever the Communists showed an interest in trade union matters, it was disastrous to the unions.

The Sixth Plenum criticized the Rumanian Communist party for its tactical errors in the 1926 communal elections when the party had preached the tactics of the united front of the working class with all opposition bourgeois parties against the Liberal oligarchy. This policy was considered to involve a serious misreading of the Rumanian situation. The error—it was an error in 1926 at any rate—lay in failing to realize that the Liberals were the most highly developed section of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, and that no real anti-Liberal bloc on the side of the opposition parties (i.e., the National Peasants) was possible. The effort to create such a bloc was a serious error, since it "obscures the class-consciousness of the working class, it gives rise to illusions which prevent the crystallization of the one social force which is actually capable of putting an end to the dictatorship of the Liberals: the united front of the proletariat with the broad masses of the peasantry, liberated from the guardianship of the opposition bourgeoisie." In effect this meant that the Communists were not to work with the National Peasants in ousting the Liberals but were rather to attract the peasants away from them.

In terms of the Rumanian situation this tactical directive of the Comintern was absolutely hopeless, although in a negative way it was correct in forecasting the difficulties in ousting the Liberals from their entrenched positions in the Rumanian economy. It must also be admitted that the Communists foresaw the dangers of Carol's return. "The 'Persecution and Exile of Prince Carol,' " said *Lupta de Clasă*, the party organ, "utilized politically by the opposition bourgeoisie can win over petty-bourgeois sections and create the illusion among many workers that a Rumanian 'Mussolini' regime would be in a position to change the miserable conditions of the masses. That Prince Carol is closely associated with the fascist organizations in Rumania is an open secret."

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

As might be expected, the victory of the National Peasants in 1928 668
caused no rejoicing among the Communists. In later years they wrote +15
of the National Peasants as having come in on a wave of popular protest against the Liberals; but the Communists themselves were hostile to the National Peasants before 1928 and fought with them throughout their term in office. Under the National Peasants Bessarabia remained a center of discontent and international friction; Vaida Voevod courted the Iron Guard as allies against the Communists.

To some extent at least this conflict arose from the fact that the National Peasants came to office at just the time the Comintern went off on an ultra-Left tangent, denouncing socialists as social-fascists, and appeared firmly convinced that the Western powers were preparing an immediate assault upon the Soviet Union.[17] During this period Rumania was considered to have a foremost place in the anti-Soviet plans of the Western imperialists. All the energies of the National Peasants were described as being employed against the U.S.S.R., and even the feeble Rumanian Social Democrats were called warmongers.[18]

The Comintern again felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian comrades. "In spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly in the field of the peasant movement." [19] The error here was the old heresy of regarding the peasantry as a social unit and failing to split the poor peasants from the kulaks. Counting on the depression to produce a revolutionary situation—although the swing to the Left had preceded the depression—the Comintern apparently had hopes of bringing social issues to the boil. "The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony. . . . With a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation." [20]

In retrospect this ultra-Left tactic of the early 1930's must be regarded as a disaster which wrought a great deal of damage. The

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[17] Of course these suspicions were fed by such events as Maniu's reported request in 1930 that the British survey the Black Sea coast with a view to constructing a strong naval base near Constanţa. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed*, p. 240.

[18] T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 7, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 300.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 303.

668
175

veering from Right to Left in the Comintern in the 1920's had brought no results but had merely caused the local parties to be regarded as altogether untrustworthy and treacherous political allies. The tactics in 1930 of smearing all non-Communist groups as fascist certainly did nothing to prevent the rise of fascism. It is hard to say how important this was in Rumania. The Rumanian Communist party was clearly on the fringes of politics and failed to make any appreciable headway. By its irresponsible behavior, however, it enabled the parties of the Right to use the Communist label as a means of discrediting all working class activity.

The last effort of the Rumanian Communists to pursue a revolutionary line was the Grivița railway strike of 1933, in which many of the later Communist leaders—Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Pătrășcanu—were involved and arrested. This strike, which began with economic demands, quickly assumed a political character. Vaida Voevod's National Peasant government violently suppressed it. After that, as Pătrășcanu said, the radicalization of the masses served to fortify the Iron Guard and the labor movement was put on the defensive.

The rise of Hitler and the realization that the fascist onslaught was not necessarily the immediate prelude to the Communist revolution was belatedly met by a shift in the party line, officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in the summer of 1935. Gheorghe Dimitrov, in the leading speeches, criticized the previous practice of calling Social Democrats social-fascists and came out for a popular front of democratic forces against fascism. Reflecting this change was an article by one of the Rumanian Communist leaders, Boris Stefanov.[21] "We are basing ourselves," he said, "upon the undoubted fact that the overwhelming majority of the working population of Rumania and even a considerable section of the bourgeoisie are opposed to fascism." What was required was a concentration of democratic forces, including the bourgeois parties, in an anti-fascist Popular Front. The Social Democrats were requested not to remain aloof and even the National Peasants received moderate praise: "The National Tsaranist (Peasant) Party is one of the biggest mass democratic forces in Rumania. Despite all the waverings and reactionary tendencies of some of its leaders, despite its great sins in the past in its relation to the Rumanian people, the National Peasant Party is nevertheless today 668 one of the most important anti-Fascist forces." Stefanov undertook 175 to refute criticisms that the Communist party was undemocratic, illegal, and antinational. As to the charge that it put forward irredentist slogans aimed at separating the new provinces from Rumania he replied that while the Communist party was against national oppression and for national self-determination it was the sworn enemy of the fascists who were trying to utilize the national issue to tear away Transylvania and Dobrogea and subject them to the fascist yoke. Significantly, even in this reconciliatory mood there was no mention of Bessarabia.

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[21] Boris Stefanov, "The Concentration of Democratic Forces in Rumania," *The Communist International, 14*, No. 3 (1937), 943. Stefanov, in 1920, had been one of the members of the general council of the Socialist party who signed the ultimatum for the general strike.

This change of tactics had no important results in the course of Rumanian politics. The Social Democrats remained suspicious and aloof. A Democratic Union was set up in the last years of the Tătărescu cabinet for the purpose of achieving a broad coalition against the extreme Right but, as Pătrăşcanu said, while it was a legal movement it worked "in the ideological cadres of the Communist Party."[22] The Tătărescu government dealt severely with the Communists. In November, 1934, the party, with all its affiliates, was again dissolved; although it had never been reinstated after 1924 its front, the Workers and Peasants bloc, had participated in elections in the early 1930's. In 1936 was held the much publicized trial of nineteen Communists, including Ana Pauker who received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At the time of the 1937 elections the Communists again attempted to create a Popular Front. This effort was foiled by the Maniu-Codreanu pact and by the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate with either the National Peasants or the Communists. The Communists eventually threw their modicum of support to the National Peasants, a move which was later regarded as a mistake.[23] In retrospect it is indeed lamentable that some sort of Popular Front was not created in 1937, the last relatively free election which Rumania was to enjoy, but certainly the Communists by their previous activity had contributed to rendering such a front impossible and must share the responsibility for the breakdown of Rumanian parliamentary government.

Shortly after the German-Soviet pact, in December, 1939, Boris Stefanov, the same who had ardently supported the Popular Front

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[22] Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 110.

[23] According to Pătrăşcanu, the Communists should have forced collaboration upon the Social Democrats, who, in his view, could not easily have refused; if the Social Democratic leaders had later tried to break away, they could have been unmasked. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

668
175

and had denied that the Communist party was antinational, wrote an article in *The Communist International* attacking British and French capital and its attempt to drag Rumania into the imperialist war, insisting that Rumania's interests demanded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union (presumably modeled after the Soviet treaties with the Baltic states which involved the establishment of Russian bases and armed forces in these countries) and directing the Rumanian Communists to work for the right of self-determination in the annexed provinces (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Dobrogea), even if this meant their political separation from Rumania. Although the Soviet Foreign Office publicly denied that Stefanov represented the views of the Soviet government, the article provides some evidence that the Russian interest in Rumania at this time was not limited solely to the recovery of Bessarabia. When this province and Northern Bucovina were taken over in the summer of 1940, the Rumanian Communists naturally defended the action and placed the blame on Carol for his bellicose declaration in the spring that he would fight for these areas. One other event, of importance for the future, occurred in 1940: Ana Pauker, who had been in a Rumanian prison since 1936, was exchanged for two members of the Rumanian parliament who had been picked up in Bessarabia when the Russians moved in.

After Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Communists again shifted their tactics and called for resistance to the German aggression, but unlike the Communists in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia they seem to have achieved very little in the way of partisan activity or sabotage.[24]

The Formation of the Groza Government

In 1944 a four-party bloc headed by Iuliu Maniu for the National Peasants, Constantin Brătianu for the Liberals, C. Titel Petrescu for the Social Democrats, and Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu for the Communists collaborated with King Michael and his intimate advisers in preparing for the coup d'état of August 23 which ousted Marshal Antonescu, expelled the Germans from Bucarest, and brought Rumania to the side of the Allies. Negotiations for a Rumanian capitulation had been carried on sporadically in various neutral capitals since 1943, generally in Maniu's name, and in some cases with the knowledge of Marshal Antonescu and his Foreign Minister Mihai An-

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[24] In 1944 there was a good deal of vague talk about their deeds of derring-do, but I could never obtain any specific examples.

168 tonescu. These negotiations were not successful and were impeded principally by the Rumanians' understandable if unrealistic reluc- 175 tance to face the fact that they must surrender to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Their repeated requests for an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans or for some type of Western protection against the foe to the East had no possibility of success, given the strategic and political arrangements arrived at by the Big Three, and could only serve to intensify the suspicions of the Russians, who were in an increasingly powerful position as their forces drove westward into Europe. The coup finally came after a Soviet offensive broke the German lines in northern Moldavia in the summer of 1944. Following the coup a provisional government was formed under General Sanatescu; the four party chiefs were ministers but most of the cabinet posts went to army officers, in the expectation, apparently, that the first days of the government would be far more seriously threatened by conflict with the Germans than proved to be the case.

By the terms of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12 Rumania was to join the Allies against Germany, supply twelve infantry divisions, intern German and Hungarian forces, and provide free passage for Soviet troops. It was obliged to face three economic obligations: provide for the Allied Command in Rumania, pay to the U.S.S.R. reparations of $300,000,000 over six years, and restore all loot taken by Rumanian troops from the Soviet Union during the war. The 1940 Soviet-Rumanian frontier was reestablished, but the Vienna Award giving northern Transylvania to Hungary was nullified. All persons arrested for favoring the United Nations or for racial reasons were to be released; war criminals were to be arrested; and fascist and Hitlerite formations disbanded. The application of the armistice was to be supervised by an Allied Control Commission operating under the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The term in parenthesis was clearly the ultimate authority.

175 With the arrival of the Russians the Rumanian Communist party took on new life and a new leadership in Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaraş, all of whom had learned their communism the hard way and had spent many years in the Soviet Union.[25] In Rumania as in the other eastern European states a distinction may be made between the purely local Communists, many of whose connections had been primarily with Western Communist parties, and the Moscow-trained group. The difference is somewhat difficult to define, since

[25] In the beginning none of the three assumed official posts; Ana Pauker was occupied with high policy, Luca, among other things, edited the party organ *Scânteia* (*The Spark*), and Bodnaraş appears to have been busy preparing his armed squads.

175 all were Leninists, all disapproved of Social Democratic reformist policies, and all believed in party discipline. Yet there was a difference, which may be illustrated by an example. Communists who had participated in the coup of August 23, were pleased that Rumania had switched sides so facilely and that the country had been spared the devastation of an invasion. Among the people coming from the East, however, there was some disappointment that the state structure had remained intact and they rather regretted that the issue had not been settled by force of arms, which would have cleared the way for immediate Communist reconstruction. This difference in view led to a number of arguments as to whether communism could be created on a rubble heap, an important issue, of course, in the interpretation of Marxism. Those who approached the subject theoretically held to the belief that communism should cap the existing economic structure. The Russian experience, however, seemed to create a different emphasis: once one had achieved power and cleared the political air, communism could proceed to work constructively on the most unpromising type of terrain.

The four-party bloc soon showed signs of strain. Early in October the National Democratic Front was launched, comprising the Communist party, the Social Democratic party, the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of Patriots, as well as representatives of the newly revived trade unions. The Union of Patriots was a rather amorphous body, often called the vestibule to the Communist party, with the apparent purpose of attracting to the National Democratic Front nonproletarian elements, professional men, and intellectuals; it never achieved any particular importance.

The Ploughmen's Front, however, deserves some mention. It was originally founded at Deva in Transylvania in 1933. Its leader was the rather eccentric but prosperous landowner and industrialist, Petru Groza, who had been a minister in Marshal Averescu's People's party cabinets of 1920 and 1926. Initially it seems to have been a straightforward radical peasant movement, rather in the spirit of Mihalache's peasantism of 1920, born in protest against the agricultural debt load resulting from the depression and against the failure of the National Peasants to fulfill their role as spokesmen for the poor cultivator. Its 1933 program was largely a series of peasant demands; three-fourths of the amount of debts to be cancelled, the remaining fourth to be paid over a more or less extended period of time, depending upon the size of the debtor's property; monetary reform to provide more money; reforms in the civil service to prevent nepotism and the holding of multiple posts; the extension of expropriation to properties over 100 hectares as well as expropriation of forest land; abolition of special privileges to industry, monopolies and cartels; reduction of the cost of the products of state monopolies; abolition of metayage, payment in kind, and labor dues; increased mechanization of agriculture; and a truly democratic regime.[26]

During the period of the attempted Popular Front it collaborated with the Communist party affiliates and strongly opposed the tendency of the peasants to join the Iron Guard.[27] During the 1930's it did not achieve any widespread following except in Transylvania, but during the months immediately after August 23 it made rapid strides throughout Rumania, an expansion that was not altogether artificial but did represent an appeal to peasant dissatisfaction. By 1944, however, it had fallen under the direction of the Communists, who were unquestionably the guiding force in the National Democratic Front, and its later function was largely as the rural arm of the Communist party.

An important feature in the political situation in the months after the armistice was the fact that while the Rumanian state structure in the central Bucarest administration had remained intact, the countryside was politically almost a *tabula rasa*. The six years of dictatorships plus the war had broken up local party organizations and their connections with the party leadership. To a considerable degree the political leaders in Bucarest were generals without armies.[28] This exceptional concentration of all political life in the capital, although there has always been a great deal of centralization, gave a certain advantage to the parties of the Left which could rally the workers in the industrial sections of the capital for demonstrations and processions.

After a three weeks' political crisis, on November 5 a more "politi-

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[26] For a history of the Ploughmen's Front, cf. Gheorghe Micle, *Răscoala pământului; istoria luptelor politice ale ţăranimii române 1933–1945* (Bucarest, 1945).

[27] In 1937, Romulus Zăroni, who was briefly Minister of Agriculture in the Groza government, wrote a simple but very clear and effective pamphlet explaining why the hard-pressed Rumanian peasant should not be tempted by the antidemocratic reaction of the fascists: *De ce nu trebue să fie plugarul român fascist* (Cluj, n.d.).

[28] During December, 1944, and January, 1945, I made fairly extensive field trips through Transylvania, Moldavia, and southern Bucovina. The farther I went from Bucarest the less organized were the local branches of the historical parties. In many cases the local Liberal and National Peasant leader had received no word whatsoever from his party's headquarters. The most impressive movement was the rapid expansion of the Ploughmen's Front which was extending its branches up into northern Moldavia and west to Timişoara. At the same time, in villages not far from Deva, its point of origin, there were many peasants who had never heard of the organization. It was my impression that, at that time at least, the growth of the Ploughmen's Front was by no means merely an invention of the National Democratic Front propagandists.

175 cal" coalition government was set up, again under General Sanatescu, with ministerial seats going to members of each of the four parties of the democratic bloc. This ministry was short-lived partly because of the vehement objections of the National Democratic Front to the National Peasant Minister of the Interior, N. Penescu. The case of Penescu is a perfect example of the curious political situation at this time. There is no question that the reason why the Communist-inspired National Democratic Front attacked Penescu was because it wanted control of that important ministry for itself. The directness with which Communist parties have gone after the ministry of the interior in all the eastern European states is well known. At the same time, Penescu was in fact violently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist and had indeed organized a section in his ministry to keep watch on the Communist party. That is to say, the Communists would have been quite justified in suspecting Penescu of hostile intentions, but that was not the reason they wanted him removed. In fact, the arguments they employed in the press were altogether disingenuous.

On December 2 the Sanatescu cabinet was replaced by a new government under General Radescu, who had gained a reputation for speaking bluntly to the Germans and being put in a concentration camp. The cabinet was about the same; Radescu took over the Ministry of the Interior, with the Communist Teohari Georgescu as Undersecretary. Petru Groza was Vice-Premier. For a time it appeared as though this ministry would be stable.

In January, 1945, however, two of the leading Rumanian Communists, Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, went to Moscow. From all evidence it appears that they were given permission, or were instructed, to carry on their campaign. Shortly after their return, the National Democratic Front announced a bid for power on the basis of its program. By this program Rumania was to make a maximum war effort and to strengthen and democratize the army. There was to be an elimination of fascists, arrest and trial of war criminals, and honest fulfillment of the armistice terms. Above all, an agrarian reform was to be carried through. The Front announced that if it came to office Northern Transylvania would be handed over to Rumania. In February the crisis steadily mounted, with violent press polemics and periodic criticisms from the Soviet radio at the laxness with which the Radescu government was carrying out the armistice conditions. At first the attack was directed against the National Peasants and the Liberals, but when General Radescu rather untactfully indicated his displeasure with the agitation and demands, the Front turned against him. The National Peasant and Liberal papers were suppressed, in

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' 175
union. Teohari Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general.

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei 175
Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's im- 648
mediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and 668
started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant

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[29] This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

[30] An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50–55.

668 dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the
648 opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had
● 175 sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians 668
did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing 648
everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military 175
defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a di- 648
vision of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement."[32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave

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[31] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1943 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

[32] Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

page 300

XIV

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: SINCE 1945

Political Developments

● 175 WITH the exception of a brief interlude after the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, the evolution of the Groza regime has been steadily toward exclusive political domination by the Communist party, increasing state direction of the economy, and complete absorption of Rumania within the Soviet sphere of control. Several stages are apparent: March-December, 1945, when the Groza government was holding on, with Soviet support, against the nonrecognition of the United States and Great Britain, and the opposition of King Michael and the National Peasant and Liberal parties; January-November, 1946, a period of uneasy and abortive compromise which broke down completely with the holding of national elections; December, 1946–December, 1947, a year spent in liquidating all political opposition and expelling the king; from 1948 on, the consolidation of the Rumanian People's Republic, the inauguration of economic plans, and a turn to collectivization in agriculture.

It is difficult to determine precisely the degree to which this progress was inherent in the Rumanian situation, and to what extent it merely mirrored the intensification of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the West. It was clear at the outset that having come to power through the will of the Russians, lacking extensive popular support, encountering widespread anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the other political parties, and confronted by a difficult economic condition which was bound to be bad in the years immediately following the war, the Groza government if it was to maintain itself had every prospect of becoming increasingly dictatorial. At the same time, the phases of increasing severity and political *Gleichschaltung* not only paralleled similar trends in other eastern European states but are closely related to the growing animosity between the Great Powers, an animosity to which the eastern European issue greatly and at points decisively contributed.

At the Potsdam Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945, the American delegation presented its contention that the Yalta Declaration had not been carried out in Rumania and Bulgaria. The immediate Soviet response was, significantly, to condemn the political situation in Greece.[1] There followed lengthy and inconclusive debates in which Stalin at one point stated the problem clearly: "A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow."[2] The Potsdam communiqué showed the failure to reach any real understanding:

> The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic governments in these states will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The only concrete gains were declarations that the press would enjoy full freedom to report from these countries and that the work of the Allied Control Commissions would be improved through regular conferences, three-power consultation, and the free movement of the American and British representatives.

The Potsdam Conference did have certain immediate consequences in the Balkans, however. In Bulgaria the elections, which showed every prospect of being rigged, were postponed for a few months. In Rumania King Michael, on the strength of the Potsdam declaration, asked for the resignation of the Groza government as the apparent prerequisite to a peace treaty, and requested the assistance of the three powers in forming a cabinet acceptable to the United States and Great Britain. It was naturally, if incorrectly, assumed by the Russians and the Rumanian Communists that Michael's action was the result of a deep-laid American plan; their reaction was truculent and negative.[3] Groza refused to resign and took a trip to Moscow, where he received full support. An anomalous situation resulted, in which the king declined to sign decrees and the government continued to carry on its business and even attempted to deny the existence of the rupture. There were, however, fleeting and perhaps illusory intimations in September and October of milder behavior and limited political objectives on the part of the regime. Minister of the Interior Georgescu indicated that political prisoners would be liberated; Prime Minister Groza stated that "his government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalization of banks or industry." Even Ana Pauker declared to an American correspondent that the Rumanian Communist party wanted unity to exist between the people, the government, and the king.[4]

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[1] Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 73.

[2] Philip E. Mosely, *Face to Face with Russia*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 70 (July–August, 1948), p. 23.

[3] Rumanians of various political views at first absolutely refused to believe that there was no American scheme behind King Michael's action, but if persuaded such was the case they showed great alarm at the thought of an undirected situation getting out of hand. As far as I know, American action in Rumania did not extend beyond informing King Michael that the Groza regime was unacceptable, a fact generally known, and indicating approval of measures taken to broaden it. The United States did not have, perhaps unfortunately, a positive, thought-out plan of action.

The Rumanian impasse continued to disturb international negotiations. At the unsuccessful London conference, September 11–October 3, 1945, Molotov charged Byrnes with desiring a government in Rumania unfriendly to the Soviet Union and was apparently baffled by the American attitude, as he was reported to have said he wished he could discover what Byrnes wanted so they could negotiate.[5] Byrnes continued to maintain that the present government was not representative and refused, correctly, to accept Molotov's contention that it enjoyed "the support of the overwhelming majority of the population." On the other hand, while Byrnes, in a radio address on October 31, stressed the importance of the Russians having friendly states as neighbors and declared that "America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigues against the Soviet Union," he seems not to have faced the fact that in pressing for free elections the United States was in effect supporting groups hostile to the U.S.S.R.

In Rumania open violence broke out on November 8, when a crowd celebrating King Michael's birthday was dispersed from the palace square by truckloads of Communist workers and fired upon by the Russian-trained Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Although the Groza government made a number of arrests and charged the historical parties with fomenting the outbreak, there is little question that the violence was introduced by the regime and its organized squads. It

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[4] See her interview with Sam Brewer, *New York Times*, October 19, 1945. In the course of this interview, however, she made two dots on a piece of paper and said: "We are realists . . . this dot is where we are and that one is Communism. When we come to an obstacle on the straight line between them we go around it, but we come back to our original line. We had to deviate to win the war. Now we must deviate to conquer present problems. But Communism is always our ultimate goal." A clear-enough sign, if that were needed, that the Communist party was not renouncing its ends, but not really a forecast of the policy to be followed.

[5] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

●175 would be rather naive, however, to assume that the crowd had gathered merely to felicitate the king; it was a political challenge, in a pattern familiar to Rumania and resorted to when the parliamentary structure collapsed.

The Moscow Conference, December 16–December 26, 1945, gave renewed hopes for continued allied cooperation and for an end to the political stalemate in Rumania. According to its final communiqué, King Michael was to be advised that one National Peasant and one Liberal should be included in the government, provided they were "truly representative members" of the parties, "suitable," and would "work loyally with the government." This reorganized cabinet should declare that free and unfettered elections would be held as soon as possible, elections in which all democratic and antifascist parties could take part; it should give assurances concerning freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association. Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and the American and British ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Harriman and Clark Kerr, were to form a commission to consult with King Michael and the Groza government on the execution of these tasks. As soon as these conditions had been fulfilled and the required assurances received, the United States and Great Britain would recognize the Rumanian government.

Although this formula had the approval of the three powers, it had little chance of success. From the point of view of the Western powers and the Rumanian opposition, the presence of two members in the cabinet could not be regarded as an adequate concession, so all hopes were necessarily placed upon the forthcoming elections, but it was quite clear by this time that a free and unfettered election was something which the Soviet Union would not permit. At no time could the historical parties of Rumania be regarded as positively friendly to Russia; by 1946, with the experience of the past fifteen months behind them, their hostility was profound.[6] Moreover, since American and British recognition would be given before the actual holding of elections, there was no obvious means of assuring their honesty, nor could there have been unless the Western powers had been willing to force a general showdown with the Soviet Union.

After a delay in which the terms "representative" and "suitable" occasioned some dispute, Mihai Romniceanu, Liberal, and Emil Hațieganu, National Peasant, entered the government. Both agreed to "work loyally" but held that their responsibility extended only to seeing that the Moscow agreement was carried out. Although they could scarcely be expected to assume responsibility for the cabinet's other actions, it was clear that no real coalition had been achieved. Groza, on his part, agreed to hold elections "as soon as possible" and to guarantee political rights. On February 4, 1946, the United States and Great Britain, with the explicit understanding that the Groza régime would fulfill the Moscow provisions, recognized the government.

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[6] For example, in October, 1945, Maniu stated in a declaration that the "present government is a Quisling government imposed by Russia . . . the Soviet government is doing everything possible to keep Groza and Tătărescu in power." This statement was true, of course, but it is difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union would have permitted the exponent of such a view to come to effective power in Rumania.

For a time the political atmosphere relaxed somewhat, the opposition parties became active, set up newspapers, and planned their political campaigns. This promising situation did not last long. Soon the government resumed press censorship, political discrimination, arrests, and the terrorizing of anti-Communist politicians. In the spring and summer as violence increased the United States and Great Britain repeatedly protested against the delay in having the elections which they expected to be held in April or May.

The government, however, required time to undermine the strength of the National Peasants and to line up their own forces.[7] In March the Social Democratic party divided on the issue of running a common electoral list with the Communists. Titel Petrescu, leader of the party, was ousted and attempted to set up an Independent Socialist party. The indecision which had haunted the Social Democrats since their inception was now approaching its final and pathetic consequences. Petrescu, who was obviously uncomfortable after March, 1945, had compromised his own position by supporting the Communist drive to power; his belated break merely split the party, and the Left-wingers, opportunists, and Communist agents moved into the government fold. In April Tătărescu's Dissident Liberal party agreed to entering a common list with the Communist-dominated bloc. In July the regime issued two decrees, one abolishing the senate and establishing a unicameral legislature, the second creating a new electoral law which extended the franchise to include women but contained certain provisions facilitating the perversion of the electoral process.

The government finally held elections on November 19, 1946, and in all the unedifying history of Rumanian ballots these more than

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[7] A vivid eyewitness account of the election campaign is given by Reuben H. Markham, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke* (Boston, 1949). Markham, who was expelled from Rumania by the Soviet Control Commission for too close association with the National Peasants and for speaking on their behalf, makes no pretense at being a dispassionate observer, but his account of Communist electioneering tactics appears to be substantially correct.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

• 175 held their own. The patently false vote received by the government bloc (the Communists, purged Social Democrats, Tătărescu Liberals, Ploughmen's Front, and National People's party, successor to the Union of Patriots) of 4,766,000, as against 880,000 for the National Peasants and 289,000 for the Liberals, was obtained through a crass combination of preelection press censorship and radio discrimination, terrorism and murder, falsification of electoral registers, multiple voting, and unabashed manipulation of the results.

There is little point in debating whether this election was more or less corrupt and unfree than its predecessors. If, as has generally been the case in Rumania, the perversion of elections is in inverse proportion to the government party's popular support, the Groza regime was clearly obliged to resort to extreme measures in rigging the election if it was to remain in power. But while it is true that a prevailing low standard of electoral ethics had been established by the Liberals in the 1920's and by the more outrageous plebiscites of Carol and Antonescu in the 1930's and 1940's, one should not resort to the rather shabby consolation that "Rumanians do not know the meaning of honest elections." The Communists knew; they had spent the preceding two decades criticizing electoral terrorism. The question is rather whether elections should ever have been regarded as a constructive solution under the prevailing circumstances.

The elections of November, 1946, mark the end of the Allied effort to resolve the Rumanian controversy. Wherein does the responsibility lie? There can be no doubt that the Groza regime and the Russians have the responsibility of breaking an international commitment. The Moscow decision was not faithfully observed in any meaningful interpretation of its terms. This responsibility is not lessened by reference to semantic difficulties, to the assumption that rigged elections aimed at simulating unanimous popular support represent true democracy to the Eastern soul, or that the opposition parties really were regarded as "fascist" by the Communists and hence not within the terms of the Moscow agreement. There may be semantic barriers between East and West but it is a dangerous delusion to take these as examples. The matter was much more simply one of taking the necessary steps to maintain and secure power. If that is the case, why did the Russians and the Rumanian Communists agree to a decision committing them to elections? Perhaps a partial answer is that it would be politically embarrassing to have to admit publicly the truth, that the "overwhelming majority" of the Rumanians really preferred not to have Russia as a neighbor, deeply mistrusted the Soviet regime and any party directed by it.

control over the situation. Admittedly the postwar attitude to be 600 adopted by the Soviet Union was by no means clearly foreseen in 1944–1945, and as suggested above it may not have been altogether fixed, but if, as it appeared in 1950, any effort at American-Soviet agreement in eastern Europe involved fitting a square peg in a round hole there was not, during the period of uncertainty, even an effort to shave off some of the sharper edges of the peg.

In any event, whatever slight chances there might have been of resolving the Rumanian political crisis, through international agreement and peaceful internal adjustment, had disappeared by the time the elections were held. The National Peasants and Liberals naturally refused to accept the results, and their delegates did not occupy their seats in the parliament. In a formal communiqué of November 25, 1946, Maniu and Brătianu, after enumerating the electoral outrages, concluded: "Our parties consider that they can no longer authorize their representatives to continue to collaborate with the present government, the perpetrator of fraudulent and blood stained elections, with which they can have no solidarity whatsoever."[9] The United States and Great Britain did not accept the elections as representing the opinion of the Rumanian people or as complying with the assurances given by the Groza government.

The peace treaty with Rumania, which had been drafted by the 728 Council of Foreign Ministers in the course of 1946 and was finally signed on February 10, 1947, did not materially alter the situation. 175 Although Article 3 obliged Rumania to secure for all persons "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press, of publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting," it was in nowise observed.[10]

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[9] See the annex to the booklet published by the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949), a hostile but heavily documented indictment of the Groza regime.

[10] Some of the main points of the treaty, which in general followed the lines of the 1944 armistice, were: frontiers to be as of January 1, 1941, except for the Hungarian frontier which remained as of January 1, 1938; the obligation to repeal and henceforth not to pass any measures discriminating against persons for sympathizing with the United Nations; dissolving and not permitting in the future any organization of a fascist type or other organization conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or other United Nations; limitation of the army to 120,000 persons; reparations in kind to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of $300,000,000, payable in eight years from September, 1944; guarantee of economic and property rights of United Nations nationals; German assets in Rumania to go to the Soviet Union; free commercial navigation on the Danube for all states; Allied forces to be withdrawn from the country within ninety days of the treaty's coming into force, except for the Soviet right to retain forces necessary to maintain the line of communication with the Soviet Zone in Austria.

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The Groza regime, bolstered by the simulacrum of popular support gained in the elections and faced by an opposition unwilling to accept an unwarranted minority position in parliament, undertook in 1947 to wipe out all unfriendly or doubtful political organizations. In the spring it unleashed a new wave of arrests of opposition leaders, arrests made suddenly, at night, and with no explanation. The Communist Minister of Justice, Pătrășcanu, expressed his belief that an uprising was being plotted but said "there was no evidence on hand fixing the responsibility upon former Premier Iuliu Maniu as leader of preparations for a revolution." [11] In July a number of National Peasant leaders, including Mihalache, were caught in an attempt to flee the country; the government arrested Maniu and the top party leadership and outlawed the party, an action which apparently evoked no popular response one way or the other.

Amid much publicity the regime, in November, tried Maniu and his followers, primarily on the charge of conspiring with "Anglo-American imperialism"; as the Communist paper, *Scânteia*, remarked, the United States was really the "twentieth defendant." Some damaging evidence was produced at the trial; observers seem generally to agree that certain members of the National Peasant party were shown to have been in contact with American intelligence officers to discuss means of overthrowing the regime.[12] Maniu, the principal defendant, while perfectly frank in his opinion of the government's illegitimacy and admitting attempting to smuggle National Peasants out of the country for the purpose of organizing resistance abroad—maintained that his opposition was within the framework of international agreements concerning Rumania, agreements which the government had flagrantly violated. But since the regime had effectively blocked any possibility of parliamentary opposition, underground planning—whether actually envisaging violence or not—was the only alternative to complete passivity.

The trial itself was conducted in a manner unhappily too familiar these days: the judge, Colonel Petrescu, was reportedly the director general of all prisons and concentration camps under the Antonescu dictatorship. Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, the other leaders to terms ranging from one to twenty-five years. Whatever weight one may attach to the demands of *raison*

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[11] See his interview with W. H. Lawrence, *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

[12] As a matter of fact, as early as the spring of 1945 a number of Rumanians, some of whom had close connections with the Liberal and National Peasant parties, were developing underground plans for ousting the Groza government and sought to enlist American support. The charges of plots against the regime were not pure concoctions, whatever the purpose of the trial may have been.

●175 661

d'état—and it is obvious that Maniu and Mihalache did represent a threat to the Groza government—it is absurd to regard in any manner their sentences as an act of justice.

While the Maniu trial was in progress, the controlled press raised a clamor against Tătărescu and pointed out, quite correctly, that many anti-Groza elements were being sheltered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Tătărescu's position had been weakening for some time. In June, 1947, he had circulated a memorandum which contained a fifteen-point proposal for changing internal and external policy: he assailed the government's economic policy, expressed alarm over the country's low economic output, which was still at only 48 per cent of the 1938 level, requested better treatment of foreign capital and less stifling state intervention, and criticized the number of preventive arrests and the poor prison conditions. The Communists were naturally displeased by this note which clearly exceeded the conventions of "criticism and self-criticism." Rumors circulated of Tătărescu's resignation, and in September he was obliged to dismiss several hundred employees in the Foreign Office. On November 5 the parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him; the following day he and the other Dissident Liberal cabinet members were removed from their posts, to be replaced by Ana Pauker at the Foreign Office and Vasile Luca at the Ministry of Finance. (In December Bodnaraș took over the Ministry of War. The real rulers of the country were at last assuming governmental positions.)

Thus ended the political career of an able if unscrupulous man, who had first attracted attention in the early 1920's for his efficient action against the Communists and who had threaded a devious course through Carol's reign. Though disliked and mistrusted by all political groups, he seems to have had a rather Talleyrandian interest in the welfare of Rumania as he saw it.

Plans for the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist parties were announced in the autumn of 1947, though this amalgamation, which was in effect the complete absorption of the Social Democrats within a Leninist-Stalinist organization and ideology, was not completed until the following spring. It seems to have met with the sincere if ineffectual opposition of most of the socialists, some of whom joined Titel Petrescu's Independent Socialist party.[18] The Petrescu faction, however, was subject to increasing attack and

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[18] For an account of this last, faltering episode in the career of the Social Democratic party, see Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949).

175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948,
661 Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 710,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrăşcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrăşcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrăşcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

172 and arrows and valued deer-horn for making holders for
174 stone axes and for other purposes. Later, perhaps, hunting became more important, and incised ornament on the pottery became a feature here as it was also further west-north-west.

THERE SEEM indications that, as time passed, aristocratic herders spread among the early cultivators, and they emphasise connections between the Ukrainian steppe and Hungary across the south-eastern Carpathians and down the Mureş. Copper axe-adzes, some with a median hole for the shaft, have been found at various spots, chiefly in Transylvania, as Childe has well shown. It is thought that the hole was punched through the heated metal and not cast. Ornaments and other details suggest that the aristocracy at least had some connections with the Aegean, and bronze was gradually introduced, as a copper-antimony alloy at first. Parvan has emphasised the importance of the Carpathian area in the Bronze Age, with fine workmanship in bronze and gold, and, in the late Bronze Age and the transition to the early Iron Age, the culture connections seem to have been mainly westward, the analogies with north Italian bronze cauldrons being specially noteworthy. There are several indications that in this period, which, in Europe, seems to have been one of dry warm summers, the south Russian steppes were relatively empty. Probably the previous spread across the south-eastern Carpathians had brought westward horsemen, either already armed with the sword or about to learn to make it, a weapon that would suit cavalry better than the axe-adze of older days. In the transition from bronze to iron the Transylvanian Carpathians were thus the eastern limit of an area including Hungary and North Italy, while southward they were linked with Attica. Agriculture had doubtless improved, settlements had become more or less permanent as it is likely that a rotatory scheme of soil use had been evolved; craftsmanship in gold and bronze for luxury objects had reached a high level.

175 THE PICTURE changes again dramatically round about 700 B.C., through two mutually supplementary influences. Firstly, the climates of Denmark and Switzerland became colder and wetter, so probably that of the Carpathians felt the influence of a lowering of the snow-line and an impoverishment of agriculture and craftsmanship. Iron work had

175 become widespread further west but had hardly reached our region before local decline set in. Secondly, the Russian steppe had become active once more with moister conditions, and the Scythians spread westward, with iron weapons and bronze-pointed arrowheads, through the Carpathian passes into Transylvania and beyond, as well as into Wallachia, where, however, they do not seem to have got through the Iron Gates, though they very probably spread into Yugoslavia. Scythian graves in Roumania are often poorer than those in South Russia, and no doubt Scythian bands were spreading through the Carpathians as they did through Polish Galicia farther north, and into Wallachia as well as via the Dobrogea into Thrace farther south. The old aristocracy of the previous period was apparently temporarily submerged under the barbarian conquerors who scattered in small groups and melted in due course into the general population. Some time after about 550 B.C. Greek trade came northward *via* the river mouths opening to the Black Sea, and Greek cities attained great strength, but did not really Hellenise Roumanian lands; perhaps the Greeks' idea of themselves as contrasted with the barbarians gives some clue to this.

CELTIC CONQUERORS spread eastward and had great influence in the Roumanian area, the early traces, dating perhaps from the fifth or the fourth century B.C. being important in eastern Transylvania and showing a civilisation using bronze and iron, and adapting ideas of ornament brought from farther west but ultimately derived from the classical world (the La Tène culture). It was apparently especially between 200 B.C. and 100 B.C. that the Celtic La Tène civilisation became dominant in this part of the world. It favoured houses crowded together to the number of nearly a hundred, built of wood, or of reeds and mud, and the clusters or villages were on defensible sites over a river or lake in many cases; there was, as in the previous phase, a large survival of fashions from the very early days of agriculture. Fortresses were built by nobles, and included terraces rising up to the central princely residence, often blocks of stone in the ramparts were kept in position by wooden beams, a scheme of building the Romans found widespread among Celtic-speaking peoples, and called the *murus gallicus;* this scheme has of course regional variations. In the mountains of

175 Roumania one of these fortresses at Gradistea Muncelului was built with enormous labour based on extensive organisation at a height of 4,000 feet above sea level. It was the work of a King Burebista who ruled over a large territory. Celtic conquerors penetrated northern Roumania on their way to the Ukraine, and touched southern Roumania on their way to Asia Minor. They brought to the Carpathians the potter's wheel and eventually made iron fairly common, but gold was apparently less abundant than before. The last feature has long been known for the corresponding phase of culture in the west, and has sometimes, rather too readily, been put down to exhaustion of gold supplies from river sands.

FROM very early times the people of this region maintained the habit of cremating the dead, though the Celtic conquerors and others before them favoured interment. Indeed, we get an impression of persistence of the simple folk with a simple early culture under a long succession of conquerors. The connections with North Italy already important in the phase of transition from bronze to iron, and revived in marked fashion by the Celtic peoples, became Roman connections, and after much difficulty the Roman Empire brought the region into subjection, the Roman province of Dacia occupying most of modern Roumania except Bessarabia. It was under Roman rule from A.D. 107 to A.D. 255 with a lingering of that rule until the official evacuation in A.D. 270-275. The Romans were different from previous conquerors in that they developed regular communications and organised agricultural and military settlement, and in Roumania they found the ground as it were prepared for them by earlier Italian connections with Transylvania mentioned just above. Christianity, in this instance at first of western rather than eastern type was brought into Roumania and the clerical leaders no doubt promoted the persistence of Latin elements in the language and helped the more or less latinised peasantry to maintain itself and its Roman tradition for some centuries after direct Roman rule was withdrawn. In Gaul the bishops in their cities maintained a good deal of the Roman tradition through the Dark Ages when trade routes were cut by the advance of Islam and northern barbarians were giving very inexperienced treatment to the ills of a decayed Roman rule. But in the west so much was maintained that in the end the cities

175 revived with, under the circumstances, the Cathedral as their focus of expression. In Roumania fate worked out things differently. The seventh to the tenth century in east-central Europe saw much forest cutting and planting of villages, and the widespread languages of these settlers belonged to the Slavonic family which may have had its [197] early home in or near Polish Galicia. This linguistic influence penetrated Roumania and combined itself with the Latin heritage to make the later language of the country. Magyars passed through on their way to the Hungarian plain, and [184] Huns and Visigoths had gone that way before. So the local tradition weakened along the valley and lowland ways and kept itself alive in the highlands where still dwell people who are no doubt largely descendants of the primeval cultivators with many waves of culture washed over them but the Roman influence vital still.

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

Bell tower, Borsec.

V.—PEOPLES AND SETTLEMENTS: THE POST-ROMAN PERIOD

101 MOUNTAIN REGIONS are often regarded as the refuges of conquered peoples and the repositories of cultures that once flourished in the plain, but although the highlands of Roumania have, from time to time, absorbed groups of folk for whom the lowlands offered insufficient security, the population of the Carpathian valleys must not be regarded as racial sweepings from the broad human highways of the Steppe. The long period of invasions that followed the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Dacia led to a concentration of Roumanians within the mountain areas of either Transylvania, whence they spread later to reoccupy the plain, or the Balkans, where their descendants, the Vlachs, still maintain their traditional form of life ; but, since those early days, their numbers in the former region have been considerably diluted by Saxons and Szeklers who have come in not as refugees but as outposts against Tatar and Turk in what for long remained an eastward frontier zone of western Christianity.

● 125 OUR KNOWLEDGE of events during the Dark Ages is necessarily scanty, but it is clear that settled life on the open grasslands where, indeed, it was possible at all, was subject to constant interruptions. One of these interruptions, the result of Magyar pressure, is of special significance for the history of Roumania from both a political and a cultural point of view. The Magyar invaders of central Europe in the ninth century penetrated far to the west before meeting with any serious resistance. After their defeats at Merseburg in 933 and at Augsburg in 955, however, they fell back towards the Hungarian Plain, and about A.D. 1000 their Szekler advanced guards began to penetrate the hill country of Transylvania. In spite of their comparatively recent Asiatic origin, the Szeklers introduced certain features of western civilisation into their newly-acquired territory, particularly feudalism, which appears to have been the chief concomitant of the Roman Catholicism that they had adopted while in the plain.

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THE spread of Roman Catholicism towards the east brought it into conflict in the eastern Carpathians with the Greek

175 795 Orthodox Church, which was extending its influence north-westwards. The ensuing struggle continued until the seventeenth century, when a compromise was effected and a new church, the Uniate, arose. Strictly speaking, this was a new branch of Roman Catholicism, for its members recognised the suzerainty of the Pope, although they kept the ritual of the Eastern Church (see Figure 7).

175 THESE contacts with the west were strengthened in the thirteenth century, when groups of Saxon crusaders settled in Transylvania at the invitation of the Magyar kings. They became established first of all near Alba Julia (Karlsburg), in the Mureş valley, and later on in the region of Mediaş (Medgyes) on the Tarnava Mare (Nagy küküllő); in the neighbourhood of Sibiu, which they named Hermannstadt; and near the mines of Rodna in the north. Feeling that the Carpathian frontier to the east and south was still insecure, Andrew II invited the Teutonic Knights to occupy strategic points that were undefended, with the result that Kronstadt (Braşov), commanding the Prahova valley, and Campulung were built. The Teutonic Knights quarrelled with the Magyar king, however, and left this area, which was taken over by the Saxons. The defence of the eastern Carpathians, with their two important passes of Ghimeş (Grymes) and Oituz (Oitoz), was entrusted to the Szeklers (see Figure 4).

BEHIND these frontier posts the Saxons were organised in seven colonies under the authority of a count, and they enjoyed various civil privileges in return for the military duties which they performed. The Szeklers were at first grouped in three colonies of a similar character in the tectonic basin of Treiscaune, but they were dislodged by the Tatars in the thirteenth century and sought refuge in the lowlands of Ciuc and Giurgiu where they are still numerically strong (see Figure 7).

DURING the early Middle Ages, the Roumanians were organised in semi-autonomous local groups, each village being under the charge of a chieftain or "kneas" (*pl.* knesi) who combined the functions of military leader, administrator and judge. Although stock-raising was the main occupation of these villagers, arable farming was also practised, and the meagre stretches of cultivable land were divided up amongst

● 175 the various families according to their needs. The pastures and forests, however, were kept in the hands of the community.

THE latter part of the thirteenth century was a critical period for these people; the Tatar invasions were over, and the Turkish invasion had not yet begun. Many of the Roumanian peasantry moved out from the mountains and re-established themselves in the foothills of the Carpathians and of the Transylvanian Alps. The pressure from the west was maintained, however, and the Roumanians became organised on a more strictly military basis. Much of the power of the knesi was usurped by the "boyars," a new military aristocracy that arose, whilst the peasants were gradually forced into a serfdom from which they were not emancipated for several centuries. The various kneaseates became united into small states, under the leadership of princes or "voivods," and were welded eventually into the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The success was short lived, however, for by the end of the fourteenth century Wallachia had fallen under the control of the Turks, and Moldavia soon followed.

THE STRUGGLE against the Turkish invaders was long and bitter; the ways through the mountains needed constant vigilance; the necessity for maintaining a united front against a common foe strengthened the communal spirit; and it is not, therefore, surprising that the alien groups in Transylvania should have preserved their individuality to a remarkable degree. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the Saxons, whose settlements to-day are veritable microcosms of Germanic culture (see Plate V).

[101] ALTHOUGH they originally had a common purpose, these two racial groups of Saxons and Szeklers have remained very different in character, for whereas the Saxons are still very largely confined to the settlements which they established in the early Middle Ages, the political, and to some extent the ethnic, boundaries of the Szeklers have been enlarged from time to time until they now encompass a considerable area of Transylvania.

144 OF the early history of the Szeklers we know but little. Racially they appear to differ somewhat from the Magyars of the plain, and to approximate more to the Roumanians in

4:Fleure S-5 (no date)1936 EDl Rumania EDl

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
TRANSYLVANIA IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES
○ MAGYAR STRONGHOLDS
● IMPORTANT SZEKLER SETTLEMENTS
● OTHER Do.
● IMPORTANT GERMAN SETTLEMENTS
● OTHER Do
☒ FRANCISCAN SETTLEMENT
→ ROUTES OF SZEKLER PENETRATION
CHIEF PASSES
LAND OVER 1000 m.
500 m. CONTOUR
MILES
R. DANUBE
C
T
T-M
M
O
S
S-G
B
1
2
3
4

FIGURE 4. B = Braşov, C = Cluj, M = Miercurea Ciucului, O = Odorhei, R = Rodna, S = Sibiu, S-G = Sf. Gheorghe. T = Turda, T-M = Targu-Mureş. T-S = Targu-Secuesc. Passes: (1) Olt, (2) Prahova, (3) Oituz, (4) Ghimeş.

144 head form, but whether this is due to the persistence of original characteristics or to partial fusion with the Roumanians it is impossible to say. At all events, they are essentially Magyar in culture, and accompanied the Magyars in their conquest of Hungary in the ninth century.

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175 FIGURE 4 shows that their penetration of Transylvania followed the valleys of the Mureş and its tributaries, which

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
SATU MARE
ORADEA
CLUJ
ARAD
ALBA IULIA
TIMISOARA
PLOESTI
BUCURESTI
CRAIOVA
BLACK SEA
PRINCIPAL TYPES OF RURAL SETTLEMENT IN ROUMANIA
TEMPORARY SHELTERS, SHIELINGS
DISPERSED SETTLEMENTS
TRANSITIONAL
SETTLEMENTS with PERHAPS TENDENCY towards AGGLOMERATION
AGGLOMERATED SETTLEMENTS
COMPACT
FRONTIERS

FIGURE 5. The distributions shown are only approximate, but they show the broad distinction between the typical Roumanian settlements ("dispersed" and "transitional") of the mountains and foothills and the compact Saxon and Szekler settlements of the Transylvanian lowlands.

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led naturally towards the tectonic basins of Treiscaune, Ciuc and Giurgiu, though these were not actually occupied until the thirteenth century. The Szeklers did not, however, displace the indigenous Roumanian population in these lowland areas; neither have they maintained the same degree of "contiguous isolation" as have the Saxons. During the nineteenth century in fact, there has been a steady assimilation of the Roumanian peasantry, some measure of which may be gained from the fact that since the middle of the century a Roumanian majority has been changed into a Szekler majority in 169 communes, whereas the reverse process has been effected in only 96 communes. In the former case, large numbers of Roumanians have adopted the dress and religion of the Szeklers, but the Roumanian


BILBOR
CORBU
TULGHES
BORSEC
GHEORGHENI
TARGU MURES
MIERCUREA CIUCULUI
TARGU SACUESC
TREI SCAUNE
St. GHEORGHE
DISTRIBUTION OF FORESTS IN THE SZEKLER COUNTRY OF TRANSYLVANIA
0 10 20 MILES

FIGURE 6. This illustrates the sharp distinction between the forested highlands and the lowlands, and should be compared with Figures 5 and [illegible].

175 178 361 majorities have resulted from the valleyward movement of families that had previously farmed the slopes overlooking these intermont basins.

361 361 AN IMPORTANT distinction between the Roumanians and the rest of the population is seen in the types and distribution of their settlements (see Fig 5). The former, with their customary attachment to highland areas and to pastoral life, are usually associated with a dispersed or loosely agglomerated

009 Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

●175 The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, [186] and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

ORIGIN OF THE RUMANIANS.

The Dacians or Getae, who are regarded as the forefathers of the present-day Rumanians, were one of the numerous Thracian tribes, that together with the Illyrians, occupied the extensive lands lying between the Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas, and stretching northwards to the confines of the Russian steppes. Their presence in the Danubian basin as far back as 1400 B.C. has been confirmed by the researches of the late Professor V. Părvan. In his book, "Dacia," as well as in his latest book "Getica," he shows that the Dacians were in occupation of Transylvania at so early a period as 1500 B.C. and that they had evolved an original art of their own, as may be inferred from the large number of gold ornaments which had been found.

By 700 B.C. they began to be influenced by Greek civilization through the Scythians who invaded the country, and whose rulers were almost completely Hellenized. The influence of the Greek towns on the Black Sea coast likewise contributed in bringing Dacia into the Greek orbit somewhere about the year 300 B.C. The Dacians or Getae occupied a very extensive territory; objects of art attributed to them have been found as far apart as Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and even in certain parts of Asia Minor, according to the testimony of Professor E. Pittard of Geneva ("La Roumanie," page 28). Excavations, conducted at numerous localities in Rumania have brought to light objects which testify that the Dacians or Getae had attained to a high degree of civilization, and this is further corroborated by the fact that they were able to oppose a determined and prolonged resistance to the Romans. Even before the appearance of the Roman armies in the Balkans, numerous Latin immigrants had already preceded them. The decline of agriculture in the Italian Peninsula, due to the importation of cereals from the African colonies, and to the employ of slaves on the large estates, had compelled large numbers of Latin farmers to give up their lands on which they could no longer live, and to seek new homesteads across the Adriatic and in southern Gaul. The immigrants seem to have succeeded in imparting a Latin character to the country, and to have imposed their language on the Thracians. Latin settlements, such as the town of Drobeta, or Drubetis, Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae on the Danube arose. Their influence slowly permeated the region and made itself felt even north of the Danube. According to Professor Parvăn: “By Vespasian's time the veterans and the Roman civilians settled in the Danubian provinces as far as the Black Sea are legion . . . Like Gaul during the same period, Dacia must have been full of *italici negotiandi causa consistentes* . . . A statistical review of the hoards found in Dacia shows that the south-eastern parts of the country were covered, in the main, by Greek merchants, while the Romans spread to the west and to the north. From the first century B.C., however, Roman penetration was at once so powerful and so general that *denarii* of the republic became quite frequent in Wallachia and even in Moldavia” (“Dacia,” pages 151 and 139). And this diffusion of Roman influence was so persistent that Professor Părvan believes that part of Wallachia must have formed part of the Roman Empire even prior to Trajan's campaign. “It seems that about A.D. 6 that a broad strip of territory north of the river was then incorporated into the Empire as a sort of extended bridgehead to face Ratiaria, Oescus and Novae.” “Dacia,” page 180.) The latinization of the Thracians was so complete and thorough that this latinized population subsisted long after the irruptions of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. When the latter were conquered by the Bulgarians, the latinized remnants of the population were yet so numerous and powerful that they managed to impose, during the eight century, two rulers from amongst their midst, in the persons of Sabinus and Paganus, as heads of the newly-established Bulgarian Empire. Though this is rigorously denied by the Bulgarian historians, who aver that these names had been wrongly transcribed by Byzantine writers, the fact that after the lapse of yet another four centuries, the Bulgarians, who had then been subjected by the Byzantines, only recovered their independence through the intervention and under the leadership of this latinized population, seems to fully confirm Professor Iorga's contention that the Bulgarian "Tsars" Sabinus and Paganus were of Latin extraction. 175

There are even further reasons for assuming this to be so, because Sabinus followed a pro-Byzantine policy that was strongly resented by the more warlike section of his subjects, those of Bulgarian extraction, who finally overthrew him.

When the Romans had occupied the Balkan peninsula, they found in the Dacians living in the region of the Carpathians and in the lands to the north of the Danube, warlike and restless neighbours, who by their persistent incursions delayed and hampered the work of colonization. Under their king Decebalus, the Dacians in the year 86 A.D. crossed the Danube, defeated the Roman garrisons, and threatened to overrun the whole province of Mysia. The Emperor Domitian himself had to head an army in order to drive out the invaders, and though he pursued the Dacians across the Danube, and followed them to their mountain strongholds in Translyvania, he was unable to subdue them. Soon after his withdrawal, the Dacians renewed their raids, until finally the successor of Domitian, Trajan, decided to put a stop to their annoying tactics. In the course of two arduous campaigns between the years 98 and 106 A.D., the whole of Dacia was occupied and became a Roman province.

Trajan's column in Rome is a striking chronicle of the difficulties encountered in the course of the two campaigns, and forms a vivid commentary on its chief episodes, while the vestiges of the stone bridge across the Danube near the Serbian town of Kladovo, which was then erected and over which Trajan's soldiers had marched to the conquest of Dacia, may be cited as a testimony of the seriousness and thoroughness with which the expeditions had been organized. A considerable colonization by Latin settlers, reinforced intensively by veterans of the Legions—(these

175 must have been extremely numerous since the Rumanians have derived their word ' batran ' = old, from ' veteranus ') —followed upon the Roman conquest. Though according to Eutropius (Book VIII, chap. VI)—

> " *Trajanus victa Dacia, ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat, ad agros et urbes colendas,*"

" this infinite host of people " may not have been all of Latin stock, yet their common tongue and dominating culture were certainly Latin. So that if the Rumanian claims of continuity of racial descent from the Romans may seem to be exaggerated, on the other hand it must be admitted that they possess a sure and legitimate basis in claiming continuity of tradition and language from the days of the Roman colony of Dacia.

Vestiges of Roman towns such as those of Ulpia Trajana, Micia, Porolissum, Romula, Apulum, Napoca, and Potaissum, testify to the importance of these settlements, while numerous ruins of roads, temples, palaces and baths, show that an era of prosperity ensued which merited the epithet of "Dacia felix," ascribed to the colony on Roman medals. From the fusion of Dacians with Latin settlers arose the ancestors of the Rumanians, who to this day continue to cherish living memories of the Roman connection in the spoken word they use, and in the name they proudly carry.

The appellations of Wallachs and Wallachia, conferred at times on the Rumanian people and the land they inhabit, seem to have a striking similarity to the term "Wealas" by which Anglo-Saxons in England designated the Romano-Britons. It may be casually remarked that the Anglo-Saxons called the Romans of Gaul, "Galwealas," and the Byzantine Empire, "weala ric." That "wealas" was equivalent to the epithet ' Roman ' is also apparent from Aelfric's glossary in which "*jus quiritium*" figures as "Weala sunder riht." So that the name "Wallach" may well constitute yet another proof of the Latin ancestry of the Rumanians, since they seem to have elicited this appellation by Teutonic and Slav tribes who used this term of "Wealas" or "Wallachs" as a generic designation of Latin-speaking peoples. One may yet find further

175

evidence in support of this contention in the fact that various kindred groups of Latinized Thracians who survived the barbarian invasions in the Balkan peninsula, were all designated by similar terms, namely:—Wallach, Kutso-Wallach, Mauro-Wallach, etc.

There is a certain parallelism in the Roman conquests of Britain and of Dacia, for both constituted the most outlying European provinces of the Roman empire, and nevertheless remained to the last amongst the most loyal and attached to the Roman tradition.

If the spread of the Latin language after the conquest was rapid in Britain, since we find the poet Martial boasting that "*dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia versus,*" it seems that the Latinization of the Dacians and Thracians must have progressed at an equally rapid pace; for when the Romans proceeded to plant settlements of latinized races in Britain, we find amongst others, those of Amboglanna (Birdoswald) and Gabrosentis (Drumburgh), both near Hadrian's wall, the first composed of Dacians, and the second of Thracians; while further south we find two other settlements of the latter at Wroxester and at Cirencester. These settlements were not exclusively composed of military in temporary occupation, but had a permanent character, as may be deduced from the inscriptions on altars and tombs which show that these settlers had remained in the same place from a very early period.

In fact, numerous stone effigies of the so-called Thracian horseman have been found all over Britain, which would prove that the contingent of Thracians who settled in Britain was considerable. The withdrawal of the Roman Legions from Dacia in A.D. 271, was in no way followed by a mass exodus of the latinized population, and the situation must have resembled that of Britain in 407 on the same occurrence. As the Roman Britons were able to maintain themselves politically unassisted until 582, when they were overwhelmed in the battle of Deorham, though, even this disaster does not seem to imply that every vestige of Roman influence and culture was extirpated; so, with most of the Latinized Dacians who remained after the departure of the Roman troops and functionaries from

175 Dacia. They were able to preserve a certain vague relation with the Empire, seeking refuge in the mountain fastnesses of the Carpathians whenever the tide of foreign invasions ran high, and returning again to the plains when the ebb set in. The plain country bordering on the Danube, and especially its eastern portion was on the main road of invasions, and must have always been unsafe for settlement. Even when Rumania had secured her independence, this region was almost a desert, and it was at a later period that it was colonized gradually. The Wallachian plain was very sparsely inhabited early in the nineteenth century, while its eastern part, the Baragan, was only colonized after 1860.

The main body of the nation, established in the highlands of Transylvania, Maramureş, and Bucovina, did not have to suffer overmuch from babarian invasions. Slavs and other barbarian tribes overran the country, but the narrowness of its cultivable area did not sufficiently attract the invaders who moved on southwards and crossed the Danube, lured on by the glamour of the rich lands of the Eastern Roman Empire. Small bands of Slavs probably strayed out of their way, and lost themselves in the maze of the mountainous valleys, to be merged finally in the dominating nationality, or have remained in isolated groups, undisturbed and stagnant as the backwater of a stream. Even to-day one comes suddenly on descendants of these invaders of old who may be recognized by their more primitive traits from their more comely Rumanian neighbours.

That the inhabitants of the mountainous regions are the real descendants of the old Daco-Roman population is confirmed by Prof. E. Pittard in his "Roumanie" (p. 33): "The mountaineers are more decidedly brachycephalous than the inhabitants of the plains. They are of higher stature——this type represents the real aboriginal Rumanian type."

The Latinized Dacians who remained behind after the departure of the Roman Legions must have been in preponderating strength since they seem to have exerted a strong civilizing influence on the Goths, if we are to judge from the writings of Gibbon, who rather heedlessly bestows on them the epithet "degenerate" which they hardly seem to deserve since they were able to curb the fury of the Goths. Nor is there any proof which would justify his imputation of their having renounced their allegiance to Rome. In his "Decline and Fall" (Vol. I, chap XI, p. 226) writing on the relinquishment of Dacia by the Emperor Aurelian, Gibbon states:—"the old country of that name retained, however, a considerable number of its inhabitants who dreaded exile more than a Gothic master. These degenerate Romans continued to serve the empire whose allegiance they had renounced, by introducing among their conquerors the first notions of agriculture, the useful arts, and the conveniences of civilized life. An intercourse of commerce and language was gradually established between the opposite banks of the Danube, and after Dacia became an independent state it often proved the firmest barrier of the empire against the invasions of the savages of the North. A sense of interest attached these more settled barbarians to the alliance of Rome, and a permanent interest very frequently ripens into sincere and useful friendship." The Emperor Constantine, in 330, undertook a campaign in Dacia, at the time overrun by the Goths, and assumed the title of "Restorer of Dacia." The restoration, though brief in the political sense, was not altogether of an ephemeral character however, for it is recorded that the Emperor Justin, himself a Dacian by race, adopted towards the end of his reign his nephew Justinian as his successor, and according to Gibbon (Decline and Fall, Vol. III, p. 36) "drew him from the rustic solitude of Dacia to have him educated (520-527) at Constantinople." . . . . This would indicate that the state of Dacia was very far from being disturbed, and was considered as a by no means unfit place for the residence of even such an ambitious and talented youth as the then heir to the Empire.

In Justinian's reign an expedition was sent across the Danube against the Gepidae who had invaded Dacia. Fortresses along the Danube were reconstructed and enlarged and new ones were built with an eye to the protection they were in effective occupation of that region, and that they must have successfully withstood for a long period any attempt by other tribes to move towards the Danube. Dr Feher goes even so far as to opine that the ancestors of the Hungarians derived the elements of civilization from these "Proto-Bulgarians," as he calls them.

According to Byzantine chroniclers, Bulgarian suzerainty during the eight and nine centuries extended as far north and west as to include parts of Transylvania. Thus the Bulgarian Khan or "Tsar" Krum is mentioned as having removed the prisoners taken in his Thracian campaigns to "Bulgaria across the Danube." In this respect it would be pertinent to refer to Prof. S. Runciman who asserts that Krum reigned over the Bulgarians of Pannonia prior to becoming the ruler of the Balkan Bulgarians. "How it happened we cannot tell. Probably the Balkan Bulgarians had always kept in touch with their cousins. Since Asperuch's day the Khan of Plisca (the first capital of Bulgaria) had controlled the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Pannonian Bulgars in Transylvania were not far off; only the Carpathians divided them." (History of the First Bulgarian Empire, p. 51).

The region to the east of the river Theiss is known to have remained for some time under the sway of the Bulgarians. Thus Prof. E. Sayous in his "Histoire Générale des Hongrois" affirms that when the Magyars at the end of the 9th century first invaded Hungary under their leader Arpad, they found the country to the east of the Theiss and Transylvania, in possession of Bulgarians, either alone, or mixed with Wallachs. The country was ruled over by four distinct Bulgarian Kings who were subjected by the Magyars in the 11th century.

This Bulgarian overlordship of Rumania is contested by some Rumanian historians though others admit it. Thus Professor Bogdan, in his book "Romînî şi Bulgari" affirms that between 680 and 1018 the Bulgarians exerted a cultural influence on the Rumanians, who adopted from them their religious and political institutions as well as the Bulgarian language for diplomatic and church use. The Rumanians had been converted to Christianity before the arrival of the Bulgarians in the Balkan peninsula. An inscription is still to be found at Cluj which proves that a branch of the Christian church existed there under Roman domination.

A Latin episcopate had been founded in 535 at Ochrida (Prima Justiniana) for all Illyricum, including lands south of the Danube, as well as Dacia, and it was after the Bulgarians had been converted to Christianity at about 866 that the Rumanians adopted the Bulgaro-Slavonic liturgy for their church. Though Professor Bogdan believes that Bulgarian influence ceased with the fall of the first Bulgarian Empire in 1018, and that subsequently only the results of this Bulgarian influence made itself felt, this seems hardly likely. On the contrary, Bulgarian influence must have been further intensified owing to the migration into Rumania of Bulgarian dignitaries and refugees who at this time sought to escape from the Byzantines.

Professor Bogdan in his work "Luptele Romînilor cu Turcii pana la Mihai Viteazu" states that the Rumanians on the north and south banks of the Danube, overwhelmed by the successive invasions of Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Avars and Slavs, sought refuge in the mountainous valleys, and there, under the authority of the Bulgarians, formed the basis of their future organizations in principalities and duchies. When the Hungarians made their appearance these small states already existed and fell gradually under their rule. Professor P. Constantinescu of Jassi seems to share the same views as to the influence exerted by Bulgaria. In a very interesting booklet entitled "Criptographia si istoria Româneasca," published in 1925, M. Em. Grigoras adduces certain facts which would tend to prove that by the year 1111 the district of Oltenia formed an independent state under the sceptre of a so-called Cosnila Assen, who may well have been a relative of the Assenides of Bulgaria, since it is well established that the founders of that dynasty were very closely connected with the populations of the north bank of the Danube and only succeeded in freeing Bulgaria from the Byzantine mastery in 1186, after receiving substantial help from across the Danube.

It is possible that following on the subjection of the first

175

Bulgarian empire, the Byzantines may have extended their domination even beyond the Danube, so that the newly formed duchies and principalities acknowledged their suzerainty, and even co-operated with them against an enemy that threatened the security of both. We thus find the Byzantine historian Cinamus, in his narrative of Manuel Comnenus' campaign in 1152–4 against Hungary, stating that the Emperor's army was joined by many Wallachians, to whose Latin origin he alludes. The close co-operation and understanding which obtained among the Wallachians and Bulgarians, and at a later period the Cumanians, is illustrated by the events which led to the restoration of the second Bulgarian Empire in 1186. The revolt was led by the brothers Peter and Assen of Wallach lineage, supported mainly by Wallachs living on the right bank of the Danube, throughout Mysia, and as far south as the Pindus. At first the movement was not successful, and the leaders had to retire to the north of the Danube in order to solicit the help of the kindred populations living there. It was only after summoning them and the Cumanians to their assistance that they succeeded in defeating the Byzantines and securing their independence. As, further, the new Bulgarian rulers assumed the title of "rex Bulgariae et Blachiae," and the bishop of Tirnovo (the then capital of Bulgaria) that of "primus Bulgarorum et Blachorum," one may surmise that there was a very close collaboration between the two peoples. Nikita Akominat, whose writings form the main source of documentation for this period, distinctly indicates that Mysia was peopled mainly by Wallachs, and that the Bulgarians were mostly in Macedonia. What the Byzantines at the time seemed to dread most was the possibility that the Wallachians might unite with the Bulgarians. (Nic. Honiatae, Historia ex recensione Im Bekker Bonnae 1835, p. 488–489).

Prof. Onciul in his "Originele Principatelor Romane," also lays stress on the close co-operation between Bulgarians and Wallachs during this period, and ascribes the weakening of the Wallach element in the regions to the south of the Danube to the relative safety that ensued with the rise of the Bulgarian Empire, which event encouraged

175 many Wallachs to return to their homeland to the north of the Danube.

During the eleventh century the Hungarians engaged in a policy of steady expansion to the east, and came into collision with the Wallachs. It is through Hungarian sources that we first hear of Wallacho-Bulgarian principalities existing on the eastern confines of Hungary, in the Banat and Transylvania. The famous Notarius Regis Belae of Hungary refers to Hungarian victories over a Prince Glad, who is designed as "dux Bulgarorum et Blacorum," and relates that the latter's army was composed of Bulgarians, Wallachs and Cumanians. King Bela also, in an epistle addressed to the Pope, complains of incursions by Bulgarians and Cumanians against which for his protection he found himself compelled to settle the Knights Hospitallers of St John on his eastern frontier near the Danube. In 1233 reference is again made to a Hungarian ruler who had been established in the Banat of Severin, whose subjects were "Valachi schismatici."

The subjection of Bulgaria by the Turks in 1394 was followed by a large immigration of Bulgarian nobles and church dignitaries into Rumania, and Bulgarian influence and culture was further strengthened and gave rise to a period of literary and artistic flowering that recalled, according to Prof. Bogdan, the influence exerted by the Greek *émigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. This is in no way surprising, since the Bulgarians being for centuries direct neighbours of the Byzantines, were able to assimilate to a certain extent their civilization and transmit it to the Rumanians who were further away.

197
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Numerous manuscripts dating from the 14th to the 17th centuries, mainly compiled in the chancelleries of the various Wallach princes, testify to the deep influence Bulgaria had exerted during this period. The language in use was not uniform but gradually evolving, which proves that it was not used merely as a standard language, like Latin, but that it was spoken by those who made use of it. This will explain the large admixture of Slav words in the Rumanian tongue, which were derived mainly from

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

Bulgarian sources. The toponymy also of Rumania 175
reveals a great number of names of Slavo-Bulgarian and 197
Cumanian origin, which can only be explained by the 177
former presence in large numbers of these two peoples in Rumania. Prof. Xenopol, in his "Istoria Romanilor," vol 1, p.71, dilating on the Slavo-Bulgarian toponymy extant in Rumania, expresses the belief that the mere official use of the Slavo-Bulgarian language is not sufficient to explain the adoption of geographical terms in this language, and that their presence must be ascribed to a "connection between people and people." An examination of D. Francescu's "Dictionaru Topograficu şi statistico al Romaniei" (1872) and Dr L. Colescu's "Dictionarul statistic al Romaniei (1914/5) would reveal an astounding number of such names. As regards the nomenclature derived from Cumanian sources, we have, Coman, Comana, Comanae, Comania, (thrice) Comanianca, Comani (twice), Comaniţa, and Comanesti (six times). Similar names are met with in Bulgaria and Macedonia (i.e. Kumanovo) and if we recollect that the Cumanians gave a royal dynasty, that of the Terters, to Bulgaria, it will be understood that this now lost people had exerted a wide-spread influence in the Balkan peninsula.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES TO 1914.

175

The policy of easterly expansion pursued by the Hungarians forced the first Rumanian political communities which had developed in the relative security of Transylvania to retreat before the continuous pressure exerted by the Hungarians. Many of the Rumanian nobility, however, seem to have passed over to the conqueror in order to safeguard their wealth and privileges at the price of Magyarization, as did the Serbian aristocracy in Bosnia which accepted the faith of their Turkish conquerors so that they might retain their lands. These Magyarized Rumanians of Transylvania gave to Hungary her most heroic figure, that of John Hunyady, as well as one of her great kings, Matthias Corvinus, son of the former.

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

RUMANIA

175 Towards the end of the thirteenth century we find these Rumanian communities abandoning Transylvania and emerging from the defiles of the Carpathians to settle to the south and east of these mountains, where they appear as the two sister principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia extending gradually their sway to the Danube and the Black Sea.

They had hardly consolidated their rule before the Turks appeared on the Danube, and Wallachia was the first to become tributary to the Sultan in 1391. The greater part of the succeeding five centuries was spent in the effort to maintain a precarious semi-independence. The subjection of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Turks differed essentially however from the submission of the other Balkan states to the same rule. In exchange for the tribute to the Sultans, the native aristocracy remained undisturbed, and continued to enjoy its privileges, one being the right of electing the ruling prince, so that the Rumanian people could continue to develop, having never experienced the abject servitude endured by Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia. The relatively privileged position of the Rumanians may be gauged by the fact that Moslems were not allowed to settle in the principalities nor to erect mosques to the north of the Danube. The history of the next five hundred years is not edifying, for it abounds in sordid intestine rivalries and intrigues, alternating with incursions by Hungarians and Poles. The fleeting appearance of outstanding personalities such as that of Stephen the Great, prince of Moldavia, threw occasionally a brief glimmer on the prevailing darkness. He inflicted a signal defeat on the Turks on the river Racova in 1475, an event that rendered him a conspicuous champion of Christianity, winning for him the praise and benediction of Pope Sixtus IV. It may be said that he was the main factor that brought to a stop the raid of Mohamed II against Central Europe. He endeavoured to create an alliance of Christian Powers to continue the war of liberation against the Turks, but instead of meeting with aid he had to face the hostility of the Poles, who even invaded Moldavia. At the end of his reign, disgusted by the insincerity of his Christian neighbours, Stephen the Great /75 finally came to terms with the Turks, and acknowledged their suzerainty in order to safeguard Moldavia from even greater misfortunes.

Another heroic figure is that of Michael the Brave, who for the brief period of a few years battled incessantly against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, and succeeded in enfranchising and uniting all the Rumanian territories. His exploits fired the imagination of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians, all of whom hailed in him the predestined liberator of the Balkan Christians; premature hopes that were to vanish at his untimely assassination in 1601. His military feats are somewhat tarnished by the fact that he introduced serfdom in Rumania, rendering thereby the lot of the hard pressed peasantry even more grievous than before. On his disappearance the Turks further strengthened their hold on the country, and exerted their rule almost without restraint. It may be incidentally noted that Michael the Brave's accession to the dignity of prince was facilitated through the support of Barton, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, though the latter's intercession was not entirely disinterested. The next instance we hear of reference to England relates to a commercial treaty concluded between Peter V of Moldavia, and Queen Elizabeth in 1588.

Two other princes of mark, Matthew Basarab and Basil Lupu, reigned almost simultaneously about the middle of the seventeenth century over Wallachia and Moldavia, and distinguished themselves as legislators and protectors of literature. The coincidence of their rule was most unfortunate, as they wasted their mutual abilities in underhand plots and intrigues to oust each other from their respective territories.

By 1716, the Turks became so predominant in power that they forbade the future election of native princes, finding them too prone to intrigue with the neighbouring Christian powers, and henceforth they appointed Greek Phanariots from amongst their Constantinople subjects to rule over the two principalities. The imposition of alien rulers left a most deplorable impress on the political life of

175 the country, owing to their addiction to corruption and rapacity. The thrones of the two principalities were put up to auction to the highest bidder, and as the posts, though lucrative, were precarious, their holders sought to recover the money spent in their acquisition by exactions from the unfortunative natives who were literally fleeced in order to satisfy the grasping covetousness of the rulers palmed upon them. As the Turks found that the conferring of these offices was a very profitable business they proceeded to accelerate the rate at which they were filled, until every two or three years new appointments were made. If the princes had come by themselves the evil would have been circumscribed; unfortunately, they were followed by retinues of hungry and greedy retainers who coveted and secured all the ecclesiastical and administrative offices. They acted like veritable harpies, bleeding the country white, and it is not surprising that they should have imparted to the Rumanians, by nature most kindly and hospitable, a sense of intense destestation for the foreigner, that found expression in such popular sayings as the following: "Nici o poamă nu-i amara ca strainatatea'n ţara" (There is no bitterer fruit than the foreigner in the land). "Atunci ii face strainul frate, cand a da din piatra lapte, Si straina suriora, Cand a pocni pusca goala." (You will turn the foreigner into a brother when the stone will yield milk, and the foreigner into a sister when the gun will go off unloaded).

The only counterbalancing advantage the Phanariots brought to Rumania was the dissemination of Western and mainly French culture. The Phanariots had all been reared in a centre which for centuries had been impregnated by French ideas, where the French tongue was spoken by all who claimed to have some refinement. France, in Constantinople, had succeeded to the rôle formerly played by the Venetians and Genoese, and her influence both politically and commercially had been paramount for centuries, and was so fertile, at least culturally, that French is still the predominant tongue to-day in the maritine zone of the Near East.

The Phanariot princes used French in their international relations, and were usually accompanied by French secretaries during their stay in the Danubian principalities. 175 Their court receptions were conducted in French, and the native aristocracy came more and more to copy the fashion set them by their rulers. French literature was widely diffused, the youth of the wealthy classes flocked more and more to Paris for their studies, until Rumanian intellectuals became so imbued with French ideas that they began to look on France as their second country. It is regrettable that while slavishly copying the French they did not show more discrimination between good and bad, and failed to assimilate to any great degree those qualities of the French which inspire admiration and respect, but rather tended to copy French superficiality. It may be pleaded in defence of the Rumanians that, owing to their inexperience and naivety, it was natural that they should be impressed by the gloss and tinsel of a civilization rather than by its more solid and austere aspects; all the more so, since being semi-orientals, they would as such be more prone to be struck by what is pompous and ostentatious and to neglect what is more positive and sane. After all, in the social as in the economic field, Gresham's law is always operative—the bad always drives out the good; this is why customs which are worst are those which seem to spread most readily. At any rate such was the strength of French cultural influence in Rumania that the memories of the old Latin connection were completely revived and the sense of her Latinity once more restored after the consciousness of it had been somewhat dimmed by the lengthy connection with Slavo-Bulgarian culture in the middle ages. It is certainly owing to their saturation with French culture that the Rumanians have not been absorbed by the Russians, and for this reason the Phanariots may be pardoned for all the evils they brought in their train, since at the same time they bestowed on Rumania that which safeguarded her most precious possession, the notion of her nationhood. It should be noted, however, that the Phanariots had imparted a particular tone to French culture which they transmitted, which is characteristically Byzantine, and not French, and for this reason it will be vain to search in

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Rumanian cultural life expressions of that virility and stamina which distinguish the French. The large influx of Greek Phanariots, and their assimilation by the wealthier class of the Rumanian population, resulted in the formation of a distinct group among the people, which, though it constituted the leading class, yet did not possess the essential traits usually the mark of a real nobility. Moral apathy, laxity, inertness . . . these formed, and unfortunately still form, the distinctive traits of this class, and in a sense, differentiate it from the great bulk of the people, which fortunately for itself does possess more virile qualities than its hybrid aristocracy.

The psychical disassociation of the aristocracy from the people is patent, since the former has contributed nothing to the national literature or art, nor to its spiritual development. The aristocratic class has stood haughtily aloof from the masses and even repudiated what kinship there may have been between the two by adopting French for their language, copying servilely French manners and turning their backs provokingly on such native traditions as others would have cherished and revered. The reign of the Phanariots came to a close with the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821; the Turks nominating henceforth native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. Their advent was marked by an increased interference of Russia in the affairs of the principalities, until by the treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Tsar virtually assumed the power which the Sultans had hitherto exerted.

During the rule of the Phanariots, the Rumanians suffered other and more serious misfortunes than their depredations. The Turks had countenanced the annexation by Austria of Bucovina in 1775 on the most flimsy of pretences, while in 1812 they ceded Bessarabia to Russia. Owing to the series of wars undertaken by Russia against Turkey, the principalities were repeatedly occupied by Russian troops, who remained in indisputed possession for several years at a time, until the outbreak of the Crimean war, when their place was taken by the Austrians.

The solitary compensation the Rumanians derived from the Russian interventions was the conferring by the latter of a more modern constitution in 1831, known as the "règlement organique," which, though altogether inadequate from the liberal point of view, yet placed the administration on a sounder footing than before. The inspirer of this reform, General Kisseleff, being an enlightened man, would have conferred several privileges on the peasantry whose status was akin to serfdom, but unfortunately he encountered obstinate opposition on the part of the landed aristocracy, who insisted on the maintenance of their feudal privileges and thus proved an obstacle to real reform. At the Congress of Paris (1856) on the close of the Crimean War an attempt was made by the Western Powers to checkmate Russia's expansion policy. She was therefore forced to retrocede the southern part of Bessarabia to Moldavia, and her tutelage over the principalities was abolished. The subject of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia was broached by the Rumanian delegates, and although this proposal met with warm support from France and Italy, and strange to say from Russia also, unfortunately owing to strenuous opposition on the part of England and Austria, the scheme was rejected, though certain concessions to the Rumanian demands were acceded to, amongst others that of the right of permitting Wallachia and Moldavia to assume the title of "United Principalities," a concession that ultimately rendered the attainment of union feasible a few years later, when, thanks to the benevolent attitude of Napoleon III, the two principalities were able to merge into one, a measure that made them better adapted to defend their national integrity.

As it was known that the neighbouring Powers would not countenance such a move, the Rumanians of the two principalities used the subterfuge of electing the same prince in the person of Alexander Cuza, who was finally acknowledged by the Turks, thanks to France's strenuous exertions on behalf of the principalities. His brief reign (1858-1866) forms a landmark in Rumanian history, as it indicates the end of dissensions and intestine rivalries between Wallachia and Moldavia which prepared and maintained that condition of helplessness

175 which had left them at the mercy, first of the Turks, and later of the Russians and Austrians.

Prince Cuza proved a very enlightened and patriotic ruler. Seconded by his able minister Cogalniceanu, he introduced a law making elementary education compulsory and free. He founded the two universities of Bucarest and of Jassy, and improved the status of the peasants, emancipating them from the intolerable burden of their feudal obligations. In order to allot land to the landless peasants, he proceeded to sequestrate monastic properties, and expropriate part of the larger estates belonging to the nobility. By his patronage of the peasantry he brought himself into conflict with the Church and the aristocracy, and as his innovations were counterbalanced by high-handed methods in dealing with his opponents, he displeased even those among his subjects who were more liberal-minded. Finally a conspiracy was hatched and the organizers, breaking one night into the palace, forced him to sign his abdication, and drove him into exile where he died seven years later. It is regrettable that in spite of Prince Cuza's courage in emancipating the peasants, the latter's position became even worse owing to the predominating political influence of the larger landowners, and finally in 1907 a desperate rising occurred, which was suppressed after some 11,000 peasants had been slaughtered.

Some difficulties were raised by interested foreign Powers at the election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern as Cuza's successor, difficulties which were finally overcome through Napoleon III's friendly attitude. Prince Charles showed himself a sagacious and capable ruler. His early efforts were devoted to the reorganization of the army and the overhauling of the country's finances. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 left him no choice but to take sides with Russia, as she had intimated that she would force for her army a passage through the principalities. At the siege of Plevna owing to the critical situation of the Russian armies, the Rumanians were at last allowed to intervene effectively in the siege and to secure the capture of the fortress.

Unfortunately Rumania's sacrifices were not fairly requited. At the Congress of Berlin, though Rumania's independence was recognized, she was forced to hand back once more to Russia the southern part of Bessarabia, and was given in exchange the northern part of the Dobrudja. The Rumanians vehemently protested against what was a double spoliation, committed at their expense and that of their neighbours the Bulgarians, to whom the Dobrudja belonged. The Dobrudja, in its then undeveloped condition, could not be any compensation for the loss of southern Bessarabia, and its annexation, as was feared by Prince Charles and his advisers, might have eventually caused the estrangement of Bulgaria. Russia, however, proved unyielding, and Rumania was forced to bow finally before the inevitable.

Prince Charles was proclaimed King on May 22nd, 1881, and to the end of his reign in 1914, devoted himself to the peaceful consolidation of his country, completely transforming Rumania during this period and making her one of the most prosperous and powerful states in the Near East.

The disillusionment caused by Russia's attitude in 1878, and the personal proclivities of King Charles permitted the latter to bind Rumania to the Central Powers, with which he signed a secret defensive treaty in 1883. It did not imply, however, blind allegiance on Rumania's part, since in 1913 her intervention in the second Balkan war was clearly inimical to the interests of Austria.

Her intererence in that fratricidal struggle brought her some territorial accretion in the form of Southern Dobrudja, a territory mainly inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. Its obtention was made feasible by the astonishing pigheadedness of certain Bulgarian politicians, who refused to make timely and reasonable concessions to Rumania. It proved, however, of very doubtful value since it alienated Bulgaria's sympathy and provoked the latter's attack during the world war which proved the main cause of Rumania's undoing.

It may be incidentally noted that Bulgaria had always cherished the most friendly feelings towards Rumania, and had never resented the annexation of northern Dobrudja which had been forced on Rumania. These sentiments of goodwill had always been reciprocated by the Rumanians who had welcomed the Bulgarians when fleeing from the

175 Turks, and assisted them to organize and prepare their struggle for independence. Such was the friendliness the Bulgarians displayed towards the Rumanians that on the forced deposition of their first prince Alexander Battenberg, brought about through Russian hostility, Bulgaria's greatest statesman, Stambulov, offered the Bulgarian crown to King Charles, and it is to be deplored that owing to Russia's veto and threat of intervention the offer could not be accepted. For a close co-operation between Rumania and Bulgaria, under the common sceptre of King Charles, would have been tantamount to the creation of a sound bulwark against the underhand schemes and machinations of the Russian and Austrian Empires which were the main cause of all the unrest in the Balkans.

RUMANIA DURING THE GREAT WAR.

The conduct of the foreign policy of Rumania had been considered by King Charles as his special prerogative. His sympathies for the Germans, and his belief in their final victory prompted him to involve Rumania in the war on the side of the Central Powers, all the more so, since he considered himself in honour bound to assist them by the treaty of 1883.

There were other practical reasons which operated in favour of such a policy. The Central Powers occupied a predominant position in Rumania's commerce. Germany, followed by Austria, headed the list of Rumanian exports and imports, the Rumanian state loans had been floated on the Berlin and Vienna stock exchanges, and Rumanian industry had been largely financed by German capital. In spite of these considerations, however, the king failed in his attempt to enlist the support of Rumanian politicians on the side of the Central Powers. Sentimental reasons prevailed. The strong pro-French leanings of the upper classes, and the more popular desire of taking advantage of the struggle in order to free the Rumanians of Transylvania from the intolerable oppression of the Magyars proved decisive.

M. Carp, a former prime-minister, seemed to be the only

175

person of importance who seconded King Charles and openly advocated siding with the Central Powers. In his paper, the "Moldava," he laid stress on the grave danger that a Russian occupation of Constantinople would constitute for Rumania, and advocated a policy that would thrust back Russia from the mouths of the Danube. German propaganda, which had suborned a large number of newspapers, did its utmost to re-awaken the old distrust of Russia, and did not weary of pointing out the precarious situation in which Rumania would find herself after an Entente victory, surrounded as she was on all sides by Slav nations.

The general staff of the army also did not at all approve of the armed intervention of Rumania so long as the Russians had not occupied Bucovina. They insisted on the necessity of the right wing of the Rumanian army being in direct contact with the Russians and Moldavia being thereby protected from a possible direct enemy attack from Bucovina. The shortage of ammunition was a further deterrent to immediate action, and the military must certainly have greatly influenced the attitude of M. Bratianu, the then prime minister, in his policy of procrastination during which he attempted to drive as hard a bargain with the Entente Powers as possible.

King Charles's death in October, 1914, removed a serious obstacle to Rumania's intervention. His nephew and successor, Ferdinand, was more amenable to Entente influences, but the failure of the Dardanelles expedition and the entry of Bulgaria into the war furnished further justification for the pursuit of a policy of expectancy, and it was only in August, 1916, after the Russian government had sent a note to Bucarest threatening to annul the promised territorial acquisitions made by the Entente, and after further assurances had been vouchsafed that the Salonica army would undertake an offensive, and Russian troops would be sent to the Dobrudja to counter a possible Bulgarian attack, that finally, Rumania was coaxed into declaring war.

Military reasons concurred in favour of an attack on Bulgaria; psychological considerations, however, rendered

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 such a plan almost impossible to carry out, so that the Rumanians decided to invade Transylvania. This move was followed by a Bulgarian onslaught on the Dobrudja, most of which fell rapidly in their possession, thus proving once more that the friendship of a neighbouring nation is a more valuable security than the possession of a strategic frontier. These swift and unexpected Bulgarian successes forced the Rumanians to draw upon their army in Transylvania so as to strengthen their defence in what remained of the Dobrudja. At this critical moment the Entente Powers failed to redeem their promises. The Bavarian troops, especially prepared for the invasion of Rumania, and which the Entente had promised to immobilise by simultaneous attacks on the western front, forced the Carpathians in spite of the desperate defence put up by the Rumanians. Almost at the same time the redoubtable von Mackensen, heading a motley army of Germans, Turks and Bulgarians, the latter released owing to the inactivity of the Salonica army, crossed the Danube, thus sealing the fate of Wallachia. The Germans entered Bucarest on Dec. 6th, 1916, the Rumanians withdrawing to Moldavia to rally and reconstruct their forces.

Undaunted by the misfortunes which had befallen them, the Rumanians set to work to reorganize their army, and by the succeeding summer, under the leadership of General Averescu, were able to secure a great victory at Marasti over the Austro-Germans. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik revolution had demoralized the Russian army, and by August, 1917, the Germans were able to draw troops from their eastern front and to concentrate them against the Rumanian positions. A fierce German attack followed but it was beaten off at Marasesti. The bravery of the Rumanians, however, proved of no avail owing to the defection of Russia, and no alternative was left for them but to initiate negotiations. These were conducted at Buftea and resulted in the peace of Bucarest. (May 7th, 1918.)

The clauses of the treaty were most humiliating to Rumania. Those who harp on the harshness of the Versailles treaty would rectify their judgement if they were to take cognizance of the conditions the " victimized " Germans imposed on Rumania. The territorial losses Rumania had 175 to suffer were comparatively light as contrasted with the draconian economic clauses of the treaty, and comprised the cession of the entire Dobrudja, and of a district of 2,920 sq. miles along the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Rumania as a solace, was allowed to annex Bessarabia, which had already been abandoned by Russia and had demanded its union with Rumania in March, 1918. The ratification of the treaty was delayed, however, King Ferdinand anticipating an Entente victory which would liberate Rumania from the onerous clauses the Germans sought to impose on her.

The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the victorious Allied offensive in the west soon justified these hopes. The Rumanians thereupon assumed the offensive on Nov. 9th, 1918, re-occupied Wallachia, re-entered Transylvania which had in December, 1918, proclaimed its union with Rumania, marched into Bucovina, the Rumanians of which province had formed a provisional government on Oct. 27th, 1918, and had invoked the assistance of the Rumanian troops, and by April, 1919, reached the line of the river Theiss. Rumania's definite frontiers, however, were to be traced by the diplomats after protracted and unedifying wranglings in Paris.

RUMANIA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

It is usual to accuse the Rumanians of having evinced at 728 the Peace Conference an intolerance and superciliousness that did not at all accord with the services they had rendered to the Allied cause. The Entente Powers alleged that the Rumanians, having concluded a separate peace with the enemy, had thereby forfeited their rights to the territories which had been originally promised them. Besides, President Wilson had taken up a most determined attitude against all secret treaties, and as Rumania's claims were based on them it is easy to understand that immense difficulties were encountered before a settlement was effected.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

AT the close of the first World War the Romanian people achieved the unity it had temporarily attained in 1601 under Michael the Brave. In the interval before the outbreak of the second World War new Romania succeeded in bringing about a mutual comprehension among components who had lived for centuries under widely differing administrations and in inaugurating among other reforms a minorities règime far more civilized than that to which the Romanian minority had been subjected in Austria-Hungary and Russia. It will suffice to point out that in Transylvania, for instance, there were in 1940 more Hungarian public schools, more Hungarian newspapers and books than there had been under the crown of St. Stephen and far greater equality of opportunity in business as in politics, and this after the ravages of a war in which Romania's devotion to the Allies had cost her one-tenth of all her population, a loss higher than that of any Allied country.

Romania after 1918 has supported every international effort for peace and a better understanding between nations. In her desire for good relations with her neighbor, Bulgaria, she has even agreed voluntarily to cede southern Dobrudja to the Sofia Government, an action which may well be compared with the cession by Great Britain of the Ionian Isles to Greece a century ago; but for this Romania deserves higher credit, for southern Dobrudja, as I was able to satisfy myself during an extended automobile tour in the Spring of 1940, was in part overwhelmingly Romanian and the Romanian element was conspicuous everywhere, while Balcic was especially dear to Romanian hearts.

Unfortunately, in this era of the glorification of force, Romania's other neighbors took this manifestation of magnanimity for one of weakness. For example, the great generosity of Bucharest to the Hungarians in Transylvania had always been considered by them as a tribute to their superiority, and had increased their traditional scorn for the Wallachs who had been subjected to them so long. And to the world's general astonishment it was the champions of self-determination, the very government which had had its definition of "aggression" accepted by others and had bound itself not to commit "aggression," which made the first unprovoked attack.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

RACIAL ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CASE

175 648 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum at Bucharest demanding the immediate cession of the province of Bessarabia, which had been under Russian domination for a brief century of its existence, as well as of the northernmost districts of Bucovina. Many Romanian patriots counseled resistance and hoped for assistance from the Western democracies; but those with longer memories recalled the non-arrival of the British and French aid solemnly promised in the treaty under which Romania entered the first World War, and the more recent fate of Czechoslovakia. Not merely was aid uncertain and remote, but once the Romanian Army was engaged on the Russian frontier, attacks were certain to follow on the western Transylvanian border. So with a heavy heart Romania yielded to overwhelming force and once more a blow such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had experienced succeeded in its impact.

61 Only a month earlier I myself had given a lecture in Romanian in the huge, filled to overflowing Eparchial Hall of the Bessarabian capital, and had thus had recent and vivid experience of the cultural upswing given by the Romanians to a city I had first known in 1919 as a sleepy provincial center, for generations victim of administrative neglect and with even Russian schools few and far between. Some ten years ago I had had the privilege of being present at the dedication of a school in a large Russian village in Bessarabia and had been keenly impressed by the good feeling between Russians and Moldavians evidenced by the ceremony and the celebration afterward.

175 648 The Communist aggression of 1940, establishing Russia at the mouth of the Danube and a step nearer the Dardanelles, affected not merely Romania but the entire continent of Europe, upsetting as it did the balance at a traditional danger spot. It was not merely a warning to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey that a new campaign of aggression had started, with no more justification than the right of the stronger, but it focussed German attention on that part of the world and evidently led the German strategists to feel that a stronger bulwark against future Russian aggression was needed than would be furnished by the Pruth or the Sereth rivers. The Carpathians were obviously the new line of resistance, and subservient Hungary was only too ready to act as the German tool. It is tragic to reflect that a genuine policy of reconciliation on the Kremlin's part, which by creating a loyal border zone all the way from the White Sea and the Baltic to the Black Sea might even perhaps have prevented this war, was sacrificed to imperialistic ambitions that have since plunged mankind in its bloodiest struggle.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

FOREWORD

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648

Anxious to guard against the new Russian move, the Germans gave Romania no credit for her correct attitude in holding aloof from the appeals of Romanian fractions of the Carpathian Ukraine to be annexed to Transylvania, just as later she maintained the same correctness by turning a deaf ear to similar prayers from Romanian communities in the break-up of Yugoslavia. To the Germans also this attitude was merely evidence of weakness, and a weakness of which the Hungarians have never been guilty. Accordingly, Berlin and Rome encouraged the Hungarians by the Vienna Award to seize parts of Transylvania where the Romanians have always been in a majority not contested even by the Hungarian census figures; and Magyar troops not merely occupied the territory, but with the utmost ruthlessness expelled the Romanian intellectual élite whose rights had been guaranteed by the Award, and with their traditional barbarity even put a considerable number of them to death.

Romania had to yield to force, the German-Russian pact still holding. But the next turn of the kaleidoscope, the break between Hitler and Stalin, gave her the cherished chance of recovering her lost provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina. And here Romania has again given proof of her sense of justice by refraining from lodging claim to territorial expansion east of the Dniester into the Ukraine notwithstanding the hundreds of thousands of Romanians forcibly settled there in the century of Czarist rule over Bessarabia.

Opposed to expansion at the expense of her neighbors, Romania is not less determined to protect her natural and historic limits against encroachment and to bring within them the greater part of such Romanian masses as still live under other règimes. With the recovery of the territory lost in the east, the Romanian nation once more feels free to look with hope to a solution of its western problem. True enough, after a searching inquiry the claims of Hungary to Transylvania had been definitely denied by the concert of Europe in 1920. Nor was the right of Romania to Transylvania thus affirmed on historical grounds alone. In 1920, and doubtless more so today, the right of all peoples to a government of their own choosing and the exercise of this right for the whole by the decision of a majority could not be denied. The Romanians are fortunately able to establish by facts and figures that every historical subdivision of their homeland has an uncontested Romanian majority. The proof consists of the scientific data collected by an American-trained staff during the population census of 1930. Their authenticity rests not only on the fact that nationality was not determined arbitrarily by the

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648
census taker but by the free statement of each inhabitant; it is confirmed by the consonance of the findings whether taking race, language or religion as criteria, as well as by comparison with the official population statistics of Austria-Hungary and Russia.

121
Inasmuch as the Award of Vienna was necessarily an expedient, I have thought it useful to give here a comprehensive abstract of Romania's racial figures together with historical outlines of her border regions, in the conviction that no lasting solution of European unrest could afford to disregard or minimize the racial realities of the continent's perennial danger zones.

C. U. C.

North Hatley, P. Q.
October 20, 1941.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

000 historical and racial truth if the peoples in the invaded areas are to be freed of physical and spiritual terror and assured a peaceful development.

175 Until June, 1940, the population of Romania was divided among seventy-one counties grouped administratively into districts approximating the several historical provinces. This territory corresponded in area to that of the Dacian Kingdom colonized as an imperial province by Rome, 105-271 A.D. To use the current names, the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia and Bucovina formed the principality of Moldavia, with the capital at Jassy; while Oltenia and Muntenia formed the principality of Wallachia, with Bucharest as capital. Early in their national evolution the two Romanian states came to feel the influence of the expanding Turkish power. This they recognized by mutual assistance pacts,[1] renouncing their sovereign rights only insofar as they assumed obligations toward the Turks, who in turn guaranteed their liberties and integrity.[2] Still under Turkish suzerainty, Moldavia and Wallachia united on January 24, 1859 to form modern Romania who declared her independence May 10, 1877, when she joined Russia in war against Turkey. By proclamation of her parliament Romania became a Kingdom on May 10, 1881.

Like Italy on May 20, 1882, Romania on October 30, 1883, adhered to the defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Like Italy in 1915, Romania in 1916 joined the Allies in the first World War. Toward the conclusion of this war Bessarabia, emerging an autonomous republic from Communist chaos by proclamation of her Diet January 24, 1918, voted the following March 27 to reunite with Romania. Bucovina and Transylvania (with the Banat of Timisoara, Crisana and Maramures), also autonomous since October, 1918,[3] followed suit, the first proclaiming her union at Cernauti November 28, the latter December 1 at Alba Iulia. Thus the integration of the Romanian provinces came about through the exercise by their peoples of the right to self-determination, and not through armed conquest or international negotiation. The peace treaties of Versailles (June 28, 1919), St. Germain (September 10, 1919) and Trianon (June 4, 1920) merely added formal recognition to a factual situation ante-dating them by more than a year.

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[1] F. C. Nano, "Condica tratatelor si a altor legaminte ale Romaniei, 1354-1937," Bucharest, 1938, p. 7, for treaty between Mircea the Old of Wallachia and Mehmed I of Turkey, 1416 (1418 ?), and p. 28, for treaty between Bogdan III of Moldavia and Selim I, 1511.

[2] N. P. Comnène, "La terre roumaine à travers les ages," Paris and Lausanne, 1919, p. 24.

[3] "The Romanian nation which lives in the (Dual) Monarchy awaits and demands after centuries of suffering the achievement of its inalienable rights in full national life." (Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voevod in the Hungarian Parliament, October 18, 1918.)

Bucovina

ON May 7, 1775, Emperor Joseph II of Austria secured the consent of a Turkey weakened by corruption and endless warfare to the occupation of the northern region of the Romanian principality of Moldavia; he claimed this "strip of land" to improve communications[1] between Galicia, which he had wrested from Poland in 1772, and the imperial province of Transylvania.

Bucovina, as the Austrians named their new domain, had had no separate political or administrative life before 1775. It had always been an integral part of Moldavia, and included the early Moldavian capital of Suceava, some of the most famous fifteenth and sixteenth century battlegrounds and the ancient monasteries endowed by the Moldavian princes, the best known among whom, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), lies buried at Putna, county Radauti.

For some years after its annexation Bucovina remained under a military government. In 1786 it was merged with Galicia, an arbitrary administrative measure that had the effect of opening the gates to a slow infiltration of Poles, Jews and Ruthenians in quest for better living conditions. Despite repeated Romanian appeals, it was not until 1848 that Bucovina received administrative autonomy as a Hapsburg duchy. Thereafter, if the status of her Romanian inhabitants differed greatly from that of the Romanians under Hungarian rule, Bucovina was kept advisedly in complete spiritual isolation[2] from the Romanian centers in contiguous Moldavia and Transylvania and efficient precautions were taken to impede the development of Romanian national life.

The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in October, 1918, resulted in the geographical isolation of Bucovina (by the intervening new States of Hungary and Czechoslovakia) from Austria, whose crown land it had been. This forcible political tie once severed, the path was cleared for the reunion with Romania of her 800,000 people and 4,000 square miles of woodland.

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[1] R. W. Seton-Watson, "A History of the Romanians," Cambridge, 1934, pp. 149-50.

[2] I. Nistor, "Bessarabia and Bukovina," Bucharest, 1939, p. 35: "Whoever in Bukovina held fast to Rumanian sentiments was persecuted and execrated. There was no place in Bukovina for a Rumanian national life and some of the greatest men of the country, like the learned George Popovici and the great historian, Demetrius Onciul, were forced to take refuge in Rumania in order to be able to live and to think as Rumanians."

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

Bessarabia

175 WHILE Austria was reaching eastward to Galicia through Moldavian Bucovina in 1775, Russia was slowly extending westward from the river Dnieper to the Bug and, by 1792, to the Dniester, thereby becoming a neighbor of Moldavia along the entire course of that river. In her wars with Turkey from 1768 onward Russia had twice invaded the Romanian principalities. The war begun in 1806 afforded her a third opportunity of quartering her armies on Romanian soil.

The Russo-Turkish peace of Bucharest, May 28, 1812, gave Russia the Moldavian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and with it control over the Danube delta. This territory had been Moldavian for over 450 years[9] before the advent of Russia on the shores of the Dniester; and while officially it received the name of Bessarabia, after the famous princely family of the Bessaraba, its inhabitants preferred to call themselves Moldavian throughout the period of Russian occupation.

In the cynical pre-Napoleonic era of large-scale grabs the fate of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland rested with the good pleasure of the Powers. No justification had been thought necessary for writing whole peoples off the map or suppressing liberties long established other than the self-interest of the strongest.[10] At the time of the signature of the Bucharest Treaty the Russian armies had been in Bessarabia six years, and this together with the weakness of declining Turkey was sufficient ground for taking it. Later the Czarist government and its Communist heir sought to justify the rape of Bessarabia on the ground that in 1812 it had been Turkish, not Moldavian, and that therefore Turkey had had a valid right to dispose of it.

The Romanian position in regard to Bessarabia, as in regard to Bucovina, is that Moldavia, a sovereign principality under Turkish suzerainty, had not been consulted, and that Turkey as suzerain could not have transmitted to Russia more extensive rights to Bessarabia than she herself had held at the time by the consent of Moldavia.[11]

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[9] A. Boldur, "La Bessarabie et les relations russo-roumaines," Paris, 1927, p. 54.

[10] Tommaso Tittoni, "Bessarabia, Romania and Italy" (in Romanian), Bucharest, 1927, p. 20: "Russian designs on Bessarabia, first under the form of a protectorate, then of annexation, had in the 19th century the earmarks of conquests. *Quia nominor leo* was their sole justification."

The fall of the Czarist règime in 1917, the Red revolution and the establishment of a "democratic" government at Moscow provided the circumstances that enabled the Bessarabians to proclaim the independence of their Moldavian republic and to exercise the recognized right of all peoples to self-determination.

The reunion with Romania is of itself a reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the province. In 1812 it counted from 250,000 to 350,000 inhabitants, mostly Romanian Moldavians. There were one million of them by 1856, and two millions by 1897.[12] During this interval the schools and the Church, the bureaucracy and the judiciary were all used by the Czarist government in a policy of Russification that embraced a program of mass colonization in which Bulgarian, Jewish, German and Ukrainian immigrants were counted upon to alter the Moldavian complexion of the province. The failure of this policy has been attested to by the official returns of the Russian state censuses and confirmed by the Romanian census of 1930.

Thus, the 1871 figures[13] compiled under the supervision of K. N. Oberoutchev, a Major General in the imperial army, gave for Bessarabia, exclusive of the three southern counties reunited to Romania in 1856, an absolute Romanian majority:

1871 Census	Total	%
Romanians	692,000	67.4
Ukrainians Great Russians	162,252	15.8
Jews	93,590	9.1
Germans	33,501	3.5
Others	45,003	4.2
Total Bessarabia	1,026,346	100.0

The Russians, it will be noted, were grouped with the Ukrainians to enhance the importance of the Slav element.

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[11] When, as a result of the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to return the three southern Bessarabian counties of Cahul, Ismail and Cetatea Alba to Moldavia, the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) implicitly recognized Moldavia as an independent state when it provided in Art. 21 that "The territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed *to the Principality of Moldavia*, under the suzerainty of the Porte. The inhabitants of this territory shall enjoy *the rights and privileges assured the Principalities* . . ." This territory was subsequently reoccupied by Russia in 1878.

[12] Boldur, op. cit., p. 134.

[13] Id., p. 136.

Transylvania

THE Romanians regard Transylvania as the cradle of their race born from the fusion of the Dacians with the colonists of Rome, 105-275 A.D. Their Daco-Roman origin and their continuous existence thereafter in the shelter which the tableland of Transylvania afforded them against successive barbarian invasions is well recognized today.[17]

Most of the invaders left few traces; but the Slavs in the seventh century and the Hungarians (Magyars) in the ninth century had come to stay. With the first the Romanians early established friendly contacts. The latter, checked in their advance westward by Otto the Great at Augsburg in 955 A.D., settled in the Pannonian plain, received Christianity from the Bohemians, and organized a state that was to bring in time increasing pressure on the organized settlements of the autochthonous Romanians in Transylvania. The influence which Hungary was able to exert on this province by 1100 A.D. was thereafter maintained not through her singlehanded effort, but by the colonization of the Carpathian foothills with Szekelys (Szeklers or Siculi) and Saxons (Germans), 1100-1149 A.D. The sweeping medieval privileges accorded the newcomers by Hungarian kings in consideration of their aid in defending Transylvania to the east formed the nucleus of the social inequality that was to prevail there as in Hungary proper until 1848.

Ruthlessly using the power conferred by feudal land tenure and social distinction,[18] the Hungarians and their federates gradually increased the subjection of the mass of the population that was largely Romanian. Partly to escape this subjection, the latter crossed the Carpathians to the south and east where they founded the independent states of Wallachia (about 1290) and Moldavia (1349). Thereafter the nobles among the Transylvanian Romanians found it increasingly expedient to join the privileged class of the Hungarians (John Hunyady and Matthias Corvinus, princes of Transylvania, were of Romanian stock); while the mass of the peasantry was left to shift as best it could under mounting impositions and exactions that culminated in the revolt of 1437.

The Magyars, Saxons and Szekelys answered this attack on their privileges with the proclamation at Kapolna (1438) of a mutual-aid

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[17] Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 13.

[18] Id., p. 103.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

[TRANSYLVANIA]

175 "Union of the Three Nations" through which Transylvania was to be ruled thenceforth to the exclusion of her other nationalities. Characteristically, this narrow class system of exploitation of the masses was tenaciously upheld despite the grave consequences it exerted on the Hungarian state. One searches in vain for evidences of "the power to build up and maintain a state by urban culture rooted in tradition, Christian ethics and ecclesiastical organization," as a recent Hungarian apologist would have us believe.[19] But there is ample proof that the collapse of the Hungarian kingdom before the Turks at Mohacs (1526) was directly traceable to the second in a long series of mass uprisings, that of Dozsa in 1514, which weakened the internal structure of the country.

The eclipse of Hungary under the Turks gave Transylvania, already locally autonomous under the triune règime, the occasion for achieving separate existence in 1538.

Under the Turkish influence extending westward through Hungary toward Vienna and eastward through the Romanian principalities far into the Ukraine and beyond, Transylvania now assumed new importance for Moldavia and Wallachia. "The history of four further centuries was to prove that the two Romanian states must either be drawn into the orbit of a great Danubian empire or, in order to achieve a sure and permanent independence of their own, must attach Transylvania to themselves."[20]

For the purpose of this outline, which is concerned with problems arising out of the independence of Romania through the union of the three Romanian states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, it will serve to record that, from 1526 to the Peace of Karlowitz (January 26, 1699), Transylvania existed as an independent Voevodate and that thereafter it remained uninterruptedly a possession of the imperial Hapsburg crown first as a principality and after 1765 as a "Great" principality until 1867.

In that year Emperor Francis Joseph I, his position imperiled by the effects of the disastrous war with Prussia (1866), was obliged to consent to a compromise (Ausgleich) establishing within a Dual Monarchy the equality with Austria of a Hungary enlarged by the cession to her of the whole of Transylvania. It is from this event, as we shall see, that the acute phase of the problem of Transylvania dates.

The incorporation of the imperial province into a Hungary just emerged from long political subjection, instead of prompting the Mag-

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[19] John Balogh, editor, in The Hungarian Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1940-41), Budapest.

[20] Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

yars to extend to the Transylvania populations the newly won liberties for which they had clamored in Vienna in 1848, fired their imagination with the dream of a great Magyar state that would encompass the greater part of Eastern Europe. The mutual checks theretofore imposed by the jealous defense of the privileges rigidly apportioned among Magyars, Szekelys and Saxons now gave way to a unilateral attempt at solving at one stroke all the difficulties confronting the establishment of a homogeneous Hungarian nation by the mass absorption of her non-Hungarian populations.[21]

The practical obstacles to the realization of this scheme have been often described; here it will suffice to point out that these populations were then contiguous to and in close spiritual communion with the main body of their connationals living in independent national states—the Slavs to the south and north, the Germans to the west and the Romanians to the east; that Latin and not Hungarian had been the official language in Hungary before 1800, (the Central Asiatic Magyar or Ural-Altaic dialect of few root-words admittedly being a difficult literary and cultural medium compared with the Romance language of the Romanians, easily understood and freely used by the inhabitants of Transylvania); that the economic structure of Hungary, in contrast to that of the states surrounding her, rested then as now on the control by a few of latifundiary estates worked by peasant-serfs isolated and insulated against modern democratic liberalism;[22] and that Magyardom, while achieving some inroads into the surrounding mass of non-Magyar nationalities, had itself become permeated socially, culturally, artistically and economically

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[21] This policy is made clear by the declarations in parliament of her leaders as to what constituted a danger to Hungary (Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 525-26). Said Count Tisza: "A radical franchise constitutes a great danger for our nation. . . . The intellectual standard is a great danger for the Magyars, since a large proportion of the non-Magyars can learn to read and write, and then there will be an end of Magyar supremacy." Also Count Bethlen: "The question of democratization is one of life and death for Transylvania, and threatens the existence of every class of society;" and lastly Count Andrassy, on self-determination, "a dangerous catchword, the realization of which would mean the end of the Hungarian State."

[22] Illyes, Gyula, "Pusztak Nepe," Budapest, 1936, p. 31. The position of labor in twentieth century Hungary is thus described by Seton-Watson (op. cit., p. 429): "The working class was entirely unrepresented in Parliament. Everything was done to hinder the growth of trade unions (as late as 1908 the Government dissolved the federations of iron-workers and timbermen). The imprisonment of strikers was an ordinary occurrence. Meanwhile housing conditions for the labourer actually grew worse. The working day for farms was from 'sunrise to sunset.' Government had devised special measures to prevent harvest strikes, and to supply the big estates with underpaid workers imported from other districts. The Agricultural Law of 1907 even legalised flogging of labourers up to eighteen by the landowner. In 52 per cent. of the Hungarian factories there were children under fourteen working twelve or more hours per day. In the richest county, Bacs-Bodrog (Backa), tuberculosis was rampant and the main certified cause of death. Emigration rose by leaps and bounds owing to bad labour conditions, coupled with political repression. Between 1900 and 1906, 657,000 left Hungary out of a population of 19,000,000; and from 1906 to 1914 the rate exceeded 200,000 a year."

[TRANSYLVANIA]

175 by the patient genius of the Jewish race.[33] Lastly, it is not to be gainsaid that the Hungarians themselves are comparatively a small race, numbering according to their own partisan census of 1910 only 10,050,575 out of a total population of 20,886,487.[34] And this brings us to our main object, the consideration of the racial structure of Transylvania.

162 Religious, civil, and fiscal censuses of Transylvania under both Austrian and Hungarian domination establish from the beginning the preponderance of the Romanian element. The early censuses of the Romanian Greek-Catholic bishopric (1714, 1733 and 1750) were not complete, counting as they did families, not individuals, and omitting the region of Barsa surrounding the city of Brasov. The 1760 Austrian census, a thorough fiscal record, listed 777,170 Romanians; the 1786 count, showing a *total* population of 1,577,515, afforded the ecclesiastical authorities a basis for reaching the following conclusion as to its racial composition:

Romanians	1,048,416
Hungarians	341,058
Saxons	188,041

For the pre-Dualist era we have the report of A. Fenyes[35] for the whole of Hungary in 1840:

Hungarians	4,812,759	37.4%
Romanians	2,202,542	17.1
Germans	1,273,677	9.9
Serbs	828,365	6.4
Croats	1,315,947	10.2
Slovenes	1,687,256	13.1
Ruthenes	442,903	3.4
Jews	244,035	1.9
hers	72,922	0.6
Total	12,880,406	100.0

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[33] Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 429: "One other vital factor in the Hungarian situation must be mentioned,—the economic transformation, which expressed itself on the one hand in the decay of the gentry, the class which had long been Hungary's political backbone, and on the other hand in the virtual capture of industry, banking, commerce and the press by the Jews."

[34] Hungary in 1910 had just elected a new parliament, to which but 8 non-Hungarians had been returned by the aid of "only 194 batallions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry." The census found not more than about 50% Hungarians in all Hungary, as we have seen, and but 31.62% Hungarians in the whole of Transylvania. Yet Count Stephen Tisza felt justified to address parliament as follows: "Our non-Magyar fellow-citizens must first of all reconcile themselves to the fact that they here belong to a national state, which is not a conglomerate of different races, but which one race has conquered and founded, upon which one race has stamped the ineradicable impress of its individuality." (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 427.)

[35] Seton-Watson, R. W., "Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers," London, 1934, p. 27.

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

[TRANSYLVANIA]

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THE CENSUS OF 1930.


Red line
Roumanians
Germans
Jews
Hungarians
Other nationalities

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA.

Red line shows southern boundary of territory awarded to Hungary, August 30, 1940.

opp. p. 16

[TRANSYLVANIA]

162 tion by counties is available,* giving the populations found living in 1930 within the identical administrative (county) boundaries to which the Hungarian count of 1910 applied.

The accompanying ethnographic map[1] illustrates in distinctive colors the distribution of the principal nationalities inhabiting Transylvania. It is to be noted, however, that this convenient mode of presentation, while outlining clearly the areas of greatest concentration of each of the nationalities considered, fails to impart any information as to the relative proportion of the various races in any given section; it tends, in fact, to convey the very definite impression that each color zone represented is inhabited exclusively by the nationality to which the color corresponds, obviously an erroneous impression. A reference to the map (page 17) which outlines the administrative boundaries of the Transylvanian counties, serves to locate in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune the great concentration of Hungarians shown in green on the color map. This region, the greatest single minority island in the province, contained in 1930 in addition to the preponderant Szekelys (listed as Hungarians) 62,817 individuals of other races. Similarly, the county of Timis-Torontal, a region which on the color map would seem preponderantly German, while actually representing one of the greatest concentration of Germans in Transylvania, contained in addition to 174,395 Germans 325,048 individuals of other races.

The Award of Vienna

175 The sinuous red line which runs from east to west on the ethnographic map was drawn at Vienna, August 30, 1940, by the Foreign Ministers of the German Reich and the Italian Kingdom, and represents their joint decision as arbiters of the claim of Hungary to Romanian Transylvania. History shows that political and other factors can and do make possible arbitrary settlements; when they do, as in the present instance, the settlement is of the essence of a compromise—a temporary working arrangement.

The Treaty of Trianon created the modern independent kingdom of Hungary. The claim of this kingdom to the territories over which Hungary as a member of the former Dual Monarchy once extended her authority were formulated by her in minute detail and submitted for the careful consideration of the experts of the Versailles peace conference. There is nothing new that Hungary could add today to what, as

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*See page 50.

[1] [technically impossible to reproduce for HB File--Analyst]

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

[TRANSYLVANIA]

● 175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice."

162 728 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession[1] to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

Census of 1930
Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary

County	Romanian	Hungarian	German	Jewish	Others	Total
1. Bihor	136,351	130,127	2,101	20,420	16,549	305,548
2. Ciuc	20,976	120,627	439	2,383	1,381	145,806
3. Cluj	141,607	85,284	2,669	16,057	11,034	256,651
4. Maramures	93,207	11,174	3,239	33,828	20,127	161,575
5. Mures	115,773	121,282	11,271	9,848	11,564	269,738
6. Nasaud*	103,897	7,488	21,211	6,450	6,528	145,574
7. Odorhei	5,430	112,375	454	1,250	2,475	121,984
8. Salaj	192,821	107,662	16,010	13,380	13,474	343,347
9. Satu Mare	178,523	74,191	9,530	23,967	8,664	294,875
10. Somes	169,942	33,870	351	10,546	4,646	219,355
11. Tarnava Mare	270	62	656	7	15	1,010
12. Tarnava Mica	131	1,580	3	42	165	1,921
13. Trei Scaune	17,505	105,834	760	707	2,963	127,769
Total	1,176,433	911,556	68,694	138,885	99,585	2,395,153

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 25, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 460,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

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"Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.

1/1 [cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940--
--Analyst]

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 1

RUMANIA & THE RUMANIANS

CHAPTER I

AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

101 175 ● The country known between the two Great Wars as Greater Rumania has had twenty-three centuries of violent and dramatic history. From about 400 B.C., when it was first colonized by Thracian tribes, up to the present day this territory has been the victim of many invasions and the scene of many migrations. It has been conquered and ruled by dozens of races and peoples who have all left their mark upon the country and its inhabitants. To-day the Rumanians form an island of Latinity between the Slavonic peoples and one of the last Asiatic invaders of Europe, the Hungarians. The language and culture of the Rumanians, although containing many elements of Slavonic, Germanic and other origins, are closely related to the civilization of Italy, France and Spain.

175 To the foreigner who visits Rumania for the first time this country and its mixed population seems full of inexplicable and insoluble contradictions. The numerous problems confronting Rumania and the Rumanians in the twentieth century have their roots in the historical development of the past. The issues of the present day cannot be understood or solved unless they are examined in the light of this history. In order to analyse the condition of contemporary Rumania, it is therefore necessary to present a short outline of Rumanian history.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1044
ED1 Rumania ED1

● 175 **THE ANCIENT RUMANIANS.** The first permanent colonization of Rumania, after the Celtic period which belongs to the twilight before the dawn of history, was carried out by the Dacians who occupied Transylvania, Wallachia and the Banat in the fourth century B.C. Knowing how to exploit the agricultural and mineral wealth of the country the Dacians attained a comparatively high standard of civilization. They were an industrious people, equally skilled in the arts of peace and war. During the last century B.C. the Dacians under King Boirebista rose to the peak of their power. They ruled over a considerable part of South-Eastern Europe. On Boirebista's death this vast empire collapsed. All that remained to the Dacians was the territory which they had first occupied.

The Roman Empire had been seriously disturbed by the growing menace on its north-eastern frontiers. The Emperors Claudius and Domitian were therefore anxious to stabilize their hold upon the Roman provinces in that area. As a preliminary step the provinces at present occupied by the States of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were added to the domains of Rome. The wealth of Dacia and the wish to consolidate the newly conquered Roman provinces tempted the Romans to invade Dacia. King Decebal not only succeeded in defending the country but inflicted several heavy defeats on the Roman legions. He even imposed an annual tribute on the Roman Empire which was paid to him promptly.

While resisting successfully any Roman attempts to subjugate Dacia, Decebal welcomed Roman traders, craftsmen and workers and encouraged the spread of Roman civilization. At the same time he

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

organized the defence of the country from his capital Sarmisegetusa, situated on the edge of the South Carpathian Mountains. 175

Soon after Trajan became emperor, war broke out between him and Decebal. In the years A.D. 100–106 Trajan defeated and conquered the Dacians. The many bridges, military highways and fortresses built by the emperor for this campaign, of which ruins can still be found to-day, show that this Roman conquest was not an easy one.

'DACIA FELIX.' Conquest was followed by systematic colonization. Many military camps, towns and roads were built by the Romans all over Southern Rumania. Colonists from Italy and the vast Roman possessions were brought here to strengthen this outpost of the empire, to cultivate the fertile soil, to develop trade and to spread Roman culture. The majority of the original inhabitants readily adopted Roman rule and civilization, although a minority retreated into mountainous Transylvania, which means 'the country beyond the forest'. There followed, according to one theory, a period of great prosperity during which Dacians and Roman settlers lived peacefully side by side, intermarried and gave birth to a new people; they were the Daco-Rumanians who spoke a Latin dialect, which was the origin of the Rumanian language.

Parallel with this process of Romanization there went great progress in agriculture, trade, transport and mining.[1] Dacia under the rule of Rome was

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[1] The salt and gold mines of Transylvania were already exploited by the Romans.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

175 prosperous, and the province became known as 'Dacia Felix'—happy Dacia.

THE ROMAN RETREAT. This favourable development in the most exposed province of the Roman Empire was interrupted and its achievements were almost completely destroyed by the pressure of barbarian tribes advancing into Europe from the east. So dangerous was the position of the Roman legions in Dacia, who were unable to stop the continuous raids of the Goths, that the Emperor Aurelian decided to abandon this province. The evacuation of the Roman legions and the Roman administration was completed by about A.D. 275. Most of the Daco-Rumanian population probably remained in the territory between the Danube and the Carpathians.

CENTURIES OF INVASIONS. The retreat of the Romans to the southern banks of the Danube opened the floodgates of invasion. From the third to the tenth century a host of nations passed through Rumania on their way to the west and south.

The spearhead of the barbarians was formed by the Visigoths, a military race, who had no difficulty in subjugating the country. During their short stay in Rumania the Visigoths were converted to the Christian faith. The process of conversion started from Constantinople, and the Rumanians, too, adopted the new creed. Thus the Rumanians, a people of partly Roman origin and Latin speech, remained attached to the Eastern Church, when its separation from the Papacy followed the separation of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. To-day the great majority of Rumanians belong to the Orthodox Church.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

The Visigoths were conquered by the Huns who, /75 about A.D. 375, broke into Europe from Asia. The Visigoths became their vassals, and when the Huns left Rumania after a short period, they took the Visigoths with them to fight in their wars which devastated a great part of Europe.

The flow of peoples who invaded Rumania continued. The next tide brought the Gepides, also a Germanic race. They settled down permanently. The Gepides were engaged in continuous warfare and maintained their supremacy over their neighbours, until their defeat by the Langobards and Avars in the sixth century.

THE SLAVS. The Gepides retired into the Carpathian Mountains. The Avars occupied the vast Danubian plains, which formed their base for expeditions far into Central Europe. Their raids were checked by Charlemagne who expelled them from their western outposts. During this time, that is, in the eighth century, the Gepides fought as auxiliaries of the Avars; soon after the fall of the latter, their name disappears from history.

Before and during the Avar period occurred the great influx of the Slavs into the Danubian and Balkan lands. Besides the Balkans, the Slav tribes settled in considerable numbers in Transylvania. Nearly all the oldest place-names of the East Carpathians are Slavonic, and the Rumanian language contains many Slavonic words.

THE BULGARIAN EMPIRES. The seventh and eighth centuries saw the coming of the Bulgars, a race of Turkish nomads from the east who, however, later

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

● 175 became absorbed by their Slavonic subjects. In the seventh century the Bulgars were already encamped north of the Danube, in the territory of the modern Rumania. Later they moved the centre of their power across the Danube, where they founded the state afterwards known as Bulgaria, though still ruling over much of modern Rumania.

The first Bulgarian Empire was at the height of its power between 893 and 972 B.C. and its Tsar Boris was one of the great conquerors of that age. This empire was in its turn subdued by Basil II, Emperor of Byzantium, in the eleventh century; the Bulgars and their Rumanian subjects were, however, able to continue to observe their own traditions, except that they were involved with the rest of the Eastern Empire in the final Schism between the Eastern Church and Rome. In the next century the Bulgarian Empire became an independent power once more, and the Bulgarian Tsars began to style themselves 'Emperors of the Vlachs and Bulgars'. The Rumanians are still called Vlachs or Wallachs by their neighbours; then, as now, there were many of them living as nomadic shepherds outside the boundaries of what eventually became known as Rumania. The Vlachs of the Second Bulgarian Empire were those of the Central Balkans and Thessaly, and Greek chroniclers tell of autonomous Vlach chieftains in those parts.

THE MAGYARS. At the close of the ninth century the Magyars crossed the Carpathians, conquered the rising duchies of the Banat and the Crisana and began to settle in the Hungarian plain. During the subsequent decades, their westward advance being

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

checked by Otto the Great, they penetrated Transylvania, subjecting the local population. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries they colonized the east and south of that country with the Szekelys, a people akin to themselves, and with German settlers (the 'Transylvanian Saxons'). 175

THE GREAT CONTROVERSY. The Magyar invasion of Europe was the last important stage in the Migration of Nations. To this time is traced the origins of Rumania as a nation.

Before turning to the creation and development of the two Rumanian principalities, mention must be made of the great controversy which centres round the question of the history of the Rumanians *during* the Migration of Nations. Although this historical controversy may seem of purely theoretical interest, it still plays a prominent part in contemporary politics.

Some historians, mostly Hungarians, hold that at the time of the Roman evacuation of Dacia the Daco-Rumanian population withdrew to the lands south of the Danube. According to this theory they recrossed the river in the thirteenth century and later penetrated into Transylvania, that is, *after* the Hungarians had occupied this territory. This theory is used to support the Hungarian claim to Transylvania.

The contrary theory is that the majority of the Daco-Rumanians remained in the lands between the Carpathians and the Danube after the Roman withdrawal. They were subjugated by numerous invaders, assimilated some of them and always managed to preserve their national character or at least their language, which is the instrument of

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 national consciousness. In times of danger they retreated into the mountains, just as those Dacians who centuries before wanted to escape the rule of Rome. Owing to the numerous invasions and colonizations, especially of Slavs, a wedge was driven between the Macedo- and Istro-Rumanians, who to-day live in Macedonia and Dalmatia, and the bulk of the Rumanians north of the Danube.

This latter view is put forward by Rumanian writers, who urge in support of it that the Rumanian rite was originally Slavonic and not Greek, as it would have been had the Rumanians immigrated from the south. It is also argued that the Rumanian migration from the north to the south is reflected in the naming of Eastern Wallachia which the Rumanians call 'Muntenia', i.e. 'country of the mountains'—transferring the name of their former home to a country known for its plains. One thing is certain: the two principalities had their origin in Transylvania. Wallachia developed to the south of it, Moldavia to the east.

THE TWO PRINCIPALITIES. Wallachia and Moldavia were created during the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century. The emergence of the two Rumanian semi-independent States was due to a great extent to a temporary ebb in the movement of peoples. Their rise was furthered by one unfavourable and one favourable circumstance. The ever-increasing pressure of the Hungarians drove many Rumanians from Transylvania into the lands beyond the Carpathians. And the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Danube gave the Rumanians an opportunity to consolidate their position. 175

While the formation of the two principalities was the logical result of historical development and the realization of national aspirations nascent since the ninth century, it also led to a considerable weakening of the Rumanian element in Transylvania. Most of the *boiars*[1] migrated to Wallachia and Moldavia and those who remained were quickly absorbed by the Hungarian nobility.[2] For the great majority of the Rumanian population of Transylvania there began a long period of economic, political and national subservience to the Magyars.

The foundation of the two principalities was already overshadowed by the impending conflict between the Turks and the European peoples opposing them, which lasted into the present century and played a decisive part in the history of Rumania. When the two principalities were formed, the Turks had not yet advanced far enough to crush them, as the Hungarians had done with their predecessors in the ninth century.

Nevertheless, the first rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia had to contend with many dangers. It is indeed surprising that the two Rumanian States could be established at all and survive in the face of extreme adversity. They found themselves constantly menaced by all their neighbours. Wallachia was from the outset involved in conflicts with

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[1] Landed nobility.

[2] One of the most striking examples is the family of Hunyadi Janos, a Magyar noble of Rumanian descent, who became famous as one of the greatest military leaders against the Turks. His son, Matthias Corvinus, was King of Hungary.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 Turkey and Hungary, Moldavia with Hungary, Poland and Turkey. And more than once Wallachia and Moldavia were in different camps fighting each other.

The short periods of relative peace and prosperity were achieved by the Rumanian princes by diplomacy rather than by decisive military victories. This is not strange in view of the great disparity between their resources and those of their major neighbours. Up to the early sixteenth century therefore the most profitable policy was that of balancing one enemy against the other.

Although there was some important progress during the brief intervals of peace, Moldavia and Wallachia could not stem the advance of the Turkish tide. This was prepared by the steady penetration of the principalities by Byzantine trade and institutions which is reflected in the structure of the Rumanian States at that time. The *voivods*[1] copied the absolutism of Constantinople, choosing their counsellors from the clergy and the big landowning families, and treated the country and its inhabitants as their personal property. The economic decline of the peasantry, continuous warfare amongst pretenders to the Rumanian thrones and against Turks, Hungarians and Poles, weakened the country to such a degree that it could not offer successful resistance to the Turks when they resumed their advance to the north.

UNDER TURKISH RULE. The death of Louis of Hungary in the battle of Mohacs against the Turks brought the end of Rumanian semi-independence

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[1] Dukes or princes.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

and the beginning of three centuries of Turkish rule. For with the collapse of Hungary there was no strong opponent of Turkey left south of Vienna. /75

The Turkish administration of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia was indirect. It relied on the native princes and ruling classes, leaving the Turks themselves free to concentrate upon their main objective, the defeat of Austria. But this did not by any means secure peaceful development for the Rumanians. The *voivods* of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Hungarian princes of Transylvania, tried to continue the policy of playing off one power against the other. The Hungarians achieved some success with this method; but for the two principalities it resulted in bloody repression and great misery for the people.

The last determined effort to free Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkish vassalage was undertaken by Michael the Brave. Within a few years this man of exceptional ability conquered Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia and in 1600 proclaimed himself Prince of all Rumanians. His achievement was of short duration: it failed because he had to fight both the Turks and the supporters of Austria, and because his own power was not founded upon the people but upon part of the landed nobility and the merchants. This brief interval of Michael's success has, however, been remembered by all Rumanians as a symbol of their highest aspiration, the unification of all Rumanians in one state.

THE PHANARIOTS.[1] The general decay of the two principalities in the early seventeenth century

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[1] From Phanar, the Greek quarter of Constantinople in which the Oecumenical Patriarchate is situated.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 opened a new stage which lasted about two hundred years and is no doubt the most miserable and tragic in the history of the Rumanian people. It is forever joined with the name of the Phanariots.

The Greek merchants who had already gained considerable influence in the economic life of the country were soon able to govern it politically also. Owing to their financial power, their connexions at the Turkish Court and their position in the Turkish Empire generally, they were able to make or break a Rumanian ruler. The *voivods* became mere tools in the hands of these merchant-politicians; and in the early eighteenth century the Phanariots instead of financing Rumanian princes secured the office of *hospodar*[1] for themselves.

The rule of the Phanariots, who were of Greek, Albanian and Slavonic origin, was one of complete and ruthless economic exploitation. The office of *hospodar* was sold by the sultan to the highest bidder and the sole motive of the prince was the acquisition of great wealth in the shortest possible time. Nor was there much time for these men to enrich themselves. For the sultan soon perceived the possibilities of this new source of income and consequently auctioned the office very frequently.

During this period the *boiars* became more and more dependent on the *hospodars.* Greek influence penetrated all spheres of activity and led to the adoption of the Greek liturgy. The decline of Slavonic culture, however, favoured the rise of Rumanian art and literature which developed with the growth of the movement for national unity and independence.

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[1] Title of Governor of the Principality.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

THE PEASANTRY. One of the most tragic features of this time is the rapid decline of the Rumanian peasantry both in Transylvania and in the two principalities. 175

The position in Wallachia and Moldavia deteriorated with alarming speed. However great the taxes and tributes imposed upon the country by sultan and *hospodar*, the *boiars* always managed to indemnify themselves by fleecing the peasants. The peasantry was soon reduced to a state of abject slavery. This decay of the peasant class led to disastrous consequences sapping the economic and military strength of the country. Within a few years after 1740 the peasant population of Wallachia, for example, is said to have declined by more than 75%.[1] Conditions in Moldavia were similar, and in some respects worse.

In Transylvania the unfavourable economic position of the peasantry was linked with the repression of national aspirations by the Magyars. The fight for political equality was waged at that time chiefly by the Rumanian lower clergy. But the rigorous feudal system on which the power of the Hungarian nobles rested could not afford to grant any substantial political or economic rights to a people upon whose labour the greater part of their wealth and position depended. In 1784 came a revolt of some Rumanian peasants, led by Horia, Closca and Crisan. They demanded the abolition of serfdom and national equality. The wording of their manifestos is re-

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[1] From a consular report by the Austrian General von Bauer who states that there were about 147,000 peasant families in 1741; that during the next four years the number was halved and then halved again; an exaggeration, no doubt, but indicative of the deplorable state of affairs.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 miniscent of the language of the men who, two centuries before them, were at the head of the great peasant risings in Germany and Bohemia. But this local movement, too, failed and was followed by bloody repression.

THE PAWN OF THE POWERS. The weakening of Turkish power after the Napoleonic wars and the rapid growth of capitalism brought South-Eastern Europe into the focus of imperialistic ambitions. Owing to its natural wealth and its geographical position Rumania became a valuable pawn on the chessboard, on which the Great Powers played the game of imperialist expansion in Eastern Europe. The movement of liberation from the Ottoman Empire was exploited by rival powers, the Russian and Habsburg Empires, which posed as protectors of subject peoples. The British, anxious to defeat Russian designs upon Constantinople, were not indifferent to the issue. Germany exported dynasties to the liberated countries.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century the hold of Austria and Russia upon the principalities increased steadily. During the first decades of the nineteenth century the purely Turkish overlordship was replaced by combined Russo-Turkish rule and eventually by Russian predominance.[1] But this period was also marked by the vigorous growth of the national liberation movements in the whole of South-Eastern Europe. In Rumania it found expression in the struggle against the foreign Greek rulers and for the union of the two principalities into one State. The revolt of Tudor Vladimirescu[1] in 1820 in Wallachia was the signal for a general rising supported by wide sections of the people. It was of only short duration and failed. But it did succeed in securing the appointment of native princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia.

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[1] 1718: Austrian occupation of the Banat and Oltenia; 1775: Bukovina annexed by Austria; 1770: Austro-Russian occupation of both principalities; 1812: Russia takes Bessarabia; 1829: Russia occupies Moldavia and Muntenia; 1854: both under Austrian occupation.

The country was frequently occupied by foreign troops and made to pay tributes. During the Russian occupation Prince Kisseleff introduced the first Rumanian Constitution[2] which confirmed the absolute power of the *boiars* over the peasants, provided some administrative reforms and laid down that the *hospodars* had to be approved by both Russia and Turkey.

REVOLT AND UNIFICATION. The year 1848 saw the rising tide of revolution sweeping all over Europe. Soon after the outbreak of the revolution in Paris, there was a rising in Rumania which achieved some initial success. Led by intellectuals and middle-class landowners, the rebels voiced demands for social and political reforms and, for the first time, for the union of all Rumanians, including those of Transylvania, in one independent State.

In Transylvania the Rumanian revolutionaries ended by playing into the hands of reaction. Owing to the great national antagonism against the Hungarians and the strong anti-Rumanian attitude of the latter, the Transylvanian Rumanians supported the Austro-Russian campaign against the Hungarian revolution, as did the Croats farther west. They hoped that this would bring them Austrian support and national emancipation. But the defeat of the Hungarian revolution also crushed all chances of realizing the national aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanians and widened yet further the gulf between the two peoples. In Wallachia and Moldavia the revolt was put down jointly by the Turks and the Russians. The year 1848 brought the clearest proof that the rival imperial powers, however violently opposed to each other, were firmly united in keeping their subject peoples in their place.

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[1] The Greek war of liberation, too, began in Rumania with the rising of Alexander Ypsilanti who hoped to gain Rumanian support.

[2] The Règlement Organique.

But repression only served to strengthen the national liberation movement. In 1856, after the Crimean War, which began with the Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia, the unification of the two principalities assumed the character of an international problem, which was complicated by the conflicting interests of the Powers and was finally solved with the help of the greatly increased French influence in favour of Rumania. The Treaty of Paris in that year restored Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia.[1]

In 1857 Moldavia and Wallachia elected the same *hospodar*, John Cuza, who, in 1861, secured the recognition of the union of the two principalities by all the major countries. From the very outset grave social problems confronted the new State, legacies of centuries of foreign occupation and misrule. The most urgent task was that of land reform, naturally opposed very violently by the *boiars*. By staging a *coup d'état* Cuza assumed dictatorial powers, intro-

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[1] For changes of frontiers in 1878 see p. 56.

duced a radical land reform and legislation for the 175
provision of general public instruction. Cuza's reforms were only partly put into practice when a palace revolution, engineered by some of the *boiars*, and by army officers, deposed him and forced him into exile.

CAROL I.[1] The unificaiton of the two principalities was now achieved. It had been accomplished from above, by the same class, greatly strengthened by Rumanized Greeks and others, who for the past centuries had served foreign rulers and exploited the peasantry. It was based on the very real and strong desire of the whole people to live in a State of its own, but the achievement of this aim was completed as a result of international diplomacy and intrigues at home, not by a genuine national revolution.

The rule of Carol I was the period of the consolidation of the new State. He introduced a constitution based on the Belgian model and after fighting the Russo-Turkish War on Russia's side was recognized by the Powers as the first King of Rumania.

During his reign[1] there was considerable progress 175
in economic life assisted by great investments of 669
foreign capital which enriched many landowners, 565
a number of Rumanian capitalists and the corrupt bureaucracy, who together became organized in the Conservative and Liberal Parties: they ruled Rumania between them. In achieving nominal independence Rumania did not succeed in ridding itself of the old social system, resting on the pre-

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[1] Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince of Rumania 1866, King 1881.

[1] [i.e.: King Carol I (1881-1914)-- Analyst]

4

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

175 dominance of a small, wealthy and powerful land-
669 owning class. The situation led in 1907 to one of the
565 bloodiest peasant revolutions of modern times which was put down brutally by General Averescu. Significantly the peasant rising began with pogroms against the Jews who had become very unpopular as the agents of the landowners: it has often been found profitable in Rumania to divert discontent into anti-Semitic channels.

175 In 1913 Rumania joined in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria and thereby gained the whole of the Dobrudja. During the period preceding the outbreak of the last Great War Rumania became an ally of the Central Powers through a secret Alliance made by King Carol I with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883. After the death of Carol and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the Rumanian Government remained neutral, until it entered the Great War on the side of the Allies on 27 August 1916.

GREATER RUMANIA. This decision was taken owing to the territorial gains which Russia and the Western Powers offered as an inducement and which were embodied in another Secret Treaty signed on 17 August, and also to the pro-French feeling of the ruling class. As a result, though swiftly defeated and overrun by the Germans and Bulgarians, Rumania was able, after the war, to satisfy her territorial claims against Hungary and Austria, and the weakness of Soviet Russia enabled her to annex Bessarabia. Thanks, therefore, to her Allies, Rumania emerged from the Peace Settlement doubled in area and in population.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

Before closing this short historical sketch mention must be made of the very remarkable proclamation of King Ferdinand to the troops at the front to whom in April 1917 he promised: 'Land will be given to you.' It is often stated that this promise and the land reform which implemented it was a wise act of statesmanship. It can equally be held that social unrest and dissatisfaction, stimulated by the successful Russian Revolution, had grown to such a degree that it was found necessary to undertake this radical step. 175 ●

Greater Rumania had achieved the unification of the great majority of all Rumanians in one State. But with it the enlarged Kingdom acquired numerous minorities and inherited many grave social problems. The damaging consequences of these are traced in the following chapters. 000

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Oltenia]

135 the Olt, copper near Baia de Arama and salt near Ocnele Mari, north of Govora. The peasant population, 511 in spite of the great agricultural wealth of the 361 province, is extremely poor. The people live in small villages near the rivers. The houses are more often than not almost subterranean mud-huts. Agricultural implements are very primitive. The wooden plough is still widely used.

175 Oltenia was the first district of Rumania which was colonized by the Romans. It formed the spearhead, and later the base, for the Roman penetration of Dacia. Among the most interesting relics of Roman times found in Oltenia are the ruins of a bridge built by Trajan and the fort just outside Turnu-Severin. After the Roman withdrawal Oltenia shared the fortunes of Muntenia,[1] and in 1859 joined the Principality of Rumania.

361 The capital and chief industrial and commercial town of Oltenia is Craiova with a population of about 60,000. It is also the road and rail junction linking Bucarest with Oltenia and the western provinces. Turnu-Severin on the Danube is the important port guarding the famous 'Iron Gates'. Here the current of the Danube, passing through a narrow gorge is too strong and the water too shallow for shipping to [503] make headway upstream. A deep channel has therefore been blasted in the rock of the river bed and vessels are towed up it by locomotives on the railway alongside. Before the Great War Turnu-Severin was the frontier town between Rumania and Austria-Hungary. It has still preserved the character of a picturesque oriental marketing centre.

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[1] Except that in 1718, after the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, Oltenia was temporarily under Austrian rule.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]

[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania. 361

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications 505
in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic 491
is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communica- 496
tions from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja.

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea^R^).[1] Up till 1878 the 175
whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940.

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern 131
corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are 133
in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile

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[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

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12: Kormos S-4.5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Dobrudja]

[Moldavia]

with the rest of Rumania are provided by the line 361
Constanza-Cernavoda-Bucarest.

MOLDAVIA (Moldova^R). The second of the two 131
original Rumanian principalities is only half as big 161
as Wallachia and its population is about half. Moldavia covers an area of about 15,280 square miles, and is inhabited by about 2,500,000 Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Slavs and Germans.

Owing to its geographical position Moldavia was 175
more exposed to Polish, Russian and also Hungarian influence than Wallachia. After the death of the *voivode* Stephen the Great in 1504, the country became part of the Turkish dominions. From then onwards Moldavia shared the fate of Wallachia. Russian influence, however, naturally made itself felt in greater intensity in Moldavia. The independence of the principality was restored under John Cuza who eventually became the first ruler of the United Principalities.

The western boundaries of Moldavia are formed 131
by the Carpathians. In the south the province borders on Muntenia and in the north on the Bukovina, which originally was part of Moldavia. The
eastern frontier is formed by the River Pruth. The 133
western part of Moldavia consists of the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and the hill region below. Farther east the country flattens out into the plains which are bordered by the valley of the Pruth. The most fertile districts lie on the western bank of the Pruth and in the eastern corner of the province. The hills, which reach heights of 1,800 ft., are wooded. But there is much fertile soil which produces wheat and maize. There are also vineyards

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]

[The Banat]

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Another important town, and the greatest Rumanian port on the Danube, is Galati with a population of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

[496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

THE NEW TERRITORIES

131
● 175
[161]
The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after the war of 1914–18 and partly ~~lost~~ since 1940, cover an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131
161
THE BANAT. The Rumanian part of the Banat covers an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures^{R} (Maros^{H}, Marosch^{G}), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Carpathians. The north-western part of the province is

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

The north-western part of the province is 133
the continuation of the Hungarian plain and is very [135]
fertile. To the east and south there are high mountains with rich forests and iron and coal deposits. The mountains of the Banat are forced by the Danube in the area between Bazias and Orsova, cutting a deep narrow valley which, in the Kazan Pass, is only about a hundred yards wide. This is where the Roman emperor Trajan built the second of his bridges over the Lower Danube. This is also one of the most picturesque regions of the Banat and the whole of Rumania,

The Banat has been a strategic and economic 175
outpost of various States and empires. Throughout 635
the times of known history this province was a favourite region for colonization. Romans, Turks, Hungarians and Austrians sought to strengthen the frontiers of their dominions by settling the Banat with peoples on whose loyalty, military and economic abilities they could rely in case of war. In consequence peoples of all races were transplanted to and took root in the Banat. In Roman times the province was fortified in order to protect the settlers who were brought here from all over the empire against the Dacians of Transylvania. During the many Turkish wars the Banat was an important defensive position upon which the Hungarians based their strategy. For over a century and a half, from 1552 to 1718, the Banat was under Turkish rule and went through a period of decay.

Under the Austrian military administration, which lasted up to 1779, the Banat experienced great prosperity. German settlers from the Rhineland and French-speaking peasants from Lorraine were brought to the Banat by the Empress Maria

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Banat]

175 Theresa; in order to strengthen the non-Magyar
635 element the settlement of Serbs and Rumanians was also encouraged. Under the governorship of Count Mercy, a friend of the statesman and warrior Prince Eugene of Savoy, the communications of the Banat were greatly improved. Land was brought under cultivation, mining and other industries were developed and commerce given a new impetus. The chief purpose of this policy was the creation of a strong military outpost of the Austrian Empire. The military frontier region was put under a special administration. All men living in this region were exempt from taxes and dues, were given land of their own but had to perform military duties. In 1779 the Banat, with the exception of the frontier region, was incorporated into Hungary. But after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 the province was again administered by the Austrians and eventually returned to Hungary in 1860. After the Great War the eastern half of the Banat became Rumanian, the western part Yugoslav.

162 About 55% of the population are Rumanians. There is a German colony 225,000 strong. These 'Swabians of the Banat', including descendants of French-speaking Lorrainers who up to half a century ago had preserved all their national characteristics but have now become absorbed by their German neighbours, constitute a very strong economic and national force. They are prosperous farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers. The Hungarians, who form more than 10% of the population, have, up to a few years ago, been in the majority in most towns. There are in the Banat many Jews, Serbs and Bulgarians and also a number of Slovaks.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Crisana]

[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important 361
position. Here there are numerous factories, 438
including mills, railway shops and locomotive works
and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar^H), with
60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the
Northern Crisana.

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first /175
occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and
subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to
Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of
the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable
Rumanian population.

By the same decision the province of Maramures
(Marmaros^H) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited
by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in
1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically /133
Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak /162
province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by
chains of mountains covered with thick forests
whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians,
which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not [496]
easily accessible except by a solitary railway line
which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia.
The small population consists of Ruthenians,
Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is
typical of the medley of races to be found in quite
small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the 313
mountainous nature of the country there is little /135
agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants
is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the
province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold,
copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major 361
town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget^H)
with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Maramures]

[Transylvania]

361 about 20,000 people, lies on the upper reaches of the Tisza; it is the centre from which beautifully hand-woven carpets are exported.

● 175 635 **TRANSYLVANIA** (Ardeal[R], Erdely[H], Siebenbuergen[G]). The citadel of Transylvania, guarded by the high walls of the Carpathians and overlooking the lowlands of the Danube, dominated the map of Greater Rumania during the interval between the two World Wars. The union of Transylvania was the fulfilment of an aspiration which Rumanians had for long wished to realize. But the incorporation of this principality into Greater Rumania brought with it a number of difficult problems which even to-day are far from being solved.

When the Magyars invaded Dacia in the tenth century there was already, according to the Rumanian contention, a substantial Rumanian population in Transylvania which was subjugated by them. Subsequent colonization with Hungarian and German settlers weakened the position of the Rumanians and led many of them to emigrate into the lowlands, south and east of the Carpathians. Transylvania became an autonomous principality within Hungary and was able to maintain its semi-independence even when the Turks advanced to the gates of Vienna. Many Transylvanian princes played a leading part in the long struggle against the Turks, notably those of the Bethlen family. Transylvania under its native Hungarian rulers succeeded in maintaining itself for a long time against both the Austrians and the Turks. But while the consequences of the struggle for independence invariably had to be borne by the majority of the population, economic and

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

political benefits were reaped only by the privileged 175
'nations'—the Hungarian nobles, the Szekelys and 635
the 'Saxons'.

The majority of the Transylvanian Hungarians did not belong to the three ruling 'nations', but, as the nobles depended on their support, they were naturally better off than the Rumanians who were regarded and treated as serfs. The Szekelys, originally free peasants, lost many of their liberties. With the progress of feudal development their position deteriorated steadily and their customs and way of life became similar to those of the mass of non-privileged Hungarians. The 'Saxons', German settlers brought to Transylvania by the Hungarian kings to strengthen the military position of the province, were the third of the ruling 'nations'; they were able to maintain their privileges up to about a hundred years ago. While they often opposed the encroachments upon their rights by the Magyars, the Saxons nevertheless were united with their opponents when it was necessary to prevent the Rumanian majority from obtaining even the most elementary political rights.

From 1526 to 1699 Transylvania was under Turkish suzerainty, but in the latter year, by the Peace of Karlowitz, it was restored to Hungary. From that time until 1848 Transylvania was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. From 1849 till 1860 the principality was administered as one of the lands of the Austrian Crown, but was eventually reunited to Hungary in 1867. By the secret Treaty of 17 August 1917 the Rumanian Government was promised Transylvania and the land as far west as the Tisza by the Allied Powers, as the price of entering the

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

• 175 war on their side. In December 1918, after the
635 collapse of the Dual Monarchy, an assembly of delegates of the Transylvanian Rumanians, meeting in Alba Julia, voted for union with the Rumanian Kingdom, and the province was occupied by Rumanian troops. The incorporation of Transylvania was later recognized and endorsed in the Peace Treaties.

563 *Rumanians.* The Rumanians of Transylvania, who form approximately 60% of the principality's population, are in many respects more advanced than their countrymen in Moldavia and Wallachia. The intensive State policy of Magyarization pursued by Budapest in the nineteenth century led to the strengthening of Rumanian national consciousness. The struggle for economic and political rights, however, never led to anything more than the granting of concessions on paper. From the Rumanian point of view the aims of the Transylvanian Rumanians were fulfilled only with the union of their country with the rest of Rumania in 1918. But, even under the Rumanian regime, the Rumanians of Transylvania were unable to gain economically in twenty years what they were prevented from obtaining during several centuries. Most of them were peasants; some were industrial workers; some became civil servants.

Magyars and Szekelys. The 500,000 Szekelys, inhabiting the eastern part of Transylvania, have still preserved some characteristics which make them distinct from the Hungarians, but politically and economically their position is now very similar to that of the Hungarian population which, in

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Transylvania]

[The Bukovina]

361 peoples of Transylvania. Farther south, on the banks of the Mures, lies Alba Julia, with an old castle, a majestic Gothic church and a chapel in which King Ferdinand was crowned. Sibiu (Hermannstadt^{G}, Nagyszeben^{H}), with a population of 46,000, half of which is German, is an ancient centre of the Transylvanian 'Saxons'. The town is entirely German in character and all the buildings, especially the churches and the market-place, are reminiscent of a little provincial borough in the Middle Ages. Two other places of historical interest are Heltau (Cisnadie^{R}) and Michelsberg (Cisnadoara^{R}), small German villages with peasant-fortresses built in the thirteenth century. The road to the east, along the foot of the South Carpathian wall, leads to Brasov (Brasso^{H}, Kronstadt^{G}), the most important industrial and economic centre of Transylvania. Although the town has a population of only 60,000, there are numerous factories producing iron and steel, machine-tools, armaments, railway equipment, textiles, and other goods.

● 175 635 **THE BUKOVINA** (Buchenland^{G}). The Bukovina forms the northernmost tip of Greater Rumania. This province of dense forests, gentle hills and fertile pastures has had a long and varied history. In Roman times it was part of Dacia and was subsequently overrun by many barbarian tribes. Soon after the establishment of Moldavia, the Bukovina was conquered by the rulers of that principality and annexed by them. For some time both Moldavia and the Bukovina were governed from the Bukovinian town of Suceava. In the following centuries the Bukovina was first under Polish, then Turkish

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[The Bukovina]

rule. It was occupied by the Russians in 1769. In /75
1774 the province was given to Austria, under which 685
it remained until 1918. On 23 October the Austrian
governor handed over the Bukovina to the Ukrainian
inhabitants of the province; but four days later an
assembly of Rumanian Bukovinians declared for the
union of the province with Rumania and asked the
Rumanian government for military assistance. This [131]
was forthcoming on 11 November and added to 162
Rumania a territory of about 4,100 square miles
with a population of about 870,000 (1930). Of these 563
over 38% were Ukrainians, 34% Rumanians and
21% Germans and German-speaking Jews. The
Rumanian administration began by a vigorous
policy of Rumanization. The Ukrainians, who under
Austrian rule had been well treated, and the Jews,
were the chief sufferers, but the Germans, too, were
ousted from many of their positions.[1]

More than half of the Bukovina is covered with /31
dense forests of beech;[2] one-fifth consists of pas- 311
tures; less than a third is arable land. The province /35
borders in the west on the Carpathians, in the south on Moldavia, in the east on Moldavia and Bessarabia and in the north on Poland. The western part of the Bukovina is formed by the slopes of the Carpathians, where manganese and iron ore are found, especially in the region of Jacobeni. To the east stretches the hilly country, covered with pastures, on which good livestock is raised, and fields of maize, wheat and tobacco. Mineral resources are confined to some

small deposits of coal, gold and lead, but the industry of the province is well developed.

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[1] The German University of Czernowitz was completely Rumanized soon after the military occupation.

[2] The German name of the province means 'Land of the Beeches'.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

by the valleys through which flow the tributaries of /33
the Pruth and Dniester. In the south, beginning near Besarabeasca, extends the Budjak steppe which merges into the sandy soils, salt marshes and lagoons of the delta of the Danube and of the Black Sea coast. The climate of Bessarabia is the same as that /32
of the regions east of the Dniester. The summers are very hot and dry, the winters very cold with icy winds and great snowfalls. Nevertheless, crops 311
grow well in Bessarabia and 61 % of the whole area is arable land. The chief products are maize, wheat, tobacco and wine and lately also soya beans. There are few factories and the only source of income for the people, apart from agriculture, is the fishing industry in the south.

The capital of Bessarabia is Kishineff (Chisinau[R]) 361
with a population of over 200,000 (1935). Here are concentrated such industrial enterprises as the province possesses, the most important being flour mills, leather factories and other secondary industries connected with agriculture.

The first colonization of Bessarabia was carried 175
out by the Romans who succeeded in occupying this 635
territory only for a short time. During the great period of migration (seventh to tenth centuries), the province was invaded by a host of tribes. Bessarabia was first occupied by Rumanians in the early fourteenth century and incorporated in Moldavia in 1367. A century and a half later Southern Bessarabia fell to Turkey, but several merchant-colonies were still administered by Genoese and Venetian traders on the Danube delta and the Black Sea coast. In the following centuries Bessarabia was often a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies, who alter-

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

175 635 nated in occupying the province. In 1812 Tsarist Russia annexed the whole of Bessarabia. Three provinces in the south of Bessarabia were returned to Moldavia, which was still under Turkish suzerainty, in 1856; but they were again taken by Russia in 1878 and Rumania received the Dobrudja by way of compensation.

In 1917, after the October Revolution in Russia, an assembly of Bessarabians declared the province to be an autonomous part of the Federation of Socialist Republics and adopted the name of 'Moldavian Democratic Republic'. The Representative Council, however, composed of Rumanian and anti-Bolshevik delegates, frightened by the spread of revolution, appealed to the Rumanian Government for military assistance to deal with revolutionary groups in Bessarabia. This help was forthcoming on condition that the province would eventually join Rumania. As an initial step the 'Independent Moldavian Republic' was proclaimed on 24 January 1918. On 5 March General Averescu declared that the Rumanian troops would be withdrawn within two months. In the meantime his government was conducting peace negotiations with the Central Powers, which had occupied part of the Ukraine and were eager to stem the revolutionary tide. They intimated that they would favour the addition of Bessarabia to the Rumanian Kingdom as compensation for its losses to Austria-Hungary.[1]

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[1] Part of Wallachia was to be ceded to the Dual Monarchy. The Treaty of Bucarest (May 1918) also provided for the demobilization of the Rumanian Army, except two divisions needed for the occupation of Bessarabia.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of 635
Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 dele- 175
gates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers.

During the following years Bessarabia was treated 635
as a conquered province. All district councils and 661
other organs of local government were abolished.
The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and 669
responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages.

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[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 5 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

p 112

CONCLUSION

175 This short survey of the different phases of the long
648 and unhappy history of Rumania and the Rumanians discloses a number of factors which, in one form or another and with varying intensity and effect, have decisively contributed to the damaging result of events both upon the land and upon the people. The Rumanians and their country, more than many other nations and States, have on the whole been rather the passive object than an active subject of history.

This involuntary passivity characterized the very emergence of the Rumanian nation and has not yet been overcome. The first attempts to form the basis of a national existence were frustrated, and postponed for many centuries, ~~owing to~~ the invasion of Europe by the Magyars. When the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were eventually created in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of these two primitive States was chiefly due to the pressure of the Hungarians in Transylvania; it was made possible owing to the decay of the Slavonic States south and west of the Danube. Moldavia and Wallachia during the subsequent centuries were the battle-grounds of Great Powers or were exploited as colonies. The nineteenth century saw the rise of Rumanian nationalism with the aim of the union of all Rumanians in one State. This aspiration was warped and misused by rival empires in order to strengthen their position in South-Eastern Europe. When this union became a reality after the First World War, it was achieved not so

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

much by the Rumanian people as by the intervention /75
of Rumanian and foreign statesmen, whose interests 648
did not coincide with those of the majority of Rumanians. The history of Rumania during the period between the two Great Wars and during the present war is another and more vivid illustration of this passivity of a people, caught in the titanic struggle between Great Powers.

The economic and political effects of this development can be seen in the exploitation to which the people have been subjected for centuries, chiefly by foreign merchants and trusts, aided and abetted by a greedy and corrupt ruling class, and in the almost suicidal situation into which the nation has been manœuvred in recent times by its short-sighted leaders.

Psychologically, many centuries of political op- /81
pression and of economic exploitation have had an even more serious effect in the attitude of many sections of the people to life in general and to their own fate in particular. Generations of Rumanians have been methodically robbed of the fruits of their work for centuries. Their fate was not greatly affected by superficial changes, such as their elevation from serfs to peasants. This explains that they are reluctant to produce more food than they themselves can eat; for it is certain that the money-lender, the tax-collector, their own or some foreign army will take it from them. This fatalism, and the ignorance which their rulers have shown no great enthusiasm to remedy, explain the backwardness of the great masses of the people. But it would be quite wrong to assume that this implies an exhaustion of their latent powers. The Rumanians have often

B 342 233 with straw roofs. They are rarely plastered with mud. In western Sredna Gora, transportable sheep pens are used (Gellert, 1937: 169).

RUMANIA

R 361 •175 177 648 In Rumania there exists a marked difference between settlements in the lowlands and those of the Carpathian Mountain region. While topograpny and the presence or absence of such building materials as stone, wood or clay are important factors, political considerations also played a significant role. With the beginning of the 18th century Greek influence became predominant in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte set up Greek rulers in these principalities, thus in reality the Rumanians were as much under Turkish dominion, although indirectly, as were the people of the Balkans. It was only after the rebellion of 1821 that Rumanian rulers were reinstated. During all periods of unrest and foreign invasion the mountains and forests served as areas of refuge; the Serbian hajduk has his counterpart in the Rumanian heydoick (Stratilesco, 1907: 30-34).

R 361 Location and Types of Settlements. The older settlements were in the nature of hamlets (catŭn). These were generally not built on the top of hills, but rather in depressions, on the edge of forests, R [133] and away from the military roads (Grothe, 1907: 54). In the hilly regions of Oltenia and Moldavia the villages were located close to a river or on the slope of a hill. Farmsteads are generally spaced fairly far apart, in no definite order. Villages may extend over two or three hills facing one another (Stratilesco, 1907: 205). R [491] Villages in the Wallachian plains are located close to the roads. The prevalent type is the road village; buildings are located on either side of the highway which forms the main road of the village. Larger villages may have additional cross-roads (Jänecke, 1918: 7). R [621] While mountain villages average a population of 350, the largest being around 700, villages of the plains average 700 and may reach 2000 (Grothe, 1907: 55).

R 342 House Types. Due to the scarcity of wood and stone in the plains, buildings are generally constructed of wicker and daub, in which technique the Rumanians are masters. The roof is made first, R [335] the walls afterwards. The principle posts are first set into the ground, then the studs of the outer walls and inner partitions are spaced at 1 to 2 foot intervals. After the roof has been formed walls are built up. Mud is kneaded down with the feet, mixed with straw, and shaped into lumps that take the place of bricks. These lumps are then set between the studs and left to dry (Stratilesco, 1907: 208). More often walls are of wickerwork, plastered inside and out with a mixture of mud, straw and cowdung to a thickness of 15-25 centimeters (Jänecke, 1918: 10). The rough walls are smoothed out by applying thinner and thinner layers of mud and cowdung mixture. They are then whitewashed inside and out. Floors of timber are recent; the floor is commonly of tamped earth.

The roof is steeper than in the plains and protrudes further over the house. The support is in the form of a collar. The rafters tend to be too widely spaced, which results in slight bending of the battens; but, while it makes for a weaker roof, this results in softer and more pleasing lines. The four corners are not sharp but tend to be rounded (fig. 62). Wooden shingles are almost exclusively used for roof covering. They are about 15 centimeters wide and may be as long as 3 meters. They overlap two to four times. Shorter shingles form 6-10 rows. The smaller shingles may have their ends in the form of swallow tails or other decorative shapes. The ridge shows a special development. On the windward side the first layer of shingles is made to protrude over the ridgepole (fig. 62). These shingles also have excised patterns and are very ornamental. The ridgepoles may extend slightly over the hip and have a small gabled roof, one shingle in height (fig. 62). This provides an opening for the smoke to escape through. Ornamental poles rise at either end of the ridgepole (fig. 61). 342 [335) [531)

Chimneys are lacking and the smoke may escape through openings at the ridge or otherwise through the roof, which then shows all shades of gray to black. In some areas of Oltenia in southwestern Rumania one finds wooden chimneys (fig. 65). These are made of wicker and daub and are covered with shingles. [354] [184]

A special development in the foothills of the Southern Carpathian Mountains is the privy, which is in the form of an annex located at the end of the veranda (fig. 64b). [184] [514]

In general the buildings in the mountain districts show a greater variation than those of the plains. The woodwork is superior, and shows a great deal of inventiveness. The construction, however, is irregular, sloppy and often not functional. Pillars that carry no weight may be very thick, while those that must support much weight may be much too slender (Jänecke, 1918: 35-43). 342 184 [335)

Kulas (fig. 67) are found only in the mountainous regions of Oltenia in the district of Mehedinti, Gorj and Râmnicu-Vâlcea. They were built by the boyars, the wealthy landowners. The oldest ones come from the period when the Rumanian rulers were paying tribute to the sultan. The ground plan is a square 7 by 12 meters in length. The width of the walls is 30-70 centimeters. The kula (fig. 67) may have three or four stories, each about 2.5 meters in height. Each story has one room. The ground floor is used for storage; sometimes a well is built into it, and occasionally there is a subterranean escape passage. The upper floors may also be used for storage, but are mainly living quarters. Windows are generally found only on one side; the other walls are provided with loopholes. On the top floor there is generally an open veranda (čerdak) about 3 meters wide, the roof over which is supported by pillars (fig. 67). The exposure is toward the valley and the south. On the side opposite the čerdak there is a simple wooden balcony under the eaves (fig. 67). Many kulas have a privy tower attached to them. 342 712 [184] [556] [175] [312) [514)

342 The stairway, about 1.25 meters wide made of massive logs, is
712 generally on the inside of the buildings; when it is located on the
outside it leads onto the wooden balcony. The exterior is white-
washed. In addition, the surface is decorated with molded bands
[531] around each story division. There may also be a vertical division,
thus creating a number of large panels. While these areas are
symmetrical, neither they nor the molded bands that enclose them
have any relation to the placing of windows or pillars (Jänecke,
1918: 62-63).

342 In 1895 there still existed about 55,000 earth huts (bordei)
[175] which were inhabited by the poorest population, generally Gypsies
[563] (fig. 63). They are common in the Danubian plain. Over an excava-
tion 1-3 meters deep is placed a gabled roof. The roof is made of
boards over which earth is laid. Sometimes reeds are placed over
the boards before the earthen cover is added. The entrance is on
one of the gabled sides, generally with a southerly exposure, and
a window is placed on each gable side (Jänecke, 1918: 4).

343 Farm Buildings. In the lowlands the buildings are arranged in
351 no definite order; though generally the house is closest to the road.
The corn-house (coşar) is either opposite to or at right angles to
the house so that it can be watched. The yard and orchard are sur-
rounded by a fence. The simplest fence is made of wickerwork
between wooden poles. More often, however, it is made of boards
[556] that have intricate excised designs (fig. 60). The wealthy people
may add an imposing gateway with a small door. Flower or vegetable
[563] gardens are rare, and the latter are called bulgări, since they are
[244] generally kept by immigrant Bulgarians who grow all the vegetables
for town consumption (Stratilesco, 1907: 233). The farmstead is
[247] surrounded by shady trees, and there is generally a plum orchard at
the back of the farm buildings (Jänecke, 1918: 8-9). [245]

In the mountain regions the arrangement of the buildings in the
[184] yard differs from that of the lowlands. The stables and other
buildings are arranged on the border of the yard in a horseshoe
form to serve as protection for the house. The yard is usually
very small, and has a strong high palisade with a massive gateway,
the whole giving the farm a fortress-like appearance (the author
points to the presence of bears in summer and wolves in winter)
(Jänecke, 1918: 32-35).

343 In the lowlands there are generally not many additional farm
[184] buildings in the yard, and this fact is correlated with the pattern
of building additional annexes to the house, a more economical and
practical procedure. Stables are of the simplest lathwork or
wickerwork, covered with a straw roof. Sheds for the storage of
straw, hay and cornstalks are absent, for the latter are stacked
into tall round piles in the open. The baking oven for summer use,
made of mud and bricks, has a hipped roof supported by four pillars.